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Conference report

**Deterrence, assurance and reductions:
rebalancing the nuclear order**

Wednesday 20 – Saturday 23 June 2012 | WP1175



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In association with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories

Following relevant discussions at the 2012 NPT PrepCom and 2012 Chicago G8/NATO Summit, this conference assessed the role of nuclear deterrence in the NATO alliance. It addressed the implications of US-Russia nuclear reductions under the New START Treaty, Obama's Prague vision for global zero, and regional security priorities vis-à-vis nuclear policy. The implications for NATO's relations with Russia and bordering regions were also assessed. Discussions debated the criteria for successful nuclear deterrence of real and potential adversaries, as well as nuclear assurance to allies.

Key points

- Strategic stability is the West's goal with respect to Russia. Preserving the international nuclear order is no longer simply an American responsibility; it requires partners to ensure stability.
- There appear to be three categories of nuclear posture among the non-superpower nuclear weapons states today. The UK and France are satisfied nuclear powers, and are reducing their arsenal sizes. India and China are restrained nuclear powers. China is not trying to achieve parity with anyone, nor is it developing new types of weaponry. India is evolving in a way similar to China, and sees the role of nuclear weapons as a secure second strike capability. Pakistan is an embattled nuclear armed state that feels an existential threat, is dealing with geographical and internal weaknesses, and believes it must rely on tactical nuclear weapons.
- Russia considers the next level of likely strategic reductions will take both sides to 1,000 strategic warheads. Going below that level would damage strategic stability. Moscow wants future reductions linked to the development of a joint missile defence system.
- The NATO member states of Central Europe are in particular need of continued U.S. assurance. For some, NATO's focus on expeditionary operations has come at the expense of core security. This is not the same alliance that Poland thought it was joining in 1994, for example. From Warsaw's perspective, Russia's growing shadow, as seen in the 2008 Georgian war, its military reforms, its responses to NATO missile defence plans, and its allure to some NATO members as a strategic partner, all weaken the Alliance's Article 5 commitments.

- There are three dimensions to the extended deterrent issue for the United States. One is providing assurance to US allies and partners. But in return, the United States seeks assurance from its allies—assurance that they will stand with Washington in the decision-making process should the West ever seriously consider having to use a nuclear weapon. And it seeks the assurance of nonaligned states that rely on the P5 to meet their obligations, and who in return will help ensure global compliance with the non-proliferation regime.
- In some analyses of Iran becoming a nuclear weapons state, there are several potential regional proliferators that are most commonly discussed: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. Of those, Turkey is least likely to pursue its own nuclear weapons, since such a programme would be costly, Turkey falls under the NATO nuclear umbrella, and neither the Turkish people nor its government have any real desire to pursue such capabilities.

US-NATO-Russian relations: decisive trends and possible futures

1. The Obama administration believes that the United States still has more weapons than it needs. NATO's Chicago Summit reaffirmed the desire to pursue transparency with Russia in order to reduce mistrust, miscalculation, and possible mistakes in decision-making. But it is clear that the United States and NATO no longer see Russia as an adversary. NATO is developing century responses to modern threats, and wants Russia to join it in those efforts. The major threat today comes from the Mediterranean and the Middle East with the rise of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles.
2. 'Mutually assured stability' is the new phrase for relations with Russia. The relationship between Russia and the West will be based on expanded military and economic cooperation. Neither side poses a threat to the core security interests of the other. Strategic stability discussions are underway with Moscow, with one element of those talks being cooperative missile defences. US objectives in those stability talks are to allow Russia to participate in NATO's programmes and see what the Alliance is doing, not just trust what it is telling them; and to forge a true strategic partnership that enhances security for all. There is time to develop confidence.
3. Questions remain about how strong the national consensus on these issues is in the United States. For example, presidential candidate Mitt Romney described Russia as a geopolitical foe. An election year like 2012 posed delays in any resolution to controversial issues. The hyper-divisive political system in an election year admittedly makes it challenging trying to identify common interests and national consensus on national issues. This is normal in a democracy, but it may also be a reflection of deeper divisions in American politics about the course it is on with respect to the Obama administration's 'reset' of relations with Russia.
4. Asian allies sometimes worry about US-Russian cooperation, and what that might imply for the region. For example, how far is the United States willing to go to deal with Russia? How can the West trust Russian intentions, if it fears that they can and might actually attack the West with thermonuclear weapons? How can it believe missile defence technologies are workable in a crisis? The United States has a solid partnership with Japan, with whom they share the Aegis missile defence system, amounting to one billion dollars per year in cooperative efforts. At the same time, strategic stability appears to be broken on the Korean Peninsula. The Six Party Talks are not working. The Peninsula was denuclearized in 1992, but North Korea has returned nuclear weapons to the region in recent years.
5. There are currently 13 areas of discussion between the Alliance and Russia for strategic stability, reflecting everything from conventional forces to missile defences to cyber security. The Russian defence minister had recently described three underlying principles that must be met for strategic stability to work: equality between the players,

an inseparable link between strategic offensive and defence, and an enduring role for offensive strategic deterrence.

6. Domestic politics notwithstanding, the US regards missile defence as a way to build networked regional relationships and a cooperative effort to deal with emerging threats. Allies see opportunities to leverage domestic capabilities and pursue business deals related to the NATO system. Agreements have already been signed with Romania, Turkey, Poland, Spain, and Norway. The level of coverage and breadth of protection will allow many players to get involved.
7. The purpose of the NATO BMD system is to deal with the proliferation of missiles in the Middle East, resulting dangers to Europe, and the possible use of Europe as a way of getting the attention of America. NATO missile defences are not meant to deter Russia, nor to threaten strategic stability with Russia. The system being deployed is not sophisticated enough to deal with Russia, and will be unable to handle an overwhelming attack—it is sized to meet a modest threat.
8. Given its history with the United States, Turkey's goal is not to be in a one-on-one relationship with America. It has concerns about US objectives in its missile defence programme and whether the United States wants to protect Turkey or Israel. It is President Obama's goal to protect all of NATO against current threats. This is a major change from the earlier Bush plan to deploy missiles in Poland to defend the United States. In fact, this is first time the Alliance has agreed to protect the territory of NATO. The plan is to deploy all four phases, but which specific systems are deployed beyond Phase III will depend on the threat that arises, particularly the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. Russia has a role to play in this regard. For example, it could pressure Iran to change its plans, in return for which the Alliance might no longer need to deploy interceptors in Poland.

Appraising the impact of the Nuclear Posture Review on the P5

9. The United States began the process of writing the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) with a review of lessons learned from previous NPRs of 1994 and 2001. One key lesson from those earlier products was that the authors had not talked with anyone outside of the US government prior to preparing those. So this administration invited all nuclear states and allies to make contributions, and held talks with all of them except China. The goal was to enhance US efforts to deal with international proliferation and nuclear terrorism. The United States has held an annual conference among the nuclear P5 to discuss follow-up efforts to the NPR since the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference. There was a desire within the administration to deepen cooperation across the board with the P5. The second lesson from previous NPRs regarded how to describe Russia. The 2001 NPR still named Russia a potential adversary and discussed potential scenarios in which the United States might need to use nuclear weapons against it. That was not conducive to strategic stability, so this perspective was modified in the latest version of the NPR. The United States wanted the new document to be more attuned to the new relationship with Moscow, and to set the stage for future arms control agreements. Therefore it called for further reductions that included non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons, and it made unilateral announcements about the size of the US arsenal. Washington has been disappointed with the lack of response from Moscow. The United States had similar goals with respect to its relationship with China, but it received little response from Beijing.
10. An objective appraisal of the level of success in achieving these high level objectives would admit that the West is a long way from a next round of strategic talks. There are no strategic stability talks underway with China. Cooperation with the UK and France has been more successful, including sustained high level dialogue. Success can be seen in the final result of NATO's Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR).
11. In the realm of deterrence strategy, the United States wants to ensure that its

deterrence force remains appropriately sized for the purpose it is meant to serve. Its primary focus is on regional conflicts that might lead some regional power to decide to use a weapon of mass destruction that threatens US or allied national interests. The United States will not rely solely on nuclear deterrence to deal with those scenarios. Its deterrence forces include nonnuclear strike systems, missile defences, and cooperative arrangements with regional allies. The United States will make decisions on further development and acquisition of specific non-nuclear prompt global strike, and seeks niche capabilities that can influence regional conflicts, but are not meant to oppose Russia.

12. The United States has spent no money on the modernization of its strategic systems since the end of the Cold war. The bill is now coming due. The Obama administration is committed to the current nuclear triad with a defined and expensive modernization and sustainment plan. It is also committed to sustaining a stockpile of weapons and the modernization of the nuclear enterprise. Funding these programmes presents a big problem.
13. This was the first NPR to state clearly and for the record that the United States recognized its NPT obligations. It was also a reaction to allied concerns that they were not going to cooperate with the United States unless they were assured that Washington meant its NPT Article VI obligations. So the United States aligned some of its findings to meet allied concerns, and everyone seemed happy with the result.
14. The US plan to continue its nuclear triad, especially its nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), is particularly helpful to the UK. The key continuing role for nuclear weapons was highlighted in the NPR. The NPR did not require London to make any additional changes to the UK's 2006 White Paper. One change that did affect UK policy, however, was the US decision to retire nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles. This made it easier for the UK to give up thinking about that option as a possible alternative to current delivery systems.
15. The UK has reduced its nuclear arsenal by 94% from its Cold War peak, making it the smallest nuclear power of the P5. At lower numbers the UK will have to see parallel reductions in the level of effect, not just in numbers. The UK's 2006 White Paper did not name likely adversaries. Instead, it focused on three aspects: the re-emergence of a major state adversary, new regional state threats, and state-sponsored WMD terrorism.
16. It proved a challenge for Britain to decide to be completely transparent in announcing its stockpile size and determining how many warheads it had. But the definition of warheads was not easy to determine. When do parts become a warhead? What about those being removed and dismantled? Still, the P5 are very close in their philosophy of what to call a warhead. Expect the UK to continue to provide publicly released numbers as measure of transparency. Furthermore, despite recent changes in the British government, there is no disconnect between the 2006 White Paper and the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. The United Kingdom is unlikely to propose major changes or create contradictions in its policy in the near term. Changing the direction of British policy would require a seismic shift in the international security environment, or a serious domestic political upheaval.
17. In France, Paris appreciated being involved in the preparatory work and the drafting of the final document. That said, the NPR did not have an immediate impact on the nuclear strategy of the other P5 states, including France. US conventional deterrence capabilities give it alternatives that other nuclear powers do not have. That helps explain the US willingness to go further on negative security assurances than others have done with respect to chemical and biological weapons. The US objective of a world without nuclear weapons has been endorsed by nearly all of the other P5 states (except France).
18. The big question from Paris is whether it is the sole responsibility of the United States

to lead the effort to create international strategic stability? Admittedly, the United States and Russia have natural leadership roles due to their arsenal size. But the P5 ought to have a role, as well, at least at the middle level. The priority should be to convince other states to pursue discussions on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. France is making a good faith effort to match the transparency shown by its allies. It releases its stockpile numbers annually, and would like to see some reciprocity by certain of the other nuclear powers.

19. The credibility of guarantees in the eyes of America's allies can take years to create. Strategic dialogues help, but they are not enough by themselves. Deep assurance comes about once allies recognize that they all share perceptions of the security environment. From an Asian ally's point of view, the 2010 NPR had a very positive impact on Japan's level of reassurance. Yet regarding the revised definition of negative security assurances, Japan retains serious concerns over the US guarantee to extend deterrence, given North Korean actions.

The future for reductions and disarmament in Europe

20. There appear to be three categories of nuclear postures among the non-superpower nuclear weapons states today: first, the UK and France are satisfied nuclear powers, happy with what they have, and are reducing their arsenal sizes. India and China are restrained nuclear powers. China is not trying to achieve parity with anyone, nor is it developing new types of weaponry. India is evolving in a way similar to China, and sees the role of nuclear weapons as a secure second strike capability. Pakistan, on the other hand, is an embattled nuclear armed state. It feels an existential threat, is dealing with geographical and internal weaknesses, and hence must rely on tactical nuclear weapons. Outsiders fear the safety and security of Pakistan's arsenal more than its size.
21. How then should the West proceed? First, define its medium term objective. Under what conditions might global zero actually be achieved one day? If today's lack of trust between major powers is not suitable, what is required? Perhaps one should seek a world of finite arsenals of small numbers, where everyone is at the UK-China-Pakistan-India level of warheads. If that is acceptable as a broad objective, the United States and Russia have to do the most to get there, and have to do so together, in parallel. The New START treaty provides a good format for that effort, with its verification provisions. The West is currently witnessing mutual unilateralism within a bilateral framework.
22. Second, if the United States and Russia were to reduce their levels to about half the current levels, at that point they can begin thinking about bringing in the other states for multilateral discussions on strategic reductions across the board. But they should not establish new ceilings for smaller states—there should be a common level without assigned numbers for each state. It is a multipolar but unequal world, and the goal should be to strive to reduce those distinctions. The world can live at that level of restraint with significantly reduced levels of transparency. There is no need to count every single warhead, define what that means, or get to levels of detail where one is unable to guarantee everything. This also allows small states a degree of survivability and security.
23. If the world reaches a point where there is international nuclear restraint at much lower numbers, one then has to ask if that is actually a stable situation, or simply a waypoint on the way to zero. The world still wants to reduce the damage that might occur were a nuclear war actually to take place. So lower numbers are better than the status quo today.
24. An alternative view argues that NATO's nuclear sharing programme makes no sense. Politically, there is no scenario wherein one can envision the use of nuclear weapons by the Alliance. These are militarily incredible weapons, and their use would not be a good idea in any situation. Therefore they cannot deter any adversary. And if they

cannot deter anyone, they are unable to provide assurance to NATO allies.

25. On the other hand, the current plan as highlighted in the NPR and NATO's DDPR is to replace the Alliance's current arrangement with stealth fighters and precision delivered tactical nuclear bombs. Would that make this a militarily usable weapon after all? Would such a move endanger stability? The United States may be converting a so-called political weapon to a precision guided, militarily usable weapon—a process that can be called 'escalation by default.'

The future of assurance

26. Central Europe continues to regard itself as in particular need of assurance, and neither France nor the UK can provide the same security guarantees as the United States. There have been several attempts to create a list of items that add to the assurance of US allies. But in fact there is no such checklist. Assurance is more art than science. The well-known 'Healey theorem', named after the British Defence Secretary Denis Healey, stated that it took only 5% of US efforts to deter Russia, but 95% to assure its allies. That still seems to be true.
27. NATO's focus on expeditionary operations has come at the expense of its core security. This is not the same alliance that Poland thought it was joining in the 1990s. Russia's growing shadow, as seen in the 2008 Georgian war, its military reforms, its responses to NATO missile defence plans, and its allure to some NATO members as a strategic partner, all are regarded as weakening the Alliance's Article 5 commitments. All of these concerns led some in 2008-09 to predict a perfect storm brewing—these issues, at the same time as the United States was preoccupied with conflicts elsewhere, meant that those years were rather fractious for the Alliance.
28. Today, however, the issue of reassurance has been put back on the Alliance agenda. The Alliance's commitment to collective defence was confirmed in the DDPR released in Chicago in May. There have been technological and political advances made in the missile defence project. Some changes to NATO's nuclear posture are coming. The principal of reciprocity with respect to the Russian arsenal has been reaffirmed. The public release of the DDPR was itself reassuring to some allies. While some were modestly disappointed in the results of the DDPR, the fact that it was a public document reaffirmed some key security principles. The United States has also made some moves that have bolstered confidence in the future of the Alliance, such as the creation of joint training programmes, a focus on interoperability, and the renewed commitment to extended deterrence.
29. At the same time, some strategic missteps by the US administration have undermined the surety felt regarding extended deterrence by some allies. The initial change made by President Obama to the Bush missile defence plan in 2009 caught both Poles and Czechs by surprise. The 2012 open microphone incident between Obama and Medvedev raised questions about the US president's belief in European security. And the US pivot toward Asia—meaning away from Europe—was received almost universally in a negative way by most European allies.
30. There may be an overestimation of the need for assurance on the part of the United States, leading to too many assurance initiatives at once. Still, the decisions have been made, some are implemented, and the Alliance needs to move forward. The ultimate question for the Alliance today is whether NATO should retain those US weapons based in Europe.
31. The world has witnessed a unique geopolitical order since World War II, with a global superpower living on the North American continent that allied itself with a range of partners on the Eurasian rimlands to offset authoritarian states that lived in the Eurasian heartland. As part of this situation, today the global strategic weight appears to be moving broadly from Europe to Asia, and within Asia that centre of gravity is moving southwest. So one should expect a reversal of the Cold War days. What

happens in Europe today will be secondary and less important than what happens in Asia.

32. This raises the concept of two models: in Asia, assurance demands are going up, and the assurer is being asked to reassure allies in an uncertain but transformational strategic environment. In the United States, the profile of nuclear weapons is going down, as these weapons are increasingly seen as a relic of the age of cold war.
33. The Asian regional reassurance contour is in disarray at both the conventional and nuclear levels. Two of the five key allies who receive extended deterrence in East Asia, Taiwan and the Philippines, do not have nuclear guarantees. The three that do get bigger guarantees are South Korea, Japan, and Australia. First tier relationships in the region for the United States are those with China, India, and Japan. Second tier relationships are those with South Korea, Australia, and Indonesia.
34. There are no doubts within Japanese society that if they are attacked, the United States will respond on their side. What assures Japan? The Japanese government has actually published criteria for assurance: the steps taken must be demonstrable, stealthy, targeted, and so on. This translates into a requirement for American conventional forces, ISR capabilities, nuclear deterrence, missile defences, and non-proliferation steps to prevent adversaries from getting WMD. The numbers matter: more is better when it comes to deterring a big adversary.
35. There are three dimensions of the extended deterrent issue that need to be considered in the United States. One is providing assurance to US allies and partners. In return, the United States seeks assurance in return from its allies—assurance that they will stand with Washington in the decision-making process should the West ever seriously consider having to use a nuclear weapon. And it seeks the assurance of nonaligned states that rely on the P5 to meet their obligations, and who in return will help ensure global compliance with the NPT and the non-proliferation regime.

The evolving political and strategic balance in the Middle East

A View from Turkey

36. Turkey and Iran have had no wars since 1639, with land borders that are set and unchanged. As a result, both countries have their own sphere of cooperation and competition. In terms of cooperation, there is annual trade of between the two states amounting to \$16 billion, but that is heavily weighted in Iran's favour. The countries have conducted a joint fight against PKK terrorism. And there is a willingness to discuss regional issues, including Iraq and Syria. Competition is primarily based on the simple fact that Iran is Shia, and Turkey is Sunni. This makes for a complicated relationship.
37. Although there are no fundamental differences in terms of Turkey's goals or strategic outcomes in Iran from those of its NATO allies, there is a difference in preferred tactics. Turkey doesn't believe in the value of sanctions, but prefers diplomatic engagement. It wants to avoid military conflict in the region.
38. Turkey's position with respect to the nuclear fuel cycle is that it is transitioning to civil nuclear power. The first reactor is being built by Rosatom, with planned future expansion of the system to meet growing electrical requirements. It has been negotiating with Russia, Japan, and South Korea over nuclear fuel. The official Turkish position is that Iran has the right to pursue peaceful atomic power as long as it abides by its NPT commitments. From Ankara's perspective, the nuclear fuel deal was presented as a confidence building measure, and was not meant to solve the entire Iran nuclear problem. Turkey has not considered the question of a limited fuel cycle. Its first reactor will use contract support from Rosatom which will handle the complete fuel cycle, front and back end. There will be no spent fuel issues for Turkey to deal with. A recent Carnegie poll showed that 54% of Turks want Iran to be allowed to develop an indigenous nuclear weapon programme. In addition, 35% said Turkey should also

develop their own nuclear weapons, and only 8% believed and trusted in NATO as its security guarantees. However, if all else fails, one should expect Turkey to remain firmly in the Western camp.

39. The Arab Spring and the NATO missile defence deal with Turkey have changed things. Deterioration in Turkey's relationship with Iran is one result. When the Arab Spring began, the two states were close in their positions. When Turkey switched its position and supported NATO intervention in Libya, things began to change. Syria today reflects this diametrically opposite position. Turkey is at the vanguard in calling for the removal of Assad in a very hawkish approach. Iran, on the other hand, is giving strong political support to the regime in Damascus.
40. The current government has shifted away from prioritizing its policies with the West. Turkey is no longer as interested in becoming firmly embedded with the West as it once was. It wants to be a regional power that can act in concert with the West. This would make it not quite an independent actor, which is fine, since Turkey would lose too much from an economic and security perspective if it did. Rather, it is trying to discover how to become a strategic player in the region while remaining wedded to the West. Recently, there have been some shifts back to the West given events in Turkey's regional security, resulting in a domestic debate over how far to go in either direction.

A View from Iran

41. Iran saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity, and hoped that the world might withdraw from what Tehran regards as Iranophobia as a result. Some regimes in the Middle East were leading efforts to enhance fear of Iran, especially President Mubarak in Egypt. Today Iran would like to improve relations with the new Egypt, while respecting its history and importance, even though it is a Sunni state. Iran wants to strengthen Islamic views in all Arabic countries. This might also allow Iran to get out of its normal status in the region, in which it is seen as a non-Arab country. It also wants to expand its regional roles in order to balance its relations with the great powers, including the United States.
42. Issues in Syria rapidly changed from an internal issue to a regional balance of power concern. Iran's primary goal in Syria is to maintain its status as an independent and friendly country. But there are other issues, as well: the relationship of the two states' heavy industry, energy security, a future oil pipeline thru Syria to the Mediterranean, and so on. In addition, Iran wants to keep the line of resistance via Hezbollah within Syria, and contain Western views from coming into the region—and more broadly, to keep the West from expanding its influence in the region. There are implications for the regional balance of power. Without solving Iranian-Turkish differences regarding Syria there can be no peace in the region.
43. From Iran's perspective, the NPT requires a lot of giving from Tehran, without getting anything in return. The United States is focusing too much on a potential threat from Iran's peaceful nuclear power programme. Washington is injecting ideological issues into a civil energy programme. The theme Washington pursues regarding nuclear terrorism may underplay the extent to which it would be bad for Iran, too. Instead, the United States and the West could make this an arena for cooperation. Iran was disappointed, for example, not to be even invited to Washington for the 2010 Nuclear Security Conference.

Proliferation, deterrence, and assurance in the Middle East

A View from Egypt

44. Efforts to achieve peaceful objectives in the Middle East have been stagnant for three or four decades. Rising antagonisms between the primary antagonists have hurt the possibility of successful negotiations over security issues, including non-proliferation. The Obama administration raised hopes in the region, but three years after his inauguration the international community is still trying to deal with a nuclearizing Iran.

Western powers rely on escalating diplomatic and economic pressure, and the IAEA works to limit materials, but Iran seems bent on gaining time to work on its programme and enhance its regional influence. So a new approach is needed to overcome the failures of the past. The world needs to overcome the interests of states in the region. The best venue to do this might be the NPT 2010 Review Conference action plan that called for a conference on a Middle Eastern WMD-free zone. Nobody underestimates how complicated the region and the issues are. But what is needed is a forum where states can begin talking, using the talks as a confidence-building measure from which cooperative thinking may develop.

A View from Israel

45. The fault lines between powers are becoming more distinguishable, conflicts are arising, and threat perceptions are being augmented as a result of developments in the region, especially the Arab Spring. In such a situation, it is hard for Israel to envision concepts of cooperative security. In Tel Aviv there is more attraction to ideas regarding counter-proliferation than non-proliferation as a result of the Iranian nuclear programme.
46. Nobody likes the military option. This should and would be a last resort. But the general consensus in Israel is that the military option needs to be left on the table. The recent domestic debate over this option was misconstrued in media reports. It was not a situation where the political community wanted a military attack, but the security community opposed it. All sides want to leave the military option on the table; the question is really about the nature and timing of an attack. Israel does not want to lose the opportunity to strike when Iran enters a 'zone of immunity'. Even after that happens, the United States could still strike Iran, though Israel would be deterred from doing so alone.
47. The bottom line is that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable to Israel. Some think that a balance of terror might be stable between the two states, but most agree that such a situation would be a bad scenario since it could leave to a cascade of proliferation in the region. Stable deterrence is much less likely in a multipolar nuclear region than in bilateral relations. And if Iran gets nuclear weapons, it may become more aggressive and assertive in its anti-Israeli activities. There are some in Israel who harbour suspicions that Iran is using the P5+1 negotiations to gain time to achieve a nuclear weapons status. Israel does not, however, think it likely that Iran would give nuclear weapons to non-state actors or terrorists, because they will know they remain responsible for the results.

Conclusion

Given the level of threats faced in the world today, the number of nuclear weapons is disproportionate. The nuclear powers do not need the 23,000 weapons in their arsenals today. The United States alone still has 1,800 deployed nuclear warheads, 1,200 in reserve, and 3,500 awaiting dismantlement. They are also very expensive, both to build and maintain. The nuclear powers should not passively accept those costs.

The Alliance will face three intellectual conundrums in the coming years. First, public attention will recede in future, and it will be harder to get traction on nuclear issues. The Obama Prague speech and the nuclear summits were valiant efforts to revitalize the debate. Second, as the world moves away from the possibility of big power war, it will also shift to lower level -weapons in regional conflicts. And third, the West has to maintain its nuclear policy while drawing down the numbers of weapons. It needs to balance rhetoric with action, deterrence and disarmament.

So what is a good roadmap for the NATO allies? First, the Alliance cannot take unilateral disarmament steps. Effective deterrence is still viable: the security provided by nuclear weapons reassures allies; makes NATO a predictable entity; and allows states to do other things. As NATO introduces new items, such as missile defences, the Partnership for

Peace, or similar programmes, these can reduce the importance of nuclear weapons.

Second, current regimes that served us well for the past 40 years are beginning to fracture. Significant nuclear states now lie outside the NPT regime, and other states, both in and outside the NPT, are helping some states get nuclear weapons in violation of their treaty commitments. Third, it is hard to tell non-nuclear states that they cannot have such weapons if the West already has them. So the Alliance has to pursue non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives.

The DDPR struck a nice balance between Obama's Prague Speech and Secretary Clinton's five principles articulated in Tallinn, and it satisfied most of NATO's East European members. It simultaneously addressed nuclear deterrence, arms control, and non-proliferation in one place. It also papered over the unravelling of the Alliance on nuclear policy, it showed that the Alliance could achieve consensus agreement. Still, it may not reflect a commonality of views within the Alliance. Cynics say that it merely kicked the nuclear can down the road, to be reopened when DCA replacement issues come up again later. But it showed the value of the process of discussing these issues in a consensual context.

One thing the DDPR did not do was translate NATO's internal debate into a NATO-Russia agenda. But it did reiterate that future reductions of US nuclear forces must involve reciprocal Russian cuts. It also created a set of conclusions regarding NATO institutions. For example, the NATO Russia Council is the correct setting for further discussions with Russia regarding nuclear matters. But there were no formal discussions with Russia during the review that led up to the DDPR, nor was there a Council meeting linked to the Chicago Summit. So how will the Alliance get Russia's inputs into the process? Russia is in no hurry to move forward on the issue of NSNW. It has created a great number of linkages between the resolution of the issue of tactical nuclear weapons and broader NATO-Russian relations. In short, NATO sees these weapons as political weapons for existential deterrence, but Russia still thinks in of them in terms of mutually assured destruction.

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