The
Road from Thessaloniki
Gerald
Knaus
European Stability Initiative
www.esiweb.org
It was the sceptics among EU diplomats and politicians - not the
visionaries gathered around Greek Foreign Minister Dr George Papandreou
- who won the debates that preceded the preparation of the recent
Thessaloniki EU summit. Thessaloniki concluded that the EU policies
used to help countries prepare for accession - and that are now
applied in Romania and Bulgaria - are not available to the region.
Most importantly, the EU is not yet willing to bring to bear its
considerable experience in supporting structural economic reform,
the cohesion policies that have been such a success in recent
years in Ireland and Greece and that will now be applied in Poland
and Lithuania. A small success - some additional money so that
EU assistance to the region does not decline further in coming
years - is tempered by the fact that much of this will not be
used to help countries catch up economically but for the same
programs already now financed under the EU CARDS programme.
Thessaloniki
is a reality check for Western Balkan leaders. They know now
that they must demonstrably want the integration of their countries
into the EU more than the EU will ever want to integrate them.
In the 1960s De Gaulle's twice vetoed the UK joining the European
Community. In the late 1970s the European Commission gave a
negative opinion on Greek accession. The history of enlargement
is the history of determined lobbying and pressure to overcome
deep scepticism. This will not change in the case of the Western
Balkans. Simply put, the EU will never ask countries to apply
for membership and the time will never be ripe unless countries
self-confidently believe in it themselves.
And yet,
there are winners from the debates leading up to the summit.
One is Greece,
which has invested more political capital in helping the region
than anybody had the right to expect, and is now widely seen
as an honest broker.
Another
are regional leaders, who have for the first time lobbied jointly
and assertively, making clear that the region wants to be taken
seriously as interlocutors, and not simply be made to accept
whatever is being offered.
And a third
is the idea that European integration requires the region to
catch up economically, and that the EU has both the instruments
and the self-interest to support this. Thessaloniki did not
bring the breakthrough in incorporating "cohesion"
into EU policy towards the Balkans, as regional politicians
have demanded in joint declaration. But the ground has been
prepared, the idea has caught on widely, in the region and in
Europe. If governments in Skopje, Belgrade and Zagreb continue
to lobby as determinedly as they have done in recent months,
the number of sceptics in the EU will diminish.
Ask the
Bulgarians how many people in Brussels, Paris or London believed
in 1988 that Bulgaria would soon be members of both the EU and
Nato? There is a road from Thessaloniki and the Greek Presidency
to Rome and to Dublin and the Italian and Irish EU Presidencies.
|