Report

The nexus of international development and climate action

Tuesday 25 – Thursday 27 January 2022 | WP2026

Report

The nexus of international development and climate action

Tuesday 25 – Thursday 27 January 2022 | WP2026

Introduction

Wilton Park is hosting a series of dialogues bringing together stakeholders from across the development and climate sectors to reimagine the future of development assistance and climate action to 2030 and beyond.

Today's global development challenges are increasingly complex, severe, and inter-connected and call for closer collaboration and coordination with national systems and support from international partners. The pathways to achieving international development and climate action are inextricably linked, yet in many ways the development and climate communities continue to work in silos.

From the global to the local level, greater emphasis is needed on the intersection between climate and development, and the mutually reinforcing pathways that can achieve development outcomes and climate action.

This dialogue, the second in the series, bought together the climate, development, and humanitarian communities to consider strategically yet practically what changes are needed to systems and process that will enable closer alignment and ultimately greater impact.

Highlights and emerging themes

- **Challenging and changing narratives on climate and development:** Development needs to be reframed in terms of "adaptation and resilience" or "green development", to move away from the real and perceived dichotomy between climate and development financing. In the longer-term all development should make economies more resilient to the impacts of climate change – but at a country level this needs to be thought about in terms of a whole economy solution.
- **Climate (+aid) finance target:** What comes after the $100 billion target needs defining, and how this can be better integrated with development priorities given the climate-development nexus. This needs to be based on analysis of what the real need is and provides an opportunity to build in a focus on quality and effectiveness of finance as well as volume. The overt focus on volume has led to distortions with little focus on learning how best to spend climate finance.
- **Access for those most vulnerable:** Improving access to climate and development finance in the most vulnerable countries is vital. Simplifying the international climate finance architecture is especially important; in its current form access is very challenging and impedes the feedback loop between donors and recipients. Sustainable capacity building approaches (not fly-in fly-out), are also needed to enable countries to better navigate financial systems.

- **Reforming the global financial architecture and multilateral systems:** The vastly complex and highly intermediated financial architecture needs to be reviewed and reformed. There are debates on the scale and type of reform needed, but broad consensus that the current system is not adequately meeting the needs of low-income countries.
- **Scaling private capital through a more supportive international financial architecture:** Green investments make financial sense in the medium to long term, even if costs are higher in the short-term; this narrative needs to be strengthened and supported by financing instruments that reflect the reality. One of the biggest challenges to increasing climate finance flows is the low-risk appetite of the private sector, who are reluctant to invest in the markets that need it the most, even if much of the risk is perceived rather than actual. The Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) and Development Financial Institution (DFI) toolkit needs expanding and better leveraging to reduce risk and catalyse this much needed funding source. Development financing can be complementary, supporting the enabling environment to reduce perceived and real risk.
- **Learning from, scaling and elevating examples of best practice:** Many of the examples of finance instruments working in practice are piecemeal, or project-by-project; in reality, portfolio and sectoral approaches are needed. Examples of effective approaches need to be documented, pooled and replicated. Climate change is having impacts today with vulnerable countries already acting. There needs to be a much greater emphasis on locally led adaptation efforts and giving agency to low-income countries and communities, rather than imposing what is believed to be needed. It is important that the Global North learn from those already dealing with these impacts and reflect this in the type of finance that is available. Better collaboration and coordination is required to ensure this happens; country-led platforms are one example of where this can occur.
- **Country-led platforms and partnerships:** While definitions are still evolving, country-led platforms are going to be an important piece of the energy transition puzzle. They can manage different types of risk, helping create standardisation, whilst having a high level of political support. They present a method of bringing multiple stakeholders around the table to collaborate and develop solutions with countries, tailored to the context.
- **Politics first:** Some described that the politics have "never been worse" from a donor perspective. A new narrative is needed which brings together a progressive alliance but is comfortable making the "self-interested" case for both development and climate action – which will land with governments making decisions. From a UK perspective, the COP presidency provides a huge opportunity and the FCDO is aiming to build trust through partnerships and global coalitions.
- **Transparency:** Transparency is essential, particularly in the context of "innovative" forms of finance, it needs to be clear what the costs are and where the risks lie. One of the key strengths of climate finance, in comparison with development finance, is the level of transparency and accountability around the Paris agreement.

What is climate finance?

The dialogue opened with a discussion on the origins of climate finance, what it was intended to be, what it is today, and what it could be in the future.

1. Climate finance was intended to be a catalyser, able to take on risk and try things that have not been done before. In practice most climate finance is very short-term, highly intermediated and risk averse.
2. While most of the financing goes to mitigation, adaptation is where there is a greater need to leverage climate finance to demonstrate proof-of-concept. This used to be the case with renewables but now proof-of-concept has been clearly demonstrated, there's less need.

"Climate finance to what end?"

3. There was some debate as to the difference between climate and development finance, and if indeed there is any difference. In terms of their function, climate finance was intended to be more catalytic, focus on areas of most need, whereas development finance has often been characterised as 'charity'.
4. One of the key advantages of climate finance is the level of accountability which is not seen in development financing.
5. The framing and narrative around development finance with a focus on poverty reduction suggests an end point, although this narrative is out of date.
6. Many stated that in practice any distinction between climate and development finance is artificial: all climate finance should ultimately lead to poverty reduction, and all broader development financing is a form of adaptation financing (e.g., building more open societies, strengthening education systems).
7. In practice there are trade-offs. In the context of the UK aid budget climate finance is ringfenced meaning that with the aid budget reduction financing for other priorities has been reduced (e.g., education was halved, as was the case with other thematic areas).

Challenging and changing narratives on climate and development

The discussion frequently returned to the predominant narratives and language framing the climate and development agendas, the challenges with the current framing and the principles that should guide future efforts to challenge and change such narratives.

8. The climate finance discourse needs to shift from the relatively narrow current conception which centres around risks to look at the vast opportunities, including how this can be linked to investment growth and full employment.
9. The framing of climate finance in terms of "adaption" and "mitigation" is unhelpful, these are two shorthand terms which mean a broad range of different things. These terms can influence and limit the community and networks which are engaged in taking climate action.
10. There is a desperate need for a new narrative that brings together the development and climate agendas and shows them as aligned and mutually reinforcing.
11. Despite the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris framework, a common accord on climate and development remains lacking, and the miscommunications, particularly between Global North and Global South countries, have been significant.
12. The framing of some (mostly western) countries as good and others (principally the largest emitters) as bad or "hostile" has inhibited genuine collaborative progress.

13. The current language and narrative hinder the climate and development communities from engaging more effectively with certain groups, including the private sector.

Framing a new narrative

14. Climate finance, or green economy investment, can and should be a driver of poverty reduction, particularly in the African context¬. Viewing all climate and development funding through a lens of 'climate compatible development', where poverty reduction and human development are at the heart of both, may be a more helpful construction.
15. Focus should be centred on tackling climate change and its impact on people's lives, especially in the most vulnerable countries.
16. The current impacts of climate change need to be conveyed strongly through the narrative, including the humanitarian impacts.
17. The narrative that vulnerable communities are victims and need help from donors must be challenged; such vulnerable countries are at the forefront of understanding how to react to the impacts of climate change and have clear vision for their development.
18. A paradigm shift is needed to fundamentally change the conditions under which climate and development finance are provided, and which shifts from donor-recipient relationships towards true partnership.

Climate (and development) finance targets

Climate finance targets were a key focus of the dialogue, with debate about the relevance and usefulness of the current $100 billion target, what the next climate finance target should be, and how volume-based targets have and continue to impact the quality of climate finance.

19. Views on the continued relevance of the $100 billion target differed:
    - Some described this as a "fossil" highlighting the many analyses which show that a far greater amount of finance is needed and urging a fundamental rethink
    - Others defended the current target and its continued importance, citing it as the only international agreement that includes a fiscal target for richer countries to help poorer countries, and highlighting that while inadequate, it hasn't been achieved.
20. Another challenge with the current target is the focus on volumes of finance. This disincentivises the mobilisation of third-party capital and incentivises funding the biggest, easiest and least risky projects, such as renewables in higher-income countries, which no longer require concessional climate finance.
21. Greater impact can be achieved with a smaller amount of financing if it is focused where it is needed most, both thematically and geographically.
22. As a result of aggregating climate financing into a single number (ie, 100b) it becomes difficult to understand the impact of these investments; this echoes development spending, where despite the vast flow of funds, understanding of the returns and impact have been limited.
23. Incentives around inclusiveness need to be incorporated within any target; the Glasgow Pact potentially provides basis for a new framework to be agreed.

24. It will be critical to ensure any post 2025 climate finance target is additional and is created involving the voices of recipients.

Access for those most vulnerable to, and impacted by climate change

The discussion focused on the needs of countries at the forefront of tackling climate change, and how the current systems and architecture meet those needs, from aligning development and climate finance with national priorities, to financing blind spots.

25. Climate change is already happening. Those in vulnerable countries are not sitting idle but are already dealing with the impacts.

26. Access to finance has been a major challenge, the least developed countries and those most vulnerable to climate change, have in practice received “next to nothing”, and where climate finance reaches the poorest countries, it is often on highly concessional terms.

27. The Vulnerable 20 (V20), a cooperation initiative of economies systemically vulnerable to climate change, has a Sustainable Insurance Facility which focuses on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), these represent a major share of climate risk exposure in V20 but are a critical component of the economy (employing large proportions of the populations) and can act as engines of growth.

28. Climate change is altering the humanitarian landscape with so-called ‘natural’ disasters increasing vulnerabilities and risks and setting back development progress.

29. Humanitarian efforts are a barometer of vulnerabilities, focus is needed on how to prevent growing humanitarian needs.

30. Access to finance was discussed in the context of national capacity, with the need to build expertise and capacity in and amongst communities to improve access.

31. “Capacity building” was acknowledged as a broad term, with many of the approaches commonly used being ineffective. There is an important distinction between “fly in, fly out” capacity building reliant on external consultants and more meaningful capacity building focused on systems and processes; technocratic capacity building will not solve the world’s problems.

Delivering development and climate finance to where it can achieve greatest impact

32. Much greater emphasis is needed on funding for locally led adaptation efforts, driven by the local community based on their own understanding of the needs.

“Least developed countries have in practice received next to nothing”

33. The narrative that low-income and vulnerable countries don’t have capacity needs to be a challenge and reframed; often capacity does exist.

34. The tensions between the need for “bankable projects” as opposed to providing funding and allowing local decision makers to decide how best to invest this in adaptation, needs to be addressed.

35. At the systems and process level, tackling the myriad and complex conditions placed on climate finance and disintermediating the process would vastly simplify access for vulnerable countries.

36. More focus is needed on the cost and quality of capital for vulnerable countries including the availability of equivalent rather than commercial loans.

37. Building capacity at a national level requires a long-term perspective; funding local universities or other educational institutions in low-income countries may be a more sustainable approach.

Reforming the global financial architecture and multilateral system

Much of the discussion focused on the global financial architecture and multilateral systems and the type and scale of reform needed to achieve greater impact on development and climate.

38. Views varied on the scale and type of reform needed for the global financial architecture, from “all global financial architecture is no longer relevant”, to suggestions that wholesale system reform isn’t the route to solve the issues.
39. Beyond system reform, change can be driven by people and partnerships, including civil servants who can be bolder in presenting innovative solutions.
40. While adaptation and resilience are vast, broad issues, funding is being directed into narrower and deeper technical pots. This presents a challenge when considering the nexus of issues.
41. The current financial architecture is becoming increasingly fragmented, with an expanding number of development agencies and funders; the international community must reflect on the implications of this proliferation and fragmentation.
42. Vulnerable countries face high costs of capital, more guarantees are needed to address this. The V20 is working on Accelerated Financing Mechanism to provide off-balance sheet de-risk tools to be deployed to reduce cost of capital to build climate resilience.
43. There needs to be a sharper focus on the quality and effectiveness of climate finance.
44. Transparency is important when talking about “innovative” forms of finance, the cost of this finance needs to be clear.
45. Transparency, as in the form of the Paris agreement, provides an opportunity.
46. Development of global climate and disaster risk financing architecture is needed to share the risks between the most vulnerable with developed economies.
47. A global shield of protection to deal with loss and damage is needed.

Governance as a foundational issue for climate and development finance

48. Climate and development cover everything and more, to the extent that this isn’t an issue about individual development institutions but about baseline governance. By addressing inadequacies in governance systems, the root causes of vulnerability can be addressed.
49. The agenda around open governance provides some useful tools but they do not focus on improving quality.
50. A common project on the quality of governance is needed, whether that be in the Global South or North.
51. Historically, greater focus has been placed on recipient countries’ need to change rather than the changes or reforms needed within the international system.
52. One suggestion was to reform debt sustainability frameworks to consider SDG needs and to broaden beyond risk to a focus on increasing fiscal space.
53. Governance reform is particularly needed on how different funds operate, including access, intermediaries and how adaptation is dealt with. The 50-50 model of

governance in the Green Climate Fund (to achieve 50% mitigation investments and 50% adaptation investments) is one example.

54. There is a lot for the development sector to learn from such climate governance initiatives.

Development banks

55. Many participants agreed that multilateral development banks are not working fast enough to scale finance for climate and that they are not providing the right incentives.

56. MDBs highlighted the greater cooperation being achieved between institutions, including at COP26, with a joint methodology on Paris alignment being developed.

57. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has committed to all projects being Paris aligned by 2023.

58. MDBs have a unique tool in terms of leveraging finance, 1 USD in finance can free up 3 USD of head room, the principle being to get donor finance to guarantee portfolios with the grant component then acting as incentive.

59. MDBs are beginning to mainstream resilience and influence their relationships with private sector partners, although this is not happening at the necessary pace.

60. The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) role in the transition is to improve budgetary space for V20. IMF's Resilience and Sustainability trust can delivery transition and crisis support needed. However, the IMF's debt sustainability metrics don't consider the large climate investment needs, leading to contradictory messages.

Scaling private capital through a more supportive international financial architecture

The conversation repeatedly returned to the role of the private sector and how to mobilise private capital to address climate change, the challenges with doing so and some of the tools to facilitate this.

61. Capital markets are already playing a critical role in climate financing and will increasingly do so in the future.

62. Concessional resource should be used to build a track-record and gather evidence on how to de-risk, rather than being in perpetuity/

63. In middle-income countries, particularly those with supportive policies for renewables, it is essential to only use concessional resource to mobilise private capital, rather than to substitute.

64. Carbon Markets offer a source of capital, but they are currently in their infancy and represent higher levels of risk.

65. Balance sheet leveraging is an important tool, with organisations such as the World Bank well positioned to raise money in private capital markets and redistribute this.

66. Time-bound subsidisation is needed to generate market scale and sustainable internal momentum; this can be delivered through a joint program of MDBs to make available premium subsidies. The V20 are currently working on this.

67. PPP (public private partnerships) frameworks are required to better allocate climate risk to where it can be managed in the private sector.

68. Beyond the focus on incentives for the private sector, focus is also needed on international regulation of the private sector.

69. The Race to Net Zero has gained buy-in across a wide range of sectors; greater effort is needed to give prominence and momentum to the Race to Resilience.

70. Climate and disaster risk insurance and financial protection products are currently fractional in scale, but the market need is great.

Addressing the issue of risk

71. The emphasis is often placed on how recipient countries can and should change to become more attractive to risk-averse private capital, more focus is needed on how the private sector can adapt and change their attitude to risk.

72. Risk biases, such as the Africa-Risk-Premium, also need to be continually challenged; a lot of risk is perceived, rather than real risk, while better mechanisms are needed to account for risk on balance sheets.

73. Capital from areas with historically low risk appetite, for example private pension funds, offer a major opportunity if the finance can be guided to green investments.

74. Financial markets need clarity on the impacts of climate risk on physical investment and commodity prices. Shifting the discussion from ‘climate change’ to ‘climate risk’ may be more productive framing for engaging the private sector.

75. Common guidance on the fiscal impact of climate risk could help to incentivise collective action on vulnerabilities. Credit rating agencies are building their capabilities in these areas and are starting to put out positive rating for economies which are proactively addressing vulnerabilities.

Learning from, scaling and elevating examples of best practice

Many countries are already responding to the impacts of climate change, participants discussed how best practice examples can be replicated and scaled and the importance of building mechanisms to share lessons and knowledge.

“We need a shift from project to portfolio”

76. Knowledge transfer must be a two-way process; the Global North must learn from those already responding to the impacts of climate change.

77. While there are pockets of good examples, the current project-by-project approach will not address the scale of the challenges posed by climate changes, instead portfolio and economy-wide approaches are needed.

78. Support is needed to expand the fiscal space so governments can make fundamental changes to economies and deliver structural reform.

79. Beyond adaptation and mitigation, emphasis is needed on expanding the use of new / innovative technologies, with private finance playing a bigger role in maturing technologies.

80. The energy transition is a question of technology and cost of capital, if battery and grid modernisation are not made available there is a risk of fossil fuel lock-in for decades to come

81. Some of the specific examples of instruments working well mentioned were:

- Development Policy Operations (DPOs) which are fast disbursing, being used increasingly and can support social economic agenda. The Fiscal Sustainability and Climate Resilience DPO in Fiji is one example.
- In Nepal the DPO is supporting the government to enhance technical capacity to tackle climate risks
- The Financing Locally Led Climate Action (FLLoCA) programme in Kenya took 10 years to fully establish, but can provide key learnings in the design of financing mechanisms

82. The tool kit for adaptation financing in poor countries needs expanding; mechanisms are needed to draw out ideas and to bring together best practice. There are pockets of locally led solutions (i.e. micro-finance) that are working well, all-be-it at small scale solutions.

COVID-19: an opportunity for green a green recovery?

83. The COVID-19 pandemic has increased vulnerability, resulting in 100 million more people living in extreme poverty, and a 10-year high of public debts.

84. Financial flows have reacted to the pandemic with trillions put into the response and recovery.

85. The recovery represents a major opportunity to direct economic stimulus in a green way; failure to do so will be a major lost opportunity and such as that seen with the economic recovery from the post-2008 financial crisis.

86. Climate must be fundamentally embedded in the covid-recovery by ensuring finance continues to flow to countries most in needed and that the finance is addressing climate risks.

Country-led platforms

Much of the discussions focused on the importance of locally led action and national platforms and mechanism to guide collective action across sectors.

87. The Country Platform concept was initially presented to the G20 several years ago. While there is no unified definition, country-led platforms are intended to promote greater synergies between the public and private sectors to scale effective climate responses
88. Some of the aims of country platforms are to:
    - Bring relevant stakeholders to the table to focus on a particular sector.
    - Ensure well developed and articulated investment strategies are developed for each sector
    - Identify the policy gaps and understand the role of project preparation platforms in that context.

89. Country Platforms can manage diverse types of risk, helping create standardisation, while also having a high level of political support.

90. National Determined Contributions (NDCs) can help to build a new kind of fiscal base for countries to face other problems, the current plans do not attract the right kind of investment or adequately mobilise finance, although there have been improvements in the latest round of NDCs.

91. There is need for more self-critique within the development and climate communities.

92. Climate Prosperity Plans will become critical tools for strategizing actions and investments needed to ensure more resilience economies.

93. National governments are primarily responsible and are working hard; the Climate Vulnerable Forum and V20 are putting forward climate recovery plans.

94. The climate and development communities are yet to adequately tackle the question of localisation and ownership, a focus on localisation is needed within discussions on local and global architecture reform.

Politics first

The importance of political context and decision-making processes was raised throughout, with considerations if the conversations were 'political enough', and how best to engage policy makers.

95. Politics are "harder than ever" and what's needed is a shared agenda across a progressive alliance.

96. Conversations can become too far removed from the political context and reality, losing sight of how difficult decisions are made.

97. There is a need to move away from donors making decision based on what's politically acceptable – shifting to donors paying their dues as they would to the UN.

98. Politicians in the Global North know exactly how to achieve action on climate change, but they do not know how to do it and be re-elected.

"[The politics] are harder than ever"

99. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that Low-to-Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) must be able to remain competitive to be able to grow and develop their economies.

100. Political support for development operations is not as strong as it might be, a narrative is needed to generate the necessary support that allows for the mobilisation of greater development and climate finance.

101. Decisions about the prioritising of Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending have important implications, especially in the context of a restricted budget.

102. Advocacy is needed to ensure all ODA is Paris aligned, but beyond ODA, large amounts of additional climate finance are needed and there is the danger that increasing climate finance allocation from ODA comes at the expense of funding for other thematic areas

Driving the global agenda: COP26 to COP27 and beyond

103. COP26 was not a 'normal' COP, it sent an important signal to the world.

104. Many developing countries have asked for support in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, but in some areas, this has meant hitting pause on climate, which will have lasting implications for the climate agenda.

105. "Climate action is the development story of the 21st century" – there needs to be better recognition that there is transformative action already underway.

106. The development and climate agenda could coalesce in the COP agreement, if the voices of those most impacted are made front and centre.

107. Adaption is the lens through which to see development financing as climate financing.

108. There are huge opportunities in adaption, such as food security etc. However, this can only happen if every leader looks at development projects in the light of adaption and how to make them resilient.

Towards COP27

109. COP27 needs to focus on the real-world implications of climate – there's a need to ramp up mitigation in parallel with a realisation that impacts are already being felt across all sectors.
110. Emerging economies are reliant on increasing energy production, while countries such as Egypt are ahead of schedule on renewable transition targets, there are still huge challenges on the adaption front, which place a heavy burden on national budgets.
111. There was good progress made at COP26 and structured regular collaboration is intended between Egypt and UK presidency, to ensure COP27 is part of ongoing progress and builds on the momentum from Glasgow.
112. Now is the time for implementation and a push for increased ambition across the board, this must be combined with the access to finance required to deliver.
113. All stakeholders need a seat at the table – this can't be solved by heads of state alone.
114. The overarching issue is Just Transition – the social-developmental aspect must be front and centre to enable that shift from unsustainable to sustainable.

UK value proposition

115. At COP26 international will to act was on display.

116. The Clean Green Initiative, launched at the COP summit, is one example of UK leadership, while investment in Kenya from CDC (the UK's development finance institution) was raised as a great example of the UK's approach.

117. The UK's ambition is to back business and use the "British superpower" of trade, to fuel development. The three key elements of remaking the UK's development offer are:
    - Transforming CDC into the British International Investment
    - Working to increase technical capability offering
    - Consolidating climate finance (compared to the power of private finance, public finance is relatively limited – the question is how the UK creates an instrument on the UK balance sheet to unlock private finance).
118. The FCDO is working to mobilise finance behind MDBs and looking at specific pilot countries. South Africa is at the forefront of this conversation, with the Just Transition.

119. The FCDO is working with international partners, to mobilise resources around credible plans, to test credibility of intention behind transition from coal.

120. Four key challenges the FCDO are working on:

    - Within the 0.5% of Gross National Income (GNI) ODA envelope, UK government is looking to build up climate finance. How can the UK government do this in a way which also builds up poverty reduction aims?

    - How can the UK accelerate growth of private finance – and mobilise private finance in a way that meets concerns of debt sustainability?

    - How can MDBs be better leveraged and how can reforms to multilateral finance be accelerated?

    - Trust –the UK cannot solve global challenges through narrow coalitions of countries. How can global partnership and coalitions be built?

Final Reflections

121. **One size doesn't fit all:** Discussions about the contexts of recipient countries need to be specific – one size doesn't fit all, and it's only through adapting to the context that fit for purpose climate action plans can be developed, given there's a huge difference between Middle-Income Countries and Low-Income Countries.

122. **A new narrative and common calls to action:** A new narrative is needed on the development-climate nexus, not just in the UK, but globally. Issues of justice, as well as giving the potential to imagine the world in a positive way, could provide a powerful vision for the climate and development agendas. The climate and development communities are not well organised together. Specific joint calls to actions are needed to drive shared visions and agendas, this can be achieved by focusing on the shared principles rather than the small disagreements.

123. **Politics first:** There is a disconnect between politics and technical discussions. Grounding the conversation in the political reality introduces more complexity, but will ultimately result in more nuanced and reasoned outcomes

124. **Predictable risk:** Approaches to and understanding of risks need to be centred within discussion on the development-climate nexus ensuring that where risk is predictable finance is available. Given the UK is investing in humanitarian, development and climate issues, and the overlap in risks across these issues, there is an opportunity for UK leadership on this.

What's Next?

- This dialogue was the second in a series of three designed to bring together stakeholders from across the development and climate sectors to reimagine the future of development assistance and climate action to 2030 and beyond. It followed a first dialogue centred on development of the UK's International Development Strategy and discussions around how the UK can remain a global leader on international development and climate action.
- By the time of the third dialogue, which is planned for September 2022, the UK Government's International Development Strategy will be published. The final dialogue will focus on applying the key themes and policy ideas emerging from this series to the UK's approach to international development and climate and explore the pathways to securing the integration of development and climate action with the UK's wider international priorities.
- In the interim, Wilton Park will host a smaller convening in the summer of 2022 designed to provide stakeholders across the UK development community an opportunity to engage on the key themes and policy solutions this series has helped surface. The findings from this convening will help inform the final scope and design of the third and final dialogue.

Anna Winston and Henry Mark
Wilton Park | March 2022

This meeting was supported by the Children's Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF).

Should you wish to read other Wilton Park reports, or participate in upcoming Wilton Park events, please consult our website www.wiltonpark.org.uk. To receive our monthly bulletin and latest updates, please subscribe to https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/newsletter/