



CONFLICT PREVENTION AND DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION IN AFRICA: A POLICY WORKSHOP

Background Paper

CONFLICT-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS: A SURVEY OF ARMED CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1980-2005

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The New School, New York

November 2007

Draft for conference, not for general circulation

The Conflict-Development Nexus: A Survey of Armed Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa 1980-2005

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I. Introduction

Today's global challenge of armed conflict is a problem of sub-Saharan Africa, and a challenge that is inextricably related to the region's poverty. Most of the armed conflicts of recent decades have occurred on that continent, and while the number of wars declined steadily over the 1990s in all other regions of the world, a similar trend in sub-Saharan Africa has been in evidence only since 2002 (Human Security Report Project, 2006). Continued large-scale conflict in several countries, the tenuousness of the peace in others, and the economic, social, and political legacy of decades of violence across the continent pose significant peace, security, and development challenges for the global community. Since 1980, 32 out of 47 countries of this region experienced some 126 wars, and almost 1 million people have died in battle, and millions more have died from related causes or displaced as a consequence.

These conflicts are strongly related to the challenges of poverty, reflecting as the *Human Security Report 2005* noted, "a volatile mix of poverty, crime, unstable and inequitable political institutions, ethnic discrimination, low state capacity and the 'bad neighbourhoods' of other crisis-ridden states—all factors associated with increased risk of armed conflict" (Human Security Project, 2005).

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the nexus of poverty/development and armed conflict in Africa. It starts with a review of conflict trends since 1980, including incidence and characteristics of wars that have taken place over the last 26 years. It then explores two sets of links between conflict and poverty. The first focuses on the consequences of war on development and poverty, examining key social and economic indicators. The second set of links are more complex and concern socio-economic structures as underlying root causes and as incentives that can drive insurgencies and incite popular support for them. This framework builds on recent research that has identified certain socio-economic factors as correlates of war.¹ The

¹ See Background Paper 1: Concept Note.

final section of the paper reviews how these links between conflict and development have been addressed in development policy.

II Trends

Historical trends since 1980

Since 1980, more than half of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa experienced armed conflict, sometimes multiple conflicts taking place simultaneously in different parts of the country involving different parties, sometimes lasting for over decades interspersed with periods of 'peace.' Appendices 1 and 2 chart 126 wars in 32 countries recorded in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. Table 1 lists these wars and their key features. While governments do not collect data on war, over 60 datasets have been created by academics and NGOs to monitor regional and global trends. The armed conflict dataset maintained by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), is increasingly used in research and policy work because it is comprehensive, is updated annually, and its methodology is considered rigorous. (See Appendix 3 on datasets.) The wars included in Table 1 include only wars in which the state is a party to conflict, and where at least 25 battle deaths have occurred. These criteria in the definition of war used in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset are common elements of the conventional definition of war used in many other datasets. However, to capture the full range of wars and the magnitude of casualties, we need to look at armed conflicts that do not involve states as well as at the casualties of conflict that occur off of the battle field. These issues will be addressed in later sections of this paper.

The conflicts listed in Table 1 include six conflicts between states (Ethiopia/Eritrea, Burkina Faso/Mali, Cameroon/Nigeria, Chad/Libya, Chad/Nigeria, and Ethiopia/Somalia), but the majority (120) of sub-Saharan armed conflicts have been intrastate conflicts. Many are decades-long civil wars that were interspersed with repeated attempts at settlement and often involving multiple warring factions pursuing different goals (Angola, Burundi, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Senegal, and Uganda). There have also been 21 intrastate conflicts of two years or less in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, and Togo. Most of the conflicts designated as 'minor wars' are such armed conflicts of short duration.

The driving claims for these conflicts have varied. The majority of conflicts have been driven by attempts to replace the central government or change its composition (Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, DRC, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, and Uganda). Other conflicts involve challenges to the status of a territory. These territorial incompatibilities may be interstate disputes over which country controls a territory (see the list of interstate wars above) or intrastate conflicts involving challenges from secessionist groups seeking autonomy for a territory (Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal). Some countries have endured more than one conflict in the period 1980-2005, each characterized by a different incompatibility (Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Sudan). (Gleditsch and others, 2002; Harbom and Högbladh, 2006)

Many of these wars have spilled across national boundaries, as instability in one country causes political tensions to rise in neighbouring countries. As different groups have supported rival warring parties in neighbouring countries, they have developed into sub-regional conflicts. In particular, they include conflicts in: the Great Lakes (Rwanda, Burundi, DRC); Southern Africa (Mozambique, Angola, DRC); Mano-River Basin (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea); and in Central East Africa (Sudan, Chad, Uganda, Central African Republic).

Table 1: Major Periods of Armed Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Country, 1980-2005

Major Conflict >1,000 Battle Deaths	Dates	Battle Deaths	Date of Peace Accord
Angola	1975*-2004	126466	2002/04/04
Burundi	1991-2005	8555	2003/11/16
Chad	1965*-2005	43085	2005/08/18
Congo (Brazzaville)	1993-2002	9791	1999/12/29
Democratic Rep. of Congo	1996-2001	149000	2003/04/02
Eritrea	1998-2000	50391	2000/12/12
Ethiopia	1976*-1991 and 1996-2005	157440	2000/12/12 (with Eritrea)
Guinea-Bissau	1998-1999	1850	1998/11/01
Liberia	1989-2003	12684	2003/08/18
Mozambique	1977*-1992	109000	1992/10/04
Rwanda	1990-2002	9759	1993/08/04
Sierra Leone	1991-2000	12997	2000/11/10
Somalia	1981-2005	67014	1997/12/22
South Africa	1966*-1988	26777	Nd
Sudan	1983-2005	61528	2005/01/09
Uganda	1977*-2005	118275	2002/12/24
Minor Armed Conflict >25 and < 999 Battle Deaths			
Burkina Faso	1985 and 1987	200	Nd
Cameroon	1984 and 1996	600	Nd
Central African Republic	2001-2002	219	Nd
Comoros	1989 and 1997	83	2003/12/20
Cote d'Ivoire	2002-2004	1200	2005/04/06
Djibouti	1991-1994	540	2001/05/12
Gambia	1981	650	Nd
Ghana	1981 and 1983	76	Nd
Guinea	2000-2001	1100	Nd
Kenya	1982	318	Nd
Lesotho	1998	114	Nd
Mali	1990-1994	300	1992/04/11
Niger	1992-1997	489	1995/04/15
Nigeria	2004	552	Nd
Senegal	1990-2003	1644	2004/12/30
Togo	1986 and 1991	55	Nd

* Onset of the armed conflict was before 1980.

Armed Conflict: A contested incompatibility that concerns the government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of the state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.

Sources: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset: Codebook--Version 4-2006, UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset Version 1.0 1989-2005.

This historical record of 26 years shows a general rise in the number of wars in the 1990s. But from 2002 to 2005, armed conflicts involving the state as one of the warring parties declined from 14 to six (Burundi, Chad, two conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan)². In 1999 the number of battle deaths³ from state-based armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa was 100,800 (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005). From 2002 to 2005 battle deaths dropped from 8,200 to 2,400 (Lavina and Gleditsch, 2005; Human Security Center, 2006). But this trend should be treated with caution because it covers only four years, and because many of the political conflicts underlying the wars remain unresolved. Moreover, these data omit wars that do not involve the state—“non-state wars.”

Non-state wars

The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Version 4-2006), defines armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns the government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of the state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” per year. The UCDP definition—as is conventional in studies of war—excludes non-state violence between groups, state sponsored violence against unarmed civilians, and acts of terrorism. To be counted in the dataset, opposition groups must be “formally organized” and battle-related deaths incurred only during “contested combat,” not as a result of spontaneous violence (Harbom and Högbladh, 2007: 4-5).

The state is a party to much violent conflict but this is not always the case in the recent wars of Africa. Violence is often initiated by organized political groups, militias, or terrorist organizations as they pursue social, political, and/or economic ends. Rival ethnic groups or criminal enterprises may engage in armed conflict that does not involve a state actor. In some cases (Angola, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone) private military firms fight as surrogates for the state (Singer, 2003).

A definition that is state-centered misses much modern intrastate warfare, as is the case when central authority collapses and power devolves to regional or tribal governing entities. State-centered definitions also fail to consider armed communal violence that occurs without government involvement, at the periphery of a still functioning state. In sub-Saharan Africa, non-state conflicts fought between militias, rival guerrilla groups, clans, warlords, and/or organized communal groups have in recent years become more numerous than state-based conflicts as shown in Table 2 (Human Security Center, 2006).

² In the reports of the Human Security Report Project, Sudan is included in the Middle East region but here is added to sub-Saharan Africa’s totals.

³ Estimates of battle-deaths are difficult to make and are often contested. The World Health Organization reports war fatalities that are several magnitudes larger than the Lacina and Gleditsch figures. The collection and coding methodology used in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset undercounts deaths and the data is best used to track trends. To arrive at the estimates in their reports, the Human Security Report Project refers to Lacina and Gleditsch figures but then imposes a slightly different methodology to arrive at the estimates in their reports. (Human Security Report Project, 2005 and 2006).

Table 2: In Sub-Saharan Africa, non-state armed conflicts are now more numerous than ones involving the state as a warring party.

	2002	2005
State based armed conflicts	14	6
Non-state armed conflicts	24	14

Source: Human Security Report Project, 2006

These non-state wars may be asymmetric or “low intensity” in their conduct with organized, non-state groups employing unconventional weapons and tactics without regard for traditional political or military codes of conduct (Krug and others, 2002). The UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset tracks conflicts fought between organized non-state groups that result in 25 or more battle-deaths per year.⁴ In the four years 2002-2005, three-quarters of all such non-state conflicts took place in sub-Saharan Africa with the majority of those centered in just two states, Nigeria (17 non-state conflicts) and Somalia (25) (Table 3). During this time four countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, and Madagascar, although nominally at peace without state involvement in armed conflict, none-the-less experienced armed violence within their borders between non-state combatants. In the DRC almost 5300 fatalities resulted from six non-state conflicts. The violence of non-state conflict compares to that of state-based conflict and may sometimes surpass it. In Nigeria, 17 non-state conflicts resulted in approximately six times the fatalities as two state-based armed conflicts in that same period.

Table 3: Comparison of State-Based and Non-State Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa 2002-2005 (> 25 battle deaths per year)

Countries with Non-State Based Armed Conflict	Number of Conflicts Between Non-state Warring Parties	Fatalities Non-State Conflicts	Number of State-Based Conflicts	Fatalities State-based Conflicts
Burundi	1	97	2	2440
Cote d'Ivoire	4	583	2	1200
Democratic Rep. of Congo	6	5298	0	0
Ethiopia	8	517	3	2210
Ghana	1	36	0	0
Kenya	1	68	0	0
Madagascar	1	79	0	0
Nigeria	17	3050	2	552
Somalia	25	1944	1	--
Sudan	7	688	4	8028
Sudan, Uganda	1	142	--	--
Uganda	5	332	3	6225
Total Sub-Saharan Africa	77	12834	17	20,655
Total Global Non-State Conflict	101	17832	--	--

Source: UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v. 4.1

⁴ Definition per UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v. 4.1: “A non-state conflict is the use of armed force between two organized groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”

Casualties

The human toll from the 126 wars listed in Table 1 amount to one million battlefield deaths. If the definition of war-related deaths were expanded beyond deaths in battle to include civilian deaths, the magnitude of war and its human costs would be substantially increased. In their Battle Deaths Dataset, Lacina and Gelditsch use a broader definition of battle deaths than the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. The Lacina/Gleditsch definition includes both soldiers who die in combat as well as civilians killed in the crossfire of battle, but they distinguish these deaths from the more encompassing term “war deaths.” War deaths include assaults on civilians that take place before and after battle throughout areas that are contested, civilian deaths that may occur as a result of disease and famine provoked by war, and deaths due to criminal and unorganized violence that may erupt in the aftermath of war. (2005) This distinction between battle deaths and war deaths yields substantially different assessments of the tolls of conflict. Lacina and Gleditsch found wide variations between estimates of battle deaths and war deaths in ten sub-Saharan conflicts. In Sudan, for example, between 1983 and 2002 total war deaths were estimated at two million; total battle deaths at 55,000 or three percent of total war deaths (Table 3).

Table 3: Battle deaths are a small part of total war deaths: Deaths in Selected Conflicts in Africa

Country	Years	Estimates of total war deaths	Battle deaths	Percentage battle dead
Angola	1975-2002	1.5 million	160,475	11%
Ethiopia (not inc. Eritrean insurgency)	1976-1991	1-2 million	16,000	< 2%
Mozambique	1976-1992	500,000 to 1 million	145,400	15-29%
Somalia	1981-1996	250,000-350,000 (to mid-1990s)	66,750	19-27%
Sudan	1983-2002	2 million	55,500	3%
Liberia	1989-1996	150,000-200,000	23,500	12-16%
Dem. Rep. of Congo	1998-2001	2.5 million	145,000	6%

Source: Lacina and Gelditsch, 2005: 159

These battle-death estimates do not include state-sponsored violence against unarmed civilians, such as the Rwandan genocide in which 800,000 people perished, and communal violence between non-state groups, such as the 1994-1995 ethnic violence of Northern Ghana that saw as many as 15,000 fatalities (Jönsson, 2007). It also excludes the depredations of militias on unarmed men, women, and children that have characterized much of the violence in Sierra Leone and Angola among other countries. Many additional non-combatants have died in war-torn countries of sub-Saharan Africa of malnutrition and disease in the complex emergencies that result from armed conflict. For example, between August 1998 and April 2004 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, an estimated 3.9 million people died from all conflict-related causes of mortality (Coghlan and others, 2006).

In addition to death and injury, the results of armed violence may include massive displacement of populations and loss of communities, the disruption of agriculture and food security, and the destruction of vital infrastructure essential to people’s health and economic wellbeing. Rape,

deliberate mutilation, the forced conscription of children, and the use of landmines are regular features of armed conflict that exact long-term costs and inhibit recovery from war. The overall legacy of violence constrains post-conflict reconciliation and political accommodation. Violent armed conflict ignites humanitarian crisis and disrupts human security in all its personal, economic, and political dimensions. (World Health Organization, 2002; Collier and others, 2003; Human Security Report Project, 2006)

Armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa has caused massive dislocation of people from their homes, livelihoods, and communities. Appendix 4 summarizes available data on such displacements. In each year 1980-2005, armed conflict has forced on average 4,164,911 Africans to flee their countries, with total refugee populations ranging from 2,718,042 in 1982 to 6,666,430 in 1994 (UNHCR, 2007). In 1993, 14 percent of Burundi's people fled the war in that country; in 1994 approximately 40 percent of Rwanda's population became war refugees; and in 2004 over two percent (732,000) of Sudan's 29.5 million people were refugees. Estimates of internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have not crossed an international border have ranged from 300,000 in the 1993-2002 Congo-Brazzaville conflict to 1.6 million in Uganda in 2005, and 7.4 million in Sudan in 2005 (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2007). Large-scale forced migration not only increases mortality and morbidity but also contributes to regional instability, environmental degradation, and loss of economic productivity.

Typology of wars

Modern armed conflict frequently blurs conceptual distinctions traditionally used to define war. Mary Kaldor has identified "new wars" that are motivated by both political and private economic objectives, that commingle state and non-state actors with local and external allies, and that involve violence perpetrated against unarmed civilians by state armies, non-state militias, and organized criminal networks (2007). She notes that "although most of these wars are localized, they involve a myriad of transnational connections so that the distinction between internal and external, between aggression (attacks from abroad) and repression (attacks from inside the country), or even between local and global, are difficult to sustain" (2007: 2).

As with definitions, typologies of war that have been developed and used by scholars have been state-centered. For example, the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset identifies four types of conflict that distinguish between those that involve external actors from those that are internal: *extrasystemic* armed conflict between a state and a nonstate groups outside its own territory; *interstate* armed conflict between two or more states; *internal* armed conflicts between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups; and *internationalized internal* armed conflict between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups with intervention from other states (Harbom and Högbladh, 2007). Similarly, the Political Instability Task Force distinguishes among types of conflict by the motivation to take action against the state: *revolutionary wars* where politically organized groups attempt to seize governmental power over the country as a whole or in specific regions; *ethnic wars* where ethnic, religious, or other communal groups seek changes in their status including independence or regional autonomy; *adverse regime changes* where the state collapses as a consequence of shifts in patterns of governance (e.g. from democratic to authoritarian); and *genocides and politicides* where the state seeks total or near-total physical extermination of a group that is

targeted either for reasons of race, ethnicity, religion, and/or political conviction, conducted with the implied consent if not explicit complicity of governing elites (Marshall and others, 2001).

In contrast, Kalyvas proposes a definition of civil war that avoids the dichotomy of state/nonstate involvement: “Civil war can be defined as armed combat taking place within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (Kalyvas, 2007: 417). He examines whether there is military asymmetry between the opposing forces, causing the weaker party to refuse to confront the stronger directly. In this analysis intrastate wars may originate from the core through an implosion of central government, or from the periphery through challenges to the central state, or may involve both processes. Based upon these processes he identifies three types of civil war:

- Conventional civil wars involving splits within an existing army or attempts by organized rebels to secede.
- Irregular civil wars that emerge incrementally and often slowly from the periphery and involve rebels in state-building. Because of the asymmetry in forces, rebels avoid direct confrontation across clear frontlines of battle but instead engage in guerrilla tactics;
- Symmetric non-conventional civil wars “fought on both sides by irregular armies following the disintegration of the state and its replacement by rival militias.” Because of the symmetry in forces there are frontlines (roadblocks/checkpoints) but there are also incursions across frontlines by roving militias that plunder and kill in enemy territory. (Kalyvas, 2007: 428-429)

This provides a useful framework for analysis of armed conflicts in the 32 countries. While few are of the first type, most of the others fall in either second or third category.

III Consequences of armed conflict on poverty and development

The human and long-term developmental costs and the mechanisms by which this occurs have been well documented⁵. However, the consequences of armed conflict on development are far from simple; the costs not only vary from one country to another, but are also uneven within countries. Within a given country the entire population does not always suffer the cost of war equally, and in the aggregate, the economy does not always falter. In fact, although wars almost invariably destroy life, infrastructure, institutions, and natural resources, countries can achieve improvements in GDP, life expectancy, and other social indicators during periods of conflict. Armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa demonstrate the diverse effects that conflicts may have on development. They also highlight the need to examine each facet of development both on its own and with others, and to disaggregate analysis within national aggregates. This section reviews the course of development in the 32 conflict-affected countries since 1980 both during and after periods of war, focusing on key economic and social outcomes.

Developmental consequences

Civil war has been called “development in reverse” (Collier et al, 2003: 13). It diverts resources away from productive economic activities and from public expenditures for social goods that advance development. They incur direct human and longer term developmental costs through loss of household assets, destruction of infrastructure essential for both human wellbeing and for

⁵ See for example Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2001 which documents the multi-country study undertaken as a UNWIDER project on the socio-economic consequences of war. See also Collier and others, 2003

successful agriculture and commerce, and loss of confidence in institutions leading to lawlessness and capital flight. Collier and others (2003) project that incomes would be 15 percent lower and absolute poverty rates 30 percent higher on average following a typical seven-year civil war than if the war had not occurred. Furthermore, armed conflict's legacy of social and economic decline is lasting. Post-conflict military spending rarely returns to pre-war levels, uncertainty regarding the risk of future conflict inhibits capital repatriation and foreign direct investment, and the loss of social capital and human capacity endures for a generation or more.

How did the 126 wars in 32 countries affect development? Figures 1 – 4 show the evolution of economic output (GDP) and human survival (Under-5 Mortality Rate – U5MR) during war years. They show a precipitous economic decline in Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, Eritrea, Burundi, Djibouti, Mozambique, and several other countries. But only nine of the 22 countries for which data are available show GDP that was lower at the end of the war than at its onset. For 13 other countries, GDP was higher at the end of the war. For some, such as Angola and Rwanda, there were dramatic declines at the height of the fighting followed by recovery. But several countries sustained GDP growth while fighting continued, such as in Sudan, Chad, Senegal, Ethiopia, and Niger.

While these findings would reflect some data error, especially as statistical services are undermined by war, a number of important examples illustrate that war does not always lead to decline in national development. Sudan, Uganda, and Chad are three countries that have experienced some of the most serious armed conflicts in the region while simultaneously enjoying growth and improvement in the national economy.

Sudan gained its independence in 1956 and since then, has endured four military coups and near constant conflict which has left more than 60,000 dead, and in 2004 caused nearly 70,000 refugees to flee across the border to Chad and, in 2005, nearly 7.4 million to be internally displaced. Oil, however, was discovered in the 1970s and is currently the largest source of government revenue (African Development Bank/African Development Fund, 2006). In Chad rich oil reserves have similarly bolstered GDP despite the constant conflict of the past two decades. With the discovery of oil, both Sudan and Chad have enjoyed growing GDP even as there has been ongoing conflict within their borders. Chad has seen improvement in access to clean water, which rose from 19 percent in 1990 to 42 percent in 2004, and has also seen an almost 50 percent increase in primary school enrolment from 34.7 percent in 1991 to 61 percent in 2003.

Conflict between the government and the Lord's Resistance Army in the north of Uganda has forced the displacement of 90 percent of the northern population (World Health Organization). And in Guinea, the rebel group *Rassemblement des forces démocratique de Guinée* (RFDG) launched a rebellion in the south and southeastern parts. Yet successful policies and international assistance (in the case of Uganda) and foreign assistance and a profitable mining industry (in the case of Guinea) have helped to improve GDP while masking these conflicts.

Figure 1: GDP decreases* during conflicts 1970-2005 (in constant 2000 US dollars)
 excluding conflicts of one year
 Source: World Development Indicators




Figure 2: GDP increases* during conflicts 1970-2005 (in constant 2000 US dollars)^
 (excluding conflicts of one year**)
 Source: World Development Indicators





Figure 3: Under-five mortality rate decreases* during conflict 1970-2005

(excluding conflicts with one or less data point recorded during conflict)

Source: World Development Indicators




*defined by under-five mortality rate being lower at last year of conflict (or closest data point, taken at five year increments) as compared with beginning of conflict

- Angola (1974-2004)
- Ethiopia1 (1976-1991)
- Sierra Leone (1991-2000)
- Uganda (1981-2005)
- Burundi (1991-2005)
- Ethiopia2 (1996-2005)
- Somalia (1981-2005)
- Congo, Rep. (1993-2002)
- Liberia (1989-2003)
- South Africa1 (1980-1988)
- Senegal (1990-2003)
- Sudan (1983-2005)
- Chad (1965-2005)

Figure 4: Under-five mortality rate increases* during conflict 1970-2005

Source: World Development Indicators



*defined by under-five mortality rate being lower at first year of conflict (or closest data point, taken at five year increments) as compared with end of conflict

- Mozambique (1977-1992)
- Rwanda (1990-2002)

Distributional impact of conflict

Even as economic and social indicators may register improvements at the aggregate national level, disaggregated data reveals that the costs of conflict may be concentrated in certain regions. During its conflict, Uganda saw its HDI improve from .411 in 1990 to .502 in 2004. Childhood immunization rose from 45 percent in 1990 to 87 percent in 2004, and access to clean water improved from 44 percent in 1990 to 60 percent in 2004. Yet these national numbers severely misrepresent the regional inequalities resulting from the conflict between the government and the LRA. Between 2002-03 and 2005-06, Uganda's national poverty rate fell from 38.8 percent to 31.1 percent, while northern Uganda's comparatively high poverty level fell from 63 percent to 60.7 percent (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2006: 60). In addition, the under-five mortality rate remains three to four times higher in the northern conflict areas than in the non-conflict areas (World Health Organization, 2005: 15) and the adult literacy rate, which stands at 77 percent in central Uganda, is a mere 47 percent in northern Uganda (United Nations Girls' Education Initiative, 2007).

In Guinea, a rebellion launched in the south and southeastern parts of the country in 2000, concluded in 2001. There was little negative effect on most economic and social indicators during the two years of conflict. (Guinea, 2002). Overall damage to the economy may have been limited because most of the violence took place in the border areas with Liberia and Sierra Leone, regions which are among the poorest in the country (World Bank Country Assistance Strategy, 2003).

Conditions in Somalia since 1991 have been better in the northern areas of Somaliland and Puntland due to the absence of armed conflict and the presence of functional administrative entities in those nominally independent regions. In Somaliland and Puntland, the governments have invested in road and port rehabilitation, while the roads, seaport, and airport of the south are rapidly deteriorating (Human Development Report, 2001). Access to humanitarian aid organizations in the south has also been restricted by the unpredictable security climate, the state has collapsed, and many have been forced to turn to private providers for education, healthcare, and access to clean water, services often unaffordable to the poorest. As a result, there are marked north/south disparities in infrastructure. The relatively peaceful and stable northwest has the best indicators, while the northeast fares second best. The war-torn south and central regions fare the poorest.

Due to its geographical isolation from the rest of Senegal, the Casamance region, which has been the site of protracted civil war, has maintained its own distinct language and culture and has been relatively neglected as a development priority. Casamance has been and remains the poorest area of the country. The Kolda region, which contains most of the landmass of the Casamance, is also the poorest region in Senegal. According to the 2002 government Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), Kolda is the region with the highest infant mortality rate in Senegal and the greatest percentage (57 percent) of people below the poverty line. Ziguinchor, Casamance's other region, has the second highest percentage of people in the nation below the poverty line (54 percent).

IV Structural conditions and war risks

Research on armed conflicts has traditionally examined historical and political factors to explain why wars emerge, persist, recur, or end. However, in response to the increasing concentration of civil wars in poor countries, new research in the 1990s began to focus on socio-economic conditions that are associated with the frequent occurrence of war. This rich and diverse literature of cross-country statistical analyses and qualitative studies identified a series of social and economic conditions that may exist in a country and that appear to favour the emergence of armed conflict. These findings point to socio-economic factors that raise risks of conflict. This literature and their policy implications are presented more fully in Background Paper 1, the *Concept Paper* of this project. (Fukuda-Parr and Picciotto, 2007). The purpose of this section is to consider the relevance of each of the identified risk factors in the 32 countries surveyed in this paper.

The risk factors identified include the following structural conditions:

- Chronic poverty and economic stagnation (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002);
- Overdependence on and poor governance of natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002);
- Horizontal inequality or group exclusion from social, economic and political power and opportunities (Stewart, 2002, 2004);
- Demographic structures - Youth bulge and unemployment (Cincotta, 2003);
- Environmental pressures related to migration (Homer Dixon, 1991);
- History of conflict (Collier and others, 2003).

Chronic poverty All of the 32 countries that experienced armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa are among the world's poorest countries with largest proportions of their population surviving in extreme poverty. They are all low income countries with 2005 per capita GDP ranging from \$91 to \$997, and 1980 per capita income ranging from \$135 to \$958, and with HDI in 2004 ranging from 0.311 to 0.532. The annual proportion of people surviving in extreme poverty measured by the international threshold of \$1 a day (PPP) ranges from 15 percent to 78 percent for the 21 countries for which estimates are available from 1996-2005. In this respect, these 32 countries are no different from the other 12 countries of the region that remained conflict-free but are also poor.

A more interesting question is whether there were economic decline and general worsening of poverty during the years immediately prior to the onset of war. Often, historical accounts of civil war attribute serious economic mismanagement and misrule by the ruling regime as one of the causes of an insurgency, such as in DRC, Liberia or Sierra Leone. Economic decline prior to the onset of war was registered in 13 of the 32 countries, where per capita income was lower at the onset of war than 5 years previously (Figure 5); and for 9 of these, GDP growth averaged less than -1% annually over that period. But this was not a generalized pattern; in 13 countries for which data are available, per capita GDP was higher at the onset of the war than 5 years previously (Figure 6), and average annual growth rate was over 1%. Under-5 Mortality rates were also improving during the years preceding the war for most countries. (Appendix 5)

Figure 5 Per Capita GDP declines 5 years prior to onset of armed conflict





Figure 6: Per Capita GDP increases during 5th years before onset of armed conflict



Overdependence on natural resources Several of the 32 countries are highly dependent on natural resource exports; such as Angola, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria where primary commodity exports exceed 15 percent as a share of GDP. If oil is included, Angola, Nigeria, and the Congo are also highly resource dependent. However, the majority of the 32 countries are not so highly dependent on primary commodity exports. The highest risk of conflict has been identified as when primary commodities are about a 32% share of GDP (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). In 2000 Cote d'Ivoire's share of primary commodities to GDP was 31.6 percent and two years later war broke out (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002).

Overdependence on minerals can be a risk factor in two ways. The first is that groups take up arms to seek control of a country's natural resources. These resources may be poorly governed and the elite may control the resources in such a way that the benefits accrue only to themselves, with little directed toward financing development that would benefit the population as a whole. The second is that once war starts, control of mineral resources becomes a lifeline for the warring parties. In Sierra Leone during the civil war that took place from 1991-2000, RUF rebels were able to finance their insurgency through profits from the diamond trade. In Angola's civil war, which raged from 1975-2002, both the government and rebels sustained themselves by exploiting natural resource wealth (Gamba and Cornwell 2000). The UNITA⁶ rebel group did so with diamonds and the MPLA-led⁷ government did so with oil. In the civil war of Cote d'Ivoire, a country with high dependence on natural resources, with primary commodity exports reaching 32 percent of GDP in 2000, the role of natural resources in sustaining violence is more ambiguous. In addition to the examples listed above it is clear that over control natural resources has been a factor in the conflicts in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta.

Horizontal inequalities. The idea that stark inequality would lead to resentment and uprising is intuitively appealing. But research has not found empirical evidence of armed war occurring more frequently where vertical inequalities are high. On the other hand, there is more evidence associating horizontal inequality—inequality between groups with ethnic, religious, or linguistic ties—with conflict. Grievance over historical exclusion from economic, social, and political opportunities and power provides incentives to insurgency, and the use of group loyalty and identity can be powerful means to mobilization. These disparities provide explanations for ethnic wars that go beyond historic enmity between groups.

Horizontal inequality is present in virtually all countries of sub-Saharan Africa, which are characterized by the multiplicity of identity groups that compose their populations, and a historical legacy of unequal political and economic power between them. Ethnic and other identity differences have shaped political formations, and differentials in political power, economic opportunities, and social prestige have been historic sources of political tension. These inequalities may be reflected in economic and social indicators such as disparities in income, educational attainment, and access to high-level employment positions, as well as in political indicators such as representation in the government, legislature, military, and other institutions of

⁶ National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

⁷ Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA).

the state. Available data consistently show sharp disparities. For example, in Namibia, HDI was estimated for six linguistic groups and ranged from a high of 0.960 for German speakers to a low of 0.326 for San speakers. Disparities are sharp not only between racial groups but also among Namibia's African populations; HDI for Oshiwambo speakers is 0.641, twice the index for the San speakers. (UNDP, 2004)

However, such data are not consistently available, and most statistical services do not collect data on key social and economic indicators disaggregated along cultural identity lines. While it is not possible to draw on such direct measures based on objective indicators from official data sources, this survey reviewed two efforts that have been made in the policy research community to set up data bases and assess the extent of horizontal inequalities that are politically salient in the context of their potential for armed conflict. The first is the Minorities at Risk Project,⁸ a research project at the University of Maryland that maintains a unique and extensive database of group-based discrimination and potential for armed political conflict, tracking some 284 politically active ethno-political groups. (Minorities at Risk Project, 2007) The second is the Failed State Index, developed by The Fund For Peace that collaborates with the publication *Foreign Policy* to provide 'an early warning and assessment of societies at risk of internal conflict and state collapse' (The Fund For Peace, 2007). Appendix 6 summarizes relevant data from these two databases.

The Minorities at Risk Project's Aggregate Differential Index (ADI) is a composite of 18 cultural, political, and economic indicators that rate differential treatment based on group identity. To be included in the database, groups⁹ must collectively suffer, or benefit from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups within a society" (Minorities at Risk, 2005a: 5). Scores are available for 26 of the 32 countries; Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, Liberia, Mali, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda score particularly high, above 10, on a scale where the maximum possible score is 18.

The Failed State Index¹⁰ uses a composite of 12 sub-indicators to group countries into four categories: "alert," "warning," "moderate," and "sustainable." Among the 12 sub-indicators are a measure of horizontal inequality: Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines¹¹; and two

⁸ An independent research-based project based at the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Founded in 1986 by Ted Gurr, its current director is Christian Davenport.

⁹ Indicators include: cultural indicators related to language, historical origin, ethnicity, religion; political indicators related to presence in official positions, access to power, voting rights, access to civil service; and economic indicators related to income, ownership of land/property, presence in commerce. Differentials are coded from 'advantaged' to 'no difference' to 'substantial' or 'extreme' difference. (Minorities at Risk 2005a, 2007)

¹⁰ The Failed State Index uses software to index and scan tens of thousands of open-source articles and reports. The data is electronically gathered using a data-collection system that includes international and local media reports and other public documents, including U.S. State Department reports, independent studies, and corporate financial filings. The software calculates the number of positive and negative "hits" for the 12 indicators. Internal and external experts then review the scores as well as the articles themselves, when necessary, to confirm the scores and ensure accuracy. For more information regarding the methodology used to calculate the Failed State Index visit <www.fundforpeace.org>.

¹¹ According to the Failed State Index 2007, the Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines is defined as: group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and economic status; group-based impoverishment as measured by poverty levels, infant mortality rates, education levels; and rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group inequalities.

others which indicate the level of political mobilization: Uneven Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia¹²; and Rise of Factionalized Elites¹³. Most of the 32 countries score high on uneven economic development; 22 of them are at the 'warning' level while nine others (Comoros, Angola, Djibouti, Eritrea, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Senegal) fall just below the cutoff. Three of these countries (Ghana, Mali, and Senegal) show low scores in political mobilization (rise of factionalized elites), but the political salience of group inequalities is evident in all the countries according to this index.

While these databases confirm the presence of group exclusion and their political activation, they do not show whether this was a factor that drove past wars. Academic and policy literature that examines the causes of wars in 32 countries identify horizontal inequality or group exclusion as a factor in several. These include Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, DRC, Congo Republic, Ethiopia, Liberia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Senegal, Togo, Nigeria, and Ghana. But group exclusion does not appear to have been a major factor in many other countries such as Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Somalia, Cameroon, and Guinea Bissau.

The war in the southern Casamance region of Senegal is a clear example of horizontal inequalities being a trigger factor for violent conflict. The Casamance region is primarily, though not exclusively, inhabited by the Diola ethnic group¹⁴, who are separated from the rest of the country geographically by The Gambia, culturally and religiously by their Christian and Animist beliefs in a country dominated by Islam, linguistically by their unique language, and economically, with the Casamance having the highest percentage of population living below the poverty line and the highest infant mortality rate in all of Senegal¹⁵. The main rebel group in the Casamance, the MFDC¹⁶, has had no shortage of recruits, as inhabitants of the region hold widespread grievances for their socio-economic exclusion against the central government. This gives the rebels the ideological basis they need to garner popular support, find sanctuary, and recruit eager bodies necessary to sustain their insurgency.

¹² According to the Failed State Index 2007, the Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia is defined as: history of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries; patterns of atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups; specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression; institutionalized political exclusion; and public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of "hate" radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric.

¹³ According to the Failed State Index 2007, the Rise of Factionalized Elites is defined as: fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines; and use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism, (e.g., a "greater Serbia") or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith").

¹⁴ According to many analyses of the conflict in Senegal inequality plays a large role in the violence in the Casamance, but since the region is inhabited by various ethnic groups fighting together against the state as opposed to just one ethnic group, it is not ranked among the worst performers in terms of the three relevant indicators in the Failed State Index.

¹⁵ The Kolda region, which contains most of the landmass of the Casamance, is also the poorest region in Senegal. According to the 2002 government PRSP Kolda had the highest infant mortality rate in Senegal and the highest level (57 percent) of a regional population below the poverty line. Ziguinchor, the other region of the Casamance, was the second highest nationally at 54 percent below the poverty line.

¹⁶ *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance* (MFDC).

Other groups and countries in which horizontal inequalities play, or have played, a central role in sustaining major armed conflicts are with northerners in the Central African Republic, southern Christians in Chad, northern ethnic groups in Congo (Brazzaville), northern Muslims and immigrants (or non-*Ivorité*) in Cote d'Ivoire, the Afar ethnic group of Djibouti, the Afar and Somali liberation movements of Ethiopia, Americo-Liberians in Liberia, the Tuareg people of Northern Mali, Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi, Darfur Black Muslims and southern Christian/Animists of Sudan, the Ewe in Togo, and northerners in Uganda.

In several other countries horizontal inequalities play a role in the persistence of low level violence. The Niger Delta region in Nigeria is another example. It is clear that there is social and economic exclusion felt by certain ethnic groups in the region, most notably the Ijaw and Ogoni (Minorities at Risk, 2007). Oil revenues derived mainly from reserves in the Delta but most of the oil profits have gone to the central government and not to local people, creating a sense among these groups of economic exclusion. As a result, some have taken to militant activities such as attacks on symbols of the government and the major oil companies in the region, most notably Shell and ChevronTexaco. Militant groups have kidnapped foreigners for ransom and have sabotaged and "bunkered" oil lines. "Bunkering," the illegal theft of crude oil, is practiced by several groups to help maintain their insurgencies. Therefore it is also Nigeria's natural resource dependence that has led to violence. Angola is another nation plagued by the "natural resource curse" as well as by horizontal inequalities, which are felt by the Ovimbundu, Kimbundu and Bakongo ethnic groups (Minorities at Risk, 2007).

In Ghana horizontal inequalities take a slightly different form. Poverty in Ghana is most severe in the three most northern regions.¹⁷ The generally high incidence of poverty in the North may have been a factor in the numerous outbreaks of violence, most notably in 1994 when violence between ethnic groups left between 2,000 and 15,000 persons dead and more than 178,000 displaced (Oxfam 1999, NPI/Inter-NGO Consortium). In this "Guinea Fowl War" of 1994, the Konkomba, who saw themselves as humiliated by other ethnic groups (Ukiwo, CRISE WP12), fought in a war against their perceived oppressors, the Dagomba, Nunumba, and Gonja. The general economic exclusion of the North by the central government has created impoverished conditions that may have increased the likelihood of violence.

Neighbourhood spillovers

In addition to domestic factors, spillover effects from neighbouring countries were significant factors driving conflict in the 32 countries. Indeed, wars have taken on sub-regional dimensions as neighbouring countries become embroiled in supporting one of the warring parties. Neighbouring countries serve as safe havens for rebel groups, or receive an influx of refugees, incite support among ethnic groups that inhabit more than one state, and provide opportunities for profiteers to engage in highly lucrative weapons or natural resource smuggling. The state and

¹⁷ The three northern regions of Ghana had the worst or near worst poverty ratings in each of the following indicators: Under 5 mortality rate, infant mortality rate, maternal mortality rate, supervised delivery, family planning, immunization of children, under 5 stunted, primary school expenditure per child, JSS (Junior Secondary School) expenditure per child, primary school age children per teacher, JSS age per children, primary school age children per classroom, JSS age children per classroom, school attendance, access to electricity, and population per post office. (According to the 2003 Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS))

other groups become involved in supporting warring parties through direct material and political support. Countries have become involved with neighbouring wars. Example include Chad, which was the refuge for thousands of people displaced from violence in Central African Republic and Sudan; Ethiopia, due to the involvement of the governments of Eritrea and Somalia who supported opposing sides in the war; Guinea-Bissau, where Casamance rebels supported the military junta and troops from Guinea (Conakry) and Senegal aided the government; Somalia, where the various warring sides have received arms from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, and Sudan; and finally, Sudan and Uganda, where the respective wars in each have mutually and negatively affected the other. In each case neighbourhood spillover, often in combination with domestic factors, has been a significant factor that drove the conflict.

Environmental pressure related to migration Although the African continent is relatively sparsely populated when compared with other regions of the world, environmental stress and demographic pressures are present in a number of countries. Mounting demographic pressures is one of the indicators of the Failed State Index. As shown in Appendix 6.2, all the 32 countries score above six, and several above nine (Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Niger, Somalia, Sudan).

A few of the conflicts have been explained as triggered by conflicts over natural resources. This is often an explanation given for the conflict in Sudan which has commonly been attributed to historical enmity on religious or racial grounds. Drought and desertification increase pressure on ever scarcer water and land resources, forcing group migration into areas settled by others. This encroachment creates stress which contributes to violence (Youngs, 2004: 8). According to Minorities at Risk, the Azawad conflict in Mali that took place from 1990–1996 was driven by socio-economic exclusion of the Tuaregs but environmental stress also played a role (2007). The desertification of the Sahel in the late 1960s to the early 1970s, as well as the frequent droughts of the 1980s caused a mass migration of Tuaregs from Northern Mali to neighboring countries.

Demographic youth bulge There is a strong statistical relationship between demographic patterns and the incidence of armed conflict. This risk factor is present in almost all countries of sub-Saharan Africa, including those that have experienced major wars, minor wars, and no wars. Each of the 32 conflict countries surveyed here has a youth bulge with a population aged 15-29 years constituting over 44% of the total. (Appendix 6.2) Cincotta (2003) identifies countries in which young adults comprise more than 40 percent of the adult population as more than twice as likely than countries with lower proportions to experience an outbreak of civil conflict. He identifies a youth bulge of 50 percent or more as under “extreme” demographic stress; of the 32 countries only Gambia, Djibouti, Sierra Leone, and Sudan had a youth bulge less than 49 percent.

History of war Global statistical analysis shows high risk that conflict will remerge (Collier 2002). The experiences of 32 countries since 1980 bear this out. From 1980 to 2005, there have been 74 ends to particular conflicts (from above to below the 25- battle-related deaths threshold that is coded as minor conflict in the UCDP/PPIO Armed Conflict Dataset) for at least one year and 80 partial or full peace agreements since 1989. Of those 154 chances for peace, in only nine cases was there no resumption of violence in any part of the country for ten or more years through 2005. For 20 additional periods after 1995 there was a cessation of violence without resumption above the battle-death threshold, but these still were not for a minimum duration of

ten years. Therefore only 19 percent (29/154) of the total cessations of violence and peace agreements have been followed by ten years of sustained peace throughout an entire country. To put in simpler terms, of the 32 conflict-affected countries only Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, South Africa, and Togo have experienced cessations of violence of at least ten years duration, as coded in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (resulting in a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths and with the state as a warring party). However even these statistics represent a misleadingly optimistic assessment of the durability of peace in those countries. In the cases of The Gambia and Kenya, since 1980 conflict has occurred, although only one instance resulted in more than 25 battle-related deaths and was code-able as a “minor conflict.” Burkina Faso had two separate minor wars that between the two did not amount to a full year of violence. In Ghana, violence has continued with numerous ethnic wars in the north that did not involve the state; the most recent of these took place in 2002. In Togo, the state has continued violent repressive measures and human rights abuses since the end of war, resulting in 400 or more deaths in 2005 (IRIN News, 2005). The conflict in Mali with the Tuareg militants has not been code-able since 1994 but tensions and divisions continue. Viewing these purported cessations of conflict through this lens, it appears that of the 32 countries only South Africa and Mozambique have truly enjoyed enduring peace after sustained periods of war. (Gleditsch and others, 2002; Harbom, L, S. and others, 2006).

V. Policy responses to addressing risk factors

The preceding sections have shown the ways in which armed conflict has affected the trajectory of development and vice versa. The destructive impact of wars is a source of current poverty and development challenges. At the same time, development patterns such as a history of ethnic exclusion and environmental pressure have been among the drivers of past conflicts and continue to raise political tensions. These linkages have important policy implications for development strategy as economic, social, and governance reform policies have important bearing on risk factors. For example, budgetary allocations can deepen horizontal inequalities and group grievance; health and education policies such as measures to increase schooling of girls are central aspects of demographic change; inappropriate agricultural and rural policies can aggravate environmental pressures and competition over land. In these and many other ways, development policy can either alleviate or worsen group grievance, the youth bulge and unemployment, environmental pressure and poor governance of natural resources, and thus help prevent or exacerbate the risks of armed conflict recurring.

To assess how development policies and priorities address these links between armed conflict and development, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) were reviewed where they were available. PRSPs reflect both national priorities and a degree of endorsement by the official donor community, notably those supporting the HIPC process. Several of the PRSPs, notably for countries that are emerging from war following a peace settlement, such as Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Congo Republic, Angola, and Djibouti or following a decisive victory such as Rwanda, identify conflict as a major source of their development and poverty challenges. All of the PRSPs emphasize the importance of governance, but mostly not in relation to preventing recurrence of violent conflict.

In fact, there is scant treatment of armed conflict and its links to development challenges in the 18 PRSPs reviewed; four made no mention of armed conflict that had taken place or was

continuing at the time, and while others mentioned the issue, only the Liberia Ii-PRSP 2007 had a section devoted to an analysis of the root causes of conflict. The conflict-development/poverty nexus is the centerpiece of this I-PRSP, as seen in its title *Breaking with the Past: From Conflict to Development*. The lack of attention to armed conflict is particularly surprising where wars were being actively fought at the time that the document was prepared and adopted: the Guinea Bissau I-PRSP of September 2000 makes no mention of the 1998-99 war; the Ethiopia PRSP of 2002 refers only to the border war with Eritrea and in the historical context of pre-1991 wars, not to the ongoing wars within the country; the Senegal PRSP of 2002 makes no mention of the persistent fighting in the South that was continuing at the time; the Chad PRSP of 2003 refers to conflict only twice in its 142 page document, referring only to a “climate of insecurity and impunity” in a “conflict-ridden environment” and to “decades of armed conflict” and its impact on armed forces.

While consequences of war on development and the claims of parties to contest may not be addressed directly, how do the PRSPs address the structural conditions that may be at the root of conflict? Virtually all the documents contain a section on governance which is identified as a policy priority, but other conflict risk factors do not receive high attention. Mention of youth unemployment, and employment in general, is virtually absent in these documents. Issues of unequal development along group lines and ethnic exclusion are rarely addressed. Inclusive development approaches including equitable growth and greater sharing of power and opportunities are not the explicit stated goals, even in countries where ethnic grievance and exclusion are politically live issues. The terms equity most often appears in relation to gender equality. Even the I-PRSP of Liberia which fully recognizes the pattern of elite rule as a source of the war that lasted over a decade, is weak when it comes to reflecting inclusion as a policy priority. The document says little about setting priorities across regions and activities to ensure distributional balance; where social and physical infrastructure development had been concentrated in Monrovia and the coast and the interior neglected, this strategy makes no provisions to reverse these historic imbalances, and where poverty is concentrated in rural areas, the economic growth strategy does not give high priority to agriculture other than the export-oriented plantation sector. (Fukuda-Parr and others, 2007).

Thus PRSPs do not systematically include analysis of conflict’s impact on development or analysis of root causes of conflict and grievances over issues of political, economic, and social exclusion. Armed conflict that is ongoing in a country is systematically ignored as a source of poverty. Indeed, that both a country’s governments and the donors who endorse them turn a blind eye to recent or ongoing fighting in the country inevitably has repercussions for development and poverty.

VI. Conclusions

Since 1980, the people of sub-Saharan Africa have endured over 126 armed conflicts in 32 countries. The nature of these wars does not easily coincide with the conventional definitions of war which are battle and state-centric. Battle deaths are only a small part of war deaths as many civilians die caught in the cross fire, and in recent years, there has been almost twice as many non-state wars (where the state was not involved) as state-based wars. These wars typify the “new wars” of the 21st century characterized by Mary Kaldor as motivated by both political and

private economic ends, and commingling state and non-state actors with local and external allies, and involving violence against civilians by the state armies, non-state militias, and organized criminal groups.

This paper has surveyed the nexus of poverty and armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa since 1980. It has focused on three aspects of the nexus: (i) the impacts of war on development as measured by basic social and economic indicators; (ii) the role of socio-economic structures as underlying root causes; and (iii) policy response to these linkages.

First, armed conflicts have incurred serious development costs but these impacts are complex and varied. There is no doubt that civil war is “development in reverse” and much has been learned about the ways in which wars not only destroy lives and infrastructure but have longer term repercussions on society, institutions, and human behavior. This survey reviewed the evolution of basic social and economic indicators during conflict. It found surprisingly that decline was not a uniform experience; some economies have kept growing and human outcomes improving even during conflict, as the impacts are contained to specific locations or as the economy is buoyed by such exogenous factors as discovery of oil or rise in commodity prices. Much more needs to be understood about the nature of these linkages.

Second, this survey reviewed the relevance of the structural risk factors and found the role of structural factors complex and varied. Economic decline in the years leading up to the outbreak of war was a part of misrule which provoked a number of armed insurgencies but by no means in all cases. In many countries, wars broke out in the context of growth and improvements in social indicators. The academic and policy literature documents the key role of control of natural resources as in the case of “blood diamonds” in financing and fueling wars in Sierra Leone, but this has not been a driving factor in some countries with similar economic structures, such as the Central African Republic which is rich in natural resources including diamonds. Identity based exclusion (or horizontal inequalities) has been a mobilizing issue in many countries, such as in Rwanda, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire. However, in some countries such as Mozambique and Sierra Leone, such exclusion does not appear to have played a major role even though it exists.

The strong statistical relationship between demographic youth bulge and armed conflict has not been well explored in country level qualitative studies, with the exception of a few excellent studies¹⁸ that examine incentives that motivate young people to join rebellions. Similarly, environmental pressure has not been identified to explain wars in most of the 32 countries.

Third, policy response, based on a review of the available PRSPs, shows surprising lack of attention to armed conflict as a factor that has caused poverty, and may undermine development in the future. The consistent absence of analysis of conflict-poverty links is surprising, especially in countries where war is actively being waged. The policy implications of these links require greater attention, starting with an analysis at the country level of the causes and impact of conflict in countries which have experienced conflict, and for those where fighting has ceased, the risks and vulnerability to recurrence.

¹⁸ See for example, the work of Humphreys and Weinstein.

Since 1980, over 100 armed conflicts have been fought in 32 countries of sub-Saharan Africa. If non-state conflicts are included, these numbers would rise even more. The countries of this region face high risks of war. Structurally, these countries are characterized by many of the risks of conflict including demographic structures, environmental pressures, and horizontal inequalities. Finally and perhaps most importantly one of the most striking characteristics of armed conflict in Africa has been the fragility of peace; where there has been an end to violence, there has been almost invariably its resumption. Since 1980 there have been 154 ends to fighting but only 29 of them resulted in peace that lasted for at least ten years. These were in 8 of the 32 countries that experienced armed conflict. These patterns point to a need for more proactive approach to addressing the structural factors that raise the risks of war.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Sub-Saharan Africa: Minor and Major Armed Conflict 1980-2005 and Peace Accords 1989-2005

Appendix 2: Battle Deaths in Armed Conflicts of Sub-Saharan Africa 1980-2005


Appendix 3: Datasets on Armed Conflict

Appendix 4: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Sub-Saharan Africa 1980-2005

Appendix 5: Economic and social trends prior to outbreak of war

Appendix 6: Indicators on structural conditions and conflict risk

Appendix 1: Sub-Saharan Africa: Minor and Major Armed Conflict 1980-2005 and Peace Accords 1989-2005



Minor War █: between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year. War █: at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a given year. P: Years during which peace agreements were signed.

Note: Somalia is not by definition an armed conflict in 1997-2000 and 2003-2005 since no government could be identified.

Sources: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2006 1946-2005; UCPD Peace Agreement Dataset Version 1.0 1989-2005

Appendix 2: Battle Deaths in Armed Conflicts of Sub-Saharan Africa 1980-2005							
Battle Deaths: Major Armed Conflict (>1,000/year)	1980-1984	1985-1989	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2004	2005	Total by Country
Angola	27665	27668	54143	11850	5140		126466
Burundi			1215	2800	4240	300	8555
Chad	13970	20180	7449	275	1101	110	43085
Congo (Brazzaville)			175	9500	116		9791
Democratic Republic of Congo				100066	48934		149000
Eritrea				40334	10057		50391
Ethiopia	64692	61493	26476	2029	1977	773	157440
Guinea-Bissau				1850			1850
Liberia	27	100	7999	500	4058		12684
Mozambique	23250	82500	3250				109000
Rwanda			5500	2700	1559		9759
Sierra Leone			1998	10599	400		12997
Somalia	600	25424	39526	1200	264	Note 3	67014
South Africa	18478	8299					26777
Sudan	8000	20000	10000	12500	10528	500	61528
Uganda	68532	38268	1950	2300	6556	669	118275
Battle Deaths: Minor Armed Conflict (25-999/year)							
Burkina Faso		200					200
Cameroon	500			100			600
Central African Rep.					219		219
Comoros		27		56			83
Cote D'Ivoire					1200		1200
Djibouti			515	25			540
Gambia	650						650
Ghana	76						76
Guinea					1100		1100
Kenya	318						318
Lesotho				114			114
Mali			300				300
Niger			400	89			489
Nigeria					552		552
Senegal			600	910	134		1644
Togo			25				55
Total per Period	226758	284159	161521	199797	98135	2352	972752

Sources: UCPD/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2006. Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Battle Deaths Dataset 1946-2005 Version 2.0. Lacin, Bethany and Niles Petter Gleditsch. (2005) 'Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: a New Dataset of Battle Deaths,' *European Journal of Population* 21(2-3): 145-165

Definitions:

Battle Deaths: Both armed combatant and civilian deaths resulting from violence inflicted during the use of armed force by a party to an armed conflict during contested combat. This definition of battle deaths includes deaths during combat and deaths from wounds received in combat. This definition excludes the sustained destruction of soldiers or civilians outside the context of any reciprocal threat of lethal force (e.g. execution of prisoners of war). It also excludes non-combat deaths resulting from famine, disease, and other results of war

Armed Conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of the state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths between armed combatants during a contested incompatibility.

Appendix 3: Datasets on Armed Conflict

There are no official datasets on armed conflict from official governmental or intergovernmental bodies. Over 60 datasets created by academic researchers and NGOs track global armed conflict. Their usefulness for research and policy applications varies along key dimensions. What years do they cover and are they updated annually? What criteria define armed conflict? What factors assess conflict severity? What data are included and excluded? These datasets with their systematic application of definitions and thresholds allow trends to be identified and cross-country comparisons to be made. This lists the datasets that have been most widely used by researchers and policy analysts internationally.

Dataset	Source	Coverage
Correlates of War (COW) Datasets on interstate, intrastate, and extra-systemic wars Covers 1816-1997	J. David Singer and Melvin Small	Includes conflicts in which battle deaths between armed combatants total 1,000 or more. Excludes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • conflicts in which the state is not a party (e.g. conflicts between non-state militias and clans); • low intensity conflicts • one-sided violence against unarmed civilians (e.g. genocide and massacres of prisoners of war) • civilian fatalities from the cross-fire of war and from factors (e.g. disease, famine) caused by war.
UDCP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2006 Covers 1946-2005 and is updated annually	Gleditsch et al of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)	Includes small conflicts in which battle deaths of armed combatants during a contested incompatibility total 25 or more. Excludes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • conflicts in which the state is not a party (e.g. conflicts between non-state militias and clans); • one-sided violence against unarmed civilians (e.g. genocide and massacres of prisoners of war) • civilian fatalities from the cross-fire of war and from factors (e.g. disease, famine) caused by war.
UCDP Battle Deaths Dataset Covers 1946-2005	Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)	Applies definitions of conflict consistent with the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and tracks conflicts recorded in that dataset. Battle death totals include armed combatants <u>plus</u> civilians killed in cross-fire or as "collateral damage" during combat. Excludes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • conflicts in which the state is not a party (e.g. conflicts between non-state militias and clans); • one-sided violence against unarmed civilians (e.g. genocide and massacres of prisoners of war) • civilian fatalities factors (e.g. disease, famine) caused by war.
Ethnic Conflict Research project (ECOR) Covers 1985-2000	Christian P. Scherrer (2002) in <i>Structural Prevention of Ethnic Violence</i> , NY: Palgrave	Studies "mass violence" which encompasses wars of high and low intensity following COW and UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset threshold levels. Uses a seven-part typology that includes non-military acts of mass violence involving non-state actors (e.g. gang wars, genocide).
Conflict Trends in Africa 1946-2004 Covers 1946-2004	Center for Systemic Peace, Monty G. Marshall	Does not provide annual data. Tracks armed conflict, political instability in the absence of armed conflict, adverse regime changes, and communal rebellion and inter-communal violence. Armed conflict dataset includes conflicts in which battle deaths reach 500 at a rate of 100/yr. Provides estimates of civilian fatalities from factors (e.g. disease, famine) caused by war.
Fearon and Laitin (2003) Covers 1945-1999	James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin Published in <i>American Political Science Review</i>	Includes civil wars that meet the 1000-death thresholds with at least 100 annually. Excludes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • conflicts in which the state is not a party (e.g. conflicts between non-state militias and clans); • state-led massacres when there is no organized opposition.

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IISS Armed Conflict Database Covers: 1997 to present	Hanna Ucko, International Institute for Strategic Studies	Updated sub-annually, but does not disaggregate data by year. Tracks international armed border and territorial conflicts, internal conflicts, and terrorism. Includes information on political status, fatalities, refugees, economic costs, and weapons.
UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v.1.1, Covers: Covers: 2002 - 2005	Joakim Kreutz and Kristine Eck Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)	A conflict-year dataset with information of communal and organized armed conflict where none of the parties is the government of a state.

Source: Eck, K. (2003) 'A Beginner's Guide To Conflict Data: Finding And Using The Right Dataset,' UCDP Paper No. 1, Uppsala Conflict Data Program.

Appendix 4: Armed Conflict's Human Toll: Populations Displaced In Sub-Saharan Africa 1980-2005

Major Conflict >1,000 Battle Deaths	Conflict Period	Population 1995 (millions)	Cross-Border Refugees in		Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in		
			Year of Greatest Displacement	Year	Number of IDPs	Year	Source
Angola	1975*-2004	12.3	470,267	2001	4,000,000	2001	IISS (b)
Burundi	1991-2005	6.2	871,319	1993	500,000	2002	IISS
Chad	1965*-2005	7.2	234,260	1981	n.d.		
Congo (Brazzaville)	1993-2002	2.8	28,958	2003	300,000	2001	IISS
Dem Rep. of Congo	1996-2001	45.3	461,037	2004	4,000,000	2003	IISS
Eritrea	1998-2000	3.2	503,200	1992	> 500,000	2001	IISS
Ethiopia	1976*-1991 and 1996-2005	60.3	2,567,998	1980	n.d.		
Guinea-Bissau	1998-1999	1.2	8,887	1998	531,616	2003	UNHCR (a)
Liberia	1989-2003	2.1	797,835	1994	>310,000	2004	IISS
Mozambique	1977*-1992	15.9	1,445,474	1992	n.d.		
Rwanda	1990-2002	5.6	2,257,514	1994	625,000	1998	UNHCR
Sierra Leone	1991-2000	4.1	488,869	1999	> 250,000	2001	IISS
Somalia	1981-2005	6.2	812,195	1992	>400,000	2002	IISS
South Africa	1966*-1988	44.0	29,560	1984	n.d.		
Sudan	1983-2005	29.5	730,647	2004	7,355,000	2005	IISS
Uganda	1977*-2005	21.3	306,060	1995	1,600,000	2005	IISS
Minor Conflict 25- 999 Battle Deaths							
Burkina Faso	1985 and 1987	10.3	978	2002	n.d.		
Cameroon	1984 and 1996	14.1	9101	2005	n.d.		
Central African Rep.	2001-2002	3.4	42,890	2005	212,000	2007	IDMC (c)
Comoros	1989 and 1997	.61	2	1997	n.d.		
Cote d'Ivoire	2002-2004	15.0	33,637	2003	< 1,000,000	2003	IISS
Djibouti	1991-1994	.62	18,101	1996	n.d.		
Gambia	1981	1.2	1,683	2005	n.d.		
Ghana	1981 and 1983	17.9	18,433	2005	n.d.		
Guinea	2000-2001	7.3	5,820	2005	n.d.		
Kenya	1982	27.4	9,570	1997	431,000	2002	IDCM
Lesotho	1998	1.7	7	2004	n.d.		
Mali	1990-1994	8.7	172,905	1994	3,000	1994	UNHCR
Niger	1992-1997	10.3	22,307	1993	n.d.		
Nigeria	2004	109.0	24,568	2002	~ 810,000	2003	IISS
Senegal	1990-2003	9.1	60,006	1990	64,000	2005	IISS
Togo	1986 and 1991	4.6	291,060	1993	1,500	2006	IDMC

* Onset of the armed conflict was before 1980. ** Year of "greatest displacement" for which data is available. Data is not available for all years. n.d.: no data

Sources: (a) UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. UNHCR definition: Refugees represent total refugees originating from the country, both assisted and unassisted by the UNHCR. IDPs: UNHCR's IDP statistics are not necessarily representative of the entire IDP population in a given country but are exclusively limited to the ones who are protected and/or assisted by the Office.

(b) IISS: International Institute for Strategic Studies) Armed Conflict Database

(c) IDMC: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

Appendix 5: Economic and social trends prior to outbreak of war**5 - Change in Under 5 Mortality Rates (per 1000 persons) in Years prior to Outbreak of War
2 most recent years prior to war**

Country	with available data	Conflict Period	Change in Under 5 Mortality Rate before War
Central Africa Republic	1995-2000	2001-2002	13
Cote D'Ivoire	1995 and 2000	2002-2004	13
Uganda	1970 and 1975	1977-2005	9
Burundi	1985 and 1990	1991-2005	0
Democratic Republic of Congo	1990 and 1995	1996-2001	0
Niger	1985 and 1990	1992-1997	0
Lesotho	1990 and 1995	1998	-11
Sudan	1978-1982	1983-2005	-11
Sierra Leone	1985 and 1990	1991-2000	-13
Togo	1980 and 1985	1986 and 1991	-13
Ghana	1975 and 1980	1981 and 1983	-14
Rwanda	1985 and 1990	1990-2002	-14
Congo Republic	1980 and 1990	1993-2002	-15
Guinea-Bissau	1990 and 1995	1998-1999	-18
Comoros (b)	1990 and 1995	1997	-19
Angola	1970 and 1975	1975-2004	-20
Mozambique	1970 and 1975	1977-1992	-20
Senegal	1985 and 1990	1990-2003	-22
Nigeria	1995 and 2000	2004	-23
Cameroon	1975 and 1980	1984-1996	-24
Kenya	1975 and 1980	1982	-24
Eritrea	1990 and 1995	1998-2000	-25
Mali	1985 and 1990	1990-1994	-25
Guinea	1995 and 2000	2000-2001	-25
Ethiopia	1990 and 1995	1976-1991 and 1996-2005	-26
Burkina Faso	1980 and 1985	1985 and 1987	-26
Liberia	1970 and 1980	1989-2003	-28
Djibouti	1980 and 1990	1991-1994	-30
Gambia	1975 and 1980	1981	-47
Comoros (a)	1970 and 1980	1989	-50
Chad	1960-1964	1965-2005	N/A
Somalia	1980	1981-2005	N/A
South Africa	1961-1965	1966-1988	N/A

Average Change in Under-5 Mortality Rate for all of sub Saharan Africa from 1980-2005 was -7 (per 1000).

Definition: Under-5 mortality rate is the probability that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates. The probability is expressed as a rate per 1,000.

Source: Harmonized estimates of the World Health Organization, UNICEF, and the World Bank, based mainly on household surveys, censuses, and vital registration, supplemented by World Bank estimates based on household surveys and vital registration.

Appendix 6: Indicators on structural conditions and conflict risk**Appendix 6.1: Structural Conditions and Conflict Risk: Failed State Index and Minorities at Risk (MAR)**

		Failed State Index 2007			MAR
Country	Conflict Period	Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia*	Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines*	Rise of Factionalized Elites*	Aggregate Differential Index - Mean Index of Cultural, Economic, and Political Differentials among Groups within Countries (1980-2000)**
Angola	1975-2004	5.9	8.7	7.5	6.0
Burkina Faso	1985 and 1987	6.4	8.9	7.7	..
Burundi	1991-2005	6.7	8.8	7.5	10.5
Cameroon	1984-1996	7.0	8.7	8.0	7.0
Central Africa Republic	2001-2002	8.8	8.6	9.3	..
Chad	1965-2005	9.5	9.0	9.7	9.0
Comoros	1989 and 1997	5.3	6.1	6.5	..
Congo Republic	1993-2002	6.8	8.1	7.2	0.5
Cote D'Ivoire	2002-2004	9.8	8.0	9.3	14.0
Democratic Republic of Congo	1996-2001	8.8	9.1	8.6	7.6
Djibouti	1991-1994	5.5	6.1	6.9	10.0
Eritrea	1998-2000	5.4	5.9	7.2	9.0
Ethiopia	1976-1991 and 1996-2005	7.8	8.6	8.9	10.4
Gambia	1981	4.2	7.0	5.9	..
Ghana	1981 and 1983	5.1	6.8	3.5	6.7
Guinea	2000-2001	8.1	8.5	9.0	8.0
Guinea-Bissau	1998-1999	5.4	8.6	6.8	..
Kenya	1982	6.9	8.1	8.2	8.0
Lesotho	1998	5.5	5.5	6.7	..
Liberia	1989-2003	6.5	8.3	8.1	12.0
Mali	1990-1994	6.1	6.6	3.7	11.0
Mozambique	1977-1992	4.7	7.2	5.6	..
Niger	1992-1997	8.9	7.2	6.0	9.7
Nigeria	2004	9.5	9.1	9.6	8.8
Rwanda	1990-2002	8.7	7.1	8.2	6.0
Senegal	1990-2003	5.2	6.9	3.8	8.0
Sierra Leone	1991-2000	7.1	8.7	7.7	5.8
Somalia	1981-2005	8.5	7.5	10.0	2.5
Sudan	1983-2005	10.0	9.1	9.7	12.0
Togo	1986 and 1991	6.0	7.5	7.6	8.0
Uganda	1977-2005	8.5	8.5	7.8	10.1

Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia*: History of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries; Patterns of atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups; Specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression; Institutionalized political exclusion; Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of "hate" radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric.

Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines*: Group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and economic status; Group-based impoverishment as measured by poverty levels, infant mortality rates, education levels; Rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group inequalities.

Rise of Factionalized Elites*: Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines; Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism, (e.g., a "greater Serbia") or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith").

Aggregate Intergroup Differentials Index**: ADI is based upon the total differences checked and rated for 18 cultural, economic and political differences including income, land/property, higher education, presence in commerce, access to power, access to civil service, legal protection, etc. Accessed from Minorities At Risk (MAR)

Appendix 6.2: Structural Conditions and Conflict Risk

		Failed State Index 2007				
Country	Conflict Period	Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors*	Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies*	Mounting Demographic Pressures*	Youth Bulge, Percentage of 15-24 year olds in total adult population (15-64 yrs. old) in 2005	Share of Primary Commodity Exports in GDP (2000) as a percentage (excluding petroleum)
Angola	1975-2004	7.6	7.5	8.5	37.4	0.5
Burkina Faso	1985 and 1987	7.0	5.6	8.6	37.6	6.0
Burundi	1991-2005	9.0	8.9	9.1	39.8	5.7
Cameroon	1984-1996	7.0	6.8	7.0	36.1	10.7
Central Africa Republic	2001-2002	9.0	8.4	8.9	35.6	9.4
Chad	1965-2005	9.0	8.9	9.1	51.3	7.0
Comoros	1989 and 1997	6.9	3.6	6.2	44.9	3.2
Congo Republic	1993-2002	7.4	7.3	8.7	44.6	4.4
Cote D'Ivoire	2002-2004	9.8	8.3	8.6	45.5	23.8
Democratic Republic of Congo	1996-2001	9.6	8.9	9.4	52.5	5.1
Djibouti	1991-1994	7.6	6.5	7.9	34.3	3.9
Eritrea	1998-2000	6.5	7.1	8.1	37.8	0.9
Ethiopia	1976-1991 and 1996-2005	6.7	7.9	9.0	35.8	6.4
Gambia	1981	6.2	5.2	6.4	31.3	9.2
Ghana	1981 and 1983	4.7	4.5	6.0		20.8
Guinea	2000-2001	8.5	7.4	7.8	34.7	14.6
Guinea-Bissau	1998-1999	7.2	6.5	7.6	35.6	35.3
Kenya	1982	7.2	8.0	8.4	38.8	10.8
Lesotho	1998	6.2	4.5	9.0	39.5	0.8
Liberia	1989-2003	9.0	8.5	8.1	37.9	16.5
Mali	1990-1994	6.9	4.4	8.5	39.0	11.1
Mozambique	1977-1992	5.9	2.2	7.5	35.3	4.7
Niger	1992-1997	8.0	5.9	9.2	33.6	12.9
Nigeria	2004	5.7	5.6	8.2	36.5	1.3
Rwanda	1990-2002	6.6	7.0	9.1	43.9	2.4
Senegal	1990-2003	5.5	4.5	7.0	35.6	10.1
Sierra Leone	1991-2000	7.0	7.4	8.6	33.1	5.3
Somalia	1981-2005	10.0	9.0	9.2	33.9	3.3
Sudan	1983-2005	9.8	9.8	9.2	33.8	3.2
Togo	1986 and 1991	6.6	5.4	7.5	36.0	14.2
Uganda	1977-2005	7.4	9.4	8.1	40.1	7.8

The Failed State Index: The FSI uses software to index and scan tens of thousands of open-source articles and reports. The data is electronically gathered using a data-collection system that includes international and local media reports and other public documents, including U.S. State Department reports, independent studies, and corporate financial filings. The software calculates the number of positive and negative "hits" for the 12 indicators. Internal and external experts then review the scores as well as the articles themselves, when necessary, to confirm the scores and ensure accuracy. For more information regarding the methodology used to calculate the Failed State Index visit <www.fundforpeace.org>.

Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors*: Military or para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict; Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on

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foreign aid or peacekeeping missions.

Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies*: Forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease, lack of clean water, land competition, and turmoil that can spiral into larger humanitarian and security problems, both within and between countries. Range of Index is 10 (worst rating) to 0 (best).

Mounting Demographic Pressures*: Pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources; Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns that affect the freedom to participate in common forms of human and physical activity, including economic productivity, travel, social interaction, religious worship; Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, and proximity to environmental hazards; Pressures from skewed population distributions, such as a "youth or age bulge," or from divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups

Youth Bulge, Percentage of 15-24 year olds in total adult population (15-64 yrs old) in 2005--Sources: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat

Share of Primary Commodity Exports in GDP (2000) as a percentage (excluding petroleum)--Sources: United Nations Conference of Trade and Development, UNCTAD Commodity Yearbook 2003, accessed online October 20, 2007, http://r0.unctad.org/infocomm/comm_docs/cybframes.htm.

**Range of Index is 10 (worst rating) to 0 (best).

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