



Wilton Park



Report

## Advancing Global Public Investment (GPI)

Monday 5 – Wednesday 7 June 2023 | WP3231

In association with:

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Equal





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## Executive Summary

Wilton Park partnered with Equal International to convene a discussion on how the principles of global public investment (GPI) can help advance a global common good agenda (GCGA). The meeting convened diverse stakeholders, including former and current policy makers, civil society, think tanks and foundations, in a cocreation dialogue to examine the political appetite and pathway for the adoption of GPI principles to address critical global challenges.

### The meeting covered key issues, including:

#### 1. Section 1: The need for a new pact on a global common good agenda

- The definition and characteristics of a GCGA, the need for a clear definition of common objectives (identifying the global element of national interests), and the need for better means of cooperation than currently exists, a gap which a GPI arrangement was seen to fill.

#### 2. Section 2: The political landscape for the adoption of GPI

##### The need for new terms of engagement

- GPI provides a 'deal-making' framework to facilitate dialogue, trust and cooperation.
- GPI is most usefully seen and applied as a *framework of principles* to establish a new norm and narrative for cooperation, solidarity and equity for institutions and funds.

##### Structure of contributions

- *Concentric convergent differentiation* (wherein countries' responsibilities and efforts to act/contribute are assessed based on capacity) can develop context-appropriate commitments and contributions to a GPI mechanism with a "global commitment towards increasing ambition" over time.

"GPI can serve as a framework of principles to guide different funds for global common goods." <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> All quotes in this document are from meeting participants

“The more we can all contribute to a new economic framing that can be described as a common good agenda, the more we will be able to help the UN and other international organisations to effectively catalyse the financing and global capacity we need for the SDGs.”

- A Norwegian Expert Committee on International Development [report](#) recommends that the Government of Norway should establish a specific modality (Category 2) of development finance targeting global public goods, in addition to overseas development assistance (ODA). This framing of a particular modality for additional funding for global goods was seen as a simple but powerful policy recommendation that can shift the norm and narrative around additionality. Work is needed to secure the recommendation into policy within Norway and internationally. GPI principles can further strengthen multilateral cooperation and solidarity around Category 2 spending internationally.
- The principle of ‘all contribute’ needs to take account of the minimal fiscal space many low-income countries are operating within, particularly due to debt burdens. A GPI framework needs to ensure flexibility for these net recipients. In-kind contributions via national capabilities should also be considered for these countries.

#### **Governance**

- ‘All decide’ has resonance in Africa because it increases the power of lower-income countries in international decision-making. However, GPI must continue to be owned and cocreated by Southern stakeholders to represent their concerns fully.
- Civil society participation in governance can help ensure that decisions reflect the needs of communities and supports accountability. Lessons from the Global Fund, the Pandemic Fund and other examples should be drawn upon when designing civil society participation and 'selling' the value of civil society participation to policy-makers.
- The accountability mechanisms and indicators for a GPI arrangement need to be further developed given that the model has a more distributed power structure and, therefore, a different accountability structure to most funds.
- The GPI approach requires power sharing to leverage collective power. Incentives for power sharing, including the national benefits from securing global outcomes, must be better understood and defined through cocreation with country stakeholders.

### **3. Section 3: Next steps and opportunities in the following 18 months.**

- Southern leadership must continue to be supported and resourced to ensure the GPI value proposition is further contextualised based on low- and middle-income country needs. Advocacy towards key global and regional policy processes should stem from and be anchored in this southern leadership.
- Regional applications of GPI principles are currently the most politically viable opportunity and will provide leadership for global adoption.
- A cautious strategy of targeting both new and existing funds and institutions should be taken, building on political momentum and testing issue-specific mechanisms.
- The Norway Category 2 proposal requires domestic and international advocacy to secure Category 2 as a new norm. The GPI principles should be injected into this advocacy to build international equity and co-responsibility around global common goods.
- Concerted advocacy is necessary to capitalise on the Brazilian G20 Presidency to embed GPI principles within international cooperation and financing discussions. Brazil is a key middle-income country engaged in globally significant regional commons challenges (e.g., the Amazon).
- Further conceptual and analytical work is needed to understand examples of GPI principles in practice better and to develop the indicators and accountability mechanisms for a GPI arrangement.

- The role of the private sector needs to be explored further. Through a 'market-shaping for common good' lens, there are many ways that public funding can incentivise private sector investment in common goods, such as seed funding and subsidies, the terms of publicly-funded contracts and Intellectual Property.

## Introduction

The **briefing paper** for this meeting set out a fundamental challenge and opportunity: a GCGA to tackle critical global challenges desperately needs effective multilateral institutions. This meeting was convened to explore how the GPI principles of 'all contribute, all benefit, and all decide' can help to develop the effective multilateralism that a GCGA needs.

Building on a political demand analysis conducted by Equal International (summarised in the briefing paper) and a global cocreation and advocacy movement, this meeting brought together a multistakeholder group, including former decision-makers, policy-makers, think tanks, civil society and foundations. Together, they examined the political pathway for adopting GPI principles as a transformative solution and a new framework for international cooperation around global commons issues. They also discussed how the GPI value proposition can be strengthened to influence key policy processes in the next 18 months.

### The meeting aimed to

- explore the need for a GCGA and the role GPI principles can play in advancing it.
- examine the political pathways and value proposition for GPI adoption by hearing political insights from primarily southern decision-makers, policy-makers, think tanks and civil society.
- identify opportunities for collaboration and coordination between participants and their organisations to take discussions on GPI forward.

This report summarises **the main themes** and **takeaway messages from the meeting**. It comprises the following sections: 1) The need for a new pact on a GCGA, 2) The political landscape for adoption of GPI, and 3) Next steps and opportunities in the following 18 months.

## Section 1: The need for a new pact on a global common good agenda

The meeting began by setting the context for a GCGA, why we need one, and the tools necessary to advance it. The key discussions were:

1. **Colliding global crises:** The polycrisis playing out internationally (climate change, debt crisis, energy pricing, job and food insecurity, conflict, pandemics and trade wars) is causing regression in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adversely affecting all countries, but especially lower-income countries and the African continent. While international cooperation is needed more than ever, multilateralism is frail, and many advanced economies are looking inwards, leaving lower-income countries increasingly vulnerable and marginalised from solutions to globally-driven threats. As a result, African leaders are shifting from a reliance on multilateralism and its reform to instead focus on fortifying regional cooperation.
2. **Agreeing the 'common':** The 'common good' concept must start first with the 'what.' – what common purpose and outcomes are we collectively striving for? Discussions on this question centred on the challenges of balancing legitimate sovereign interests and national development with securing globally common resources and needs. Each country's relationship to the 'global' differs based on national politics, economy, geography and history. Therefore, participation must be at the foundation of defining the common good.

"The biggest game-changer for the Pandemic Fund is to take the fund out of the door mentality into a more universal structure that allows for the industrial capacity to be developed in the global South."

The SDGs are our best current articulation of the common good, but the tools for securing these common goods differ depending on the specific national and global characteristics of them. Therefore, while there was broad agreement that truly global issues, such as climate, pandemics, and biodiversity, are global and represent a high level of common ownership and responsibility, the mode of cooperation around these issues must be contextualised with and by affected stakeholders. Therefore, in conceptualising how GPI principles can be used to advance a GCGA, a common theme emerged: the need to test the application of GPI principles to specific common goods. Common goods at the regional level were seen to more easily bridge the national versus international common interest question, such as cooperation around regional vaccine manufacturing capacity, ecosystems, food security and digital infrastructure.

3. **Limitations of existing tools to secure a global common good agenda:** Discussants explored the tools available in the current international cooperation architecture, drawing out the significant limitations, including the lack of resources (concessional or otherwise) directed towards common goods, the lack of equity and participation in governance, and the lack of accountability for commitments and spending. Underpinning these limitations are geopolitical challenges of trust and competition. For example, ODA and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) are poverty-focused and insufficient for the scale of a GCGA; they do not have the participatory governance required to build increased co-investments. On the other hand, mechanisms more focused on global common good issues, such as the Green Environment Facility, COVAX, and the Pandemic Fund, lack sufficient equity necessary to bring all countries around the table to deliver fair and effective results. Furthermore, loan institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are shareholder-driven models with inequitable governance arrangements that burden countries with debt and, therefore, do not provide the fiscal space needed to respond to the globally driven challenges they face.
4. **GPI as a viable tool for the global common good agenda:** Recognising the limitations of existing tools, discussants assessed the utility of the GPI principles to implement a GCGA. The GPI principles were seen to encapsulate the modality of partnership needed for an effective GCGA by securing equity, participation, ownership, commitment to long-term solidarity, expanding the contributor base and demarcating global goods funding as additional to ODA, and the grant/concessional basis of the funds raised and disbursed. Key questions were raised, however, as to how countries with limited to no fiscal space can contribute; which common goods are sufficiently 'common' enough to incentivise power sharing; whether GPI is a new fund for *all* common goods or for *specific* common goods; principles to reform existing institutions or national budget lines to be managed unilaterally; whether public funds could be raised through international taxes and levies; and how civil society participation can be ensured. These discussions are further summarised in the following sections.

"In building a new framework and to understand countries' needs, we need to bring the past into the present."

## Section 2: The political landscape for the adoption of GPI

Having explored the need for a GCGA, its conceptualisation, and the role that GPI principles might play in advancing it, the core of the meeting discussion focused on the political landscape and pathways for GPI adoption.

1. **Deal-making framework:** The GPI principles were considered useful as a deal-making framework whereby the principles can support the terms of engagement for cooperation around international priorities. The equity and co-responsibility embedded in the GPI principles can facilitate increased trust, which is critical to international negotiations. The COP climate negotiations and Brazil's proposal for *concentric differentiation* were given as an example of where an equitable framework of co-responsibility helped bring diverse stakeholder interests into a common agreement. Building on this, the GPI principles were seen to offer an adaptable set of principles to embed equity and co-responsibility as a norm for deal-making around different common good issues.

"For GPI to be relevant and have ownership and impact, it needs strong Southern support."

2. **A framework of principles:** Participants explored whether 'GPI' was most viable and valuable as a singular fund for common goods, a set of new issue-specific funds, or principles to guide new and existing funds. A consensus emerged that GPI should be seen as a set of principles that can provide a normative *framework* to inform the governance of different common goods mechanisms. Such a normative framework for equity and co-responsibility was seen as a critical deficit in existing multilateral architecture, which is inhibiting a GCGA. Countries and multilateral mechanisms can then sign up to or endorse this framework, using it to sense-check the equity, co-responsibility, and ultimately effectiveness of governance models for common goods such as mitigation, biodiversity and pandemic security. This flexible framework approach was seen as a more viable political pathway than brokering a single fixed global policy agreement, which would be fraught with challenges of national sovereignty. However, many frameworks in development cooperation are not properly implemented — thus, developing strong incentives and accountability mechanisms is vital.
3. **A new narrative:** One of the most significant barriers to progress on a GCGA was considered to be the prevailing political narrative and mindset. For example, in the UK, where even the more progressive opposition Labour Party is not committed to increasing ODA back to 0.7% gross domestic product because of national politics, which is also seen in other traditional donor countries. GPI principles were seen to offer a way to foster a new political narrative of equity and co-responsibility for global common goods, beyond the remit of ODA's poverty focus. Emphasising and framing global common good spending as 'risk management' could further strengthen this narrative because this is a key lens through which finance and foreign affairs ministries view and measure spending. Within this, there needs to be a clear investment theory of social impact. Underlining all of this, the GPI narrative must be firmly rooted in the needs and voices of the global South.
4. **How to structure contributions:**
  - **Concentric differentiation:** the model of concentric differentiation was first proposed by Brazil at the Peru COP20 climate summit. It divides economies into three income groups within which national targets are developed based on the specific characteristics of national economies. Concentric differentiation is foundational to nationally-determined contributions and implementing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities within the Paris Climate Agreement. Concentric differentiation provides a framework by which contributions within a GPI approach could be contextualised to national needs and capabilities, providing a way to define and measure responsibility and capacity to contribute to elements of a GCGA. As with the Paris Agreement, the targets established through a concentric differentiation framework can be evaluated and updated periodically as country capacities and the GCGA evolve. Prior work on contributions to a GPI model for the Pandemic Fund similarly developed fair-share assessed contributions, using country income bands to stratify countries based on their ability to contribute.<sup>2</sup>
  - **Category 2 for global goods:** A Norwegian expert group was set up to assess Norway's development finance and aid policies. The group's recommendations were put forward in the report *Investing in a Common Future* and presented by one of the Commissioners at the meeting. Central to the report is the view that Norway's ODA budget is insufficient to respond to Norway's poverty reduction targets as well as global challenges (e.g., climate change mitigation), which are increasingly absorbing ODA funds. The report, therefore, proposes that Norway's 'investment in sustainable development' should evolve into two categories: Category 1 — maintain the 0.7% gross national income (GNI) commitment to poverty reduction focused ODA; Category 2 — an additional 0.7% GNI for investment in global public goods such as climate and ecosystems, infectious disease prevention, peace and stability, research and innovation, and normative work. The report proposes a commitment to mobilising a further 0.7% GNI from private sector investment in developing countries. The report recommends that these funds be seen as 'investments' to maximise socio-environmental outcomes, rather than 'aid' or 'assistance'.

<sup>2</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/country-contributions-global-public-goods-health-patterns-prospects-and-futures>

“The global South can be a strong broker for global financial negotiations.”

There was broad agreement among the discussants that this framing of additional finance for global goods was helpful and that GPI principles could assist in strengthening Category 2 by providing a framework for cooperation with other countries investing in global common goods. Given that the Category 2 proposal has yet to be policy, significant work is needed to promote and socialise the proposal both within Norway and internationally to embed this new norm of *additional* global goods financing.

- **Limited fiscal space:** it is foundational to the GPI approach that while all countries will contribute, some countries will be net recipients. Still, the limited fiscal space and debt burdens many low-income countries face must be appropriately recognised to ensure there isn't additional fiscal pressure and that net benefits are achieved. A framework of concentric differentiation helps to structure different country capacities and can identify non-monetary, in-kind contributions to a GCGA produced by national capabilities such as pandemic surveillance and biodiversity management. This cognisance and approach to fiscal space would ensure that a GPI framework is complementary to the Bridgetown Initiative.
- **International taxes** on transnational corporate activities were also discussed as a potential source of contributions, such as airline and shipping levies. However, tax justice advocates have long advocated for this proposal, and still, it poses questions and challenges of which sovereign entity would collect and disburse the taxes and whether taxes would be levied at the point of source or company residence. Further work is needed to understand the viability of international taxes, which should be aligned with the work on conceptualising the role of the private sector in a GPI arrangement.
- **Regional public-private partnerships:** a key example of both the regional application of GPI principles and the role for the private sector emerged through discussions of the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) model, which is currently being implemented in South Africa. JETP sees funding from multilateral development banks, high-income traditional donors, national development spending, and commercial banks cooperating to support renewable energy infrastructure projects and skills training for decarbonisation as well as energy security. As such, it meets both global needs (climate change mitigation) and local needs (energy security, industrial development and climate stability) through international and multisector collaboration. A JETP for Southeast Asia is being developed, which could be strengthened by the GPI principles to ensure greater participation and co-responsibility in both the contributions and governance for equitable outcomes. Furthermore, a discussion emerged around the potential for applying GPI principles across global value chains to build multisector, inter-regional co-responsibility of social and environmental outcomes.

## 5. Governance

- **The principle of ‘all decide’ has resonance with African stakeholders.** The current global architecture is not fit for purpose, and Africa is seeking a fairer, equitable, inclusive and accountable architecture. African governments want to change the narrative and contribute to solutions rather than be treated as victims. Consultations in Africa are finding that GPI principles are viewed as an opportunity to restructure power dynamics between the Global North and South, giving African countries a stronger voice in decision-making fora, to determine their own needs and adequate solutions. However, there is deep distrust due to colonial history, leading to concerns about the legitimacy of new agendas. This speaks further to the need for the GPI proposal to be developed and owned by Southern countries to build it as a legitimate solution to Southern needs.

"We need better metrics to measure the quality of public-private partnerships... For a biologist, that would be perfectly normal..."

- **Incentives:** A GPI approach requires power sharing to leverage collective power. To unlock this collective power and respect sovereign interests, the beneficial outcomes of collective investment in a GCGA must be more evident to ministries managing limited budgets. This speaks to the core of the discussion around identifying which elements of a common good are global and national and what the beneficial outcomes are from a national perspective. Work is therefore needed to cocreate issue-specific test cases with decision-makers to identify common incentives.
- **Civil society participation** in a GPI governance structure will help ensure that decisions reflect the needs of communities and support accountability. The civil society seats on the Boards of the Global Fund and the Pandemic Fund are examples where this has been achieved, particularly in the case of the Global Fund, which has been a driver of accountability and effectiveness for equitable outcomes. GPI adoption also requires concerted public campaigns, so there is also an essential role for civil society to play in building the demand for GPI principles.
- **Accountability mechanisms:** power in a GPI governance structure is highly distributed, which poses different accountability challenges compared to a model with a more central axis of power. Therefore, work is needed to develop accountability mechanisms and indicators for a GPI governance model. The Global Fund is one example where lessons can be drawn, as well as foundational elements of federal republic models, which are a type of collective governance and accountability structures.

### Section 3: Next steps and opportunities in the following 18 months

This section summarises the key opportunities and political pathways discussed that need to be developed to advance the adoption of GPI principles.

1. **Southern leadership:** Dialogue and cocreation of GPI principles in the global South must be supported and resourced to further contextualise and build ownership of the GPI value proposition in lower- and middle-income countries. Building on this, key policy spaces and processes need to be engaged and influenced, including those of the UN, World Bank, G20, DAC, Pandemic Accord, Future of Global Health Initiatives process, the African Climate Summit, the Pandemic Fund, the Regional Vaccine Manufacturing, as well as the post-SDG 2030 framework.
2. **Regional focus:** The GPI principles were considered very relevant at the regional level, and the concept of regional public investments is gaining traction in Africa. There is growing political commitment in Africa to build intraregional solidarity and economic integration, as seen in the revitalisation of regional projects like the African Continental Free Trade Area and Agenda 2063. In addition, there is a solid and growing movement for South-South cooperation. GPI principles can strengthen these efforts by providing a framework to broker partnerships for investment and collaboration for common goods. Therefore, work must continue to embed GPI principles in regional initiatives, such as the African Regional Vaccine Hub, expansion of the JETP model to Southeast Asia, and cooperation within the Amazon bioregion. Regional adoption of GPI principles would provide significant leadership for global adoption.

"Don't make GPI a strait jacket; continue to be searchers and not planners... Let it be tested and developed in different sectors and regions; seek momentum."

3. **New and existing institutions** can benefit from GPI principles but represent different challenges and opportunities. Existing institutions have greater path dependency and embedded interests. Therefore, they are harder to change, yet institutions such as the World Bank and the DAC have the most significant influence over the mode and norms of development cooperation and represent the greatest opportunity if reformed. On the other hand, new institutions are easier to influence during their inception. Yet, their influence is relatively marginal, and the arrival of new funds contributes to fragmentation as well as the risk of their own ongoing institutional path-dependency, taking up precious focus and resources if they do not achieve their intended goals. On this basis, a cautious strategy must be maintained of advocating for the adoption of GPI principles as an overarching framework, as well as advocacy on multiple fronts, for example, the Pandemic Fund's governance, as well as the G20, World Bank and DAC reform.
4. **Issue-specific application of GPI:** the discussants regarded the GPI principles as broadly helpful and transformative but highlighted that the GPI value proposition needs to be further contextualised in specific global commons applications as each policy context is different. Aligned with this, proof of concept and piloting in any single issue will produce momentum in other areas. Some of the common applications that discussants considered GPI particularly useful for were ecosystems and biodiversity, oceans and water, JETP, food security, the Pandemic Fund<sup>3</sup> and regional vaccine manufacturing.
5. **Conceptual and analytical development:** GPI principles are already in practice to an extent in several funds, such as the Global Fund and the Green Environment Facility. Further analysis of existing examples will help to demonstrate 1) the benefits and challenges of applying GPI principles, 2) how to secure the adoption of GPI principles, and 3) the impact of a *lack of* GPI principles. Work is also needed to define 'common good' to distinguish the relationship between national and global benefits and develop the indicators and measurements of how 'all benefit'. In addition, a referential framework (or glossary) would help strengthen and speed up understanding and communication of the GPI principles, as they can be interpreted to refer to many things, which has 'constructive ambiguity' up to a point but now needs to become more specific to bring political stakeholders on board.
6. **Role of the private sector:** While GPI emphasises the role of public money, the role of the private sector is critical and must be further conceptualised. Building on the concept of 'collective value production'<sup>4</sup> (which emphasises the need for governments to engage in active market shaping towards public benefits) the pay-out terms for GPI funds can seed private investment in public goods, set clearer public-benefit terms on publicly funded contracts, and strengthen governance of corporate activities, including across global value chains, to better serve public benefits. JETPs are one example of such active market shaping, using public money to direct private-sector engagement in a public good. A clearer conception of the role of the private sector within a GPI arrangement is particularly important for demonstrating the value proposition to ministries of finance who are concerned with leveraging private sector investment. Developing the analysis and role of the private sector in a GPI arrangement and any other public-private partnership, requires better metrics to assess the quality of partnerships.

<sup>3</sup> The Pandemic Fund has been a central point of focus and has seen some progress for GPI adoption, thanks to concerted civil society advocacy, to improve what was, from an equity and participation lens initially, a very retrograde governance model. Critical next steps for making the Pandemic Fund more GPI-oriented include developing a robust resource mobilisation mechanism informed by GPI principles. The Secretariat must also increase engagement with countries to secure greater contributions and commitments. Questions remain on disbursing current funding and ways to manage demand for more sustainable funding.

<sup>4</sup> [https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/sites/bartlett\\_public Purpose/files/a\\_collective\\_response\\_to\\_our\\_global\\_challenges\\_-\\_a\\_common\\_good\\_and\\_market-shaping\\_approach\\_.pdf](https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/sites/bartlett_public Purpose/files/a_collective_response_to_our_global_challenges_-_a_common_good_and_market-shaping_approach_.pdf)

7. **Category 2 policy adoption:** The Norwegian proposal for a 'Category 2' of additional financing for global public goods is a simple but powerful framing to protect the poverty-reduction focus of ODA while increasing funding for global challenges. Work is needed to embed this proposal into policy, both within Norway and internationally. The GPI principles can strengthen equitable international cooperation around Category 2. Therefore, work is needed to develop a GPI framework for Category 2 and embed this in the adoption of a Category 2 approach
  - Recommendation: a follow-up dialogue is necessary to develop how to advance the Category 2 proposal and how the GPI principles can be embedded into this new international norm.
8. **A deal-making framework for the Brazil G20 Presidency:** The GPI principles can support deal-making within the G20 process. The G20 is also a key forum where the utilisation of GPI principles would influence the norms of numerous international financing and cooperation mechanisms. Therefore, the Brazilian G20 Presidency should be a priority focus for advocacy, as the discussion will be grappling with crucial questions of global commons (e.g., the Amazon biosphere), regional development and middle-income country ownership of and contribution to international cooperation.

## Conclusion

The meeting advanced critical political questions on the role of GPI principles in promoting a GCGA and the pathway to their implementation. The GPI principles provide a new narrative and framework to strengthen cooperation and commitment to securing a GCGA beyond the scope of ODA. There is broad interest and appetite for the GPI principles at all country-income levels and among civil society. To capitalise on this opportunity, significant work is needed to socialise and cocreate the application of the GPI principles with stakeholders in different common-good contexts to develop further the incentives and accountability mechanisms, as well as to influence key financing discussions, including the G20 process and the Norwegian Category 2 policy proposal.

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## About Equal International

[Equal International](#) is a specialist international development think tank based in the UK and South Africa, which uses technical expertise to lead cocreation, thought leadership, policy research and advocacy to address marginalisation, the rights of those at risk of being 'left behind', and the drivers of inequality. Equal International has supported GPI's cocreation since the idea's inception, including functioning as the Secretariat to the [Expert Working Group on Global Public Investment](#).

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