



Wilton Park

## Programme

### **The 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak: lessons for response to a deliberate event**

Monday 19 – Wednesday 21 September 2016 | WP1496

The dialogue will build on an investigation conducted by the United States to determine how the response from the IOs and NGOs may change, or even cease, if an outbreak is determined to be intentional, or if the outbreak spread to a non-permissive environment. The study reached out to key stakeholders from relevant response organisations who were asked to describe how their organisations would have responded to a fictional scenario in which a non-state actor claims responsibility for new cases of Ebola in an adjacent geographical area with a previously unexposed population. The study subsequently reached out to major bilateral donors to the Ebola response to better understand the challenges and approaches nations would take in the event of a deliberate component to a humanitarian disaster response. This meeting will bring together a selected group of multi-sector participants to glean what has been learned so far and develop firm proposals for action that can be taken.

#### Objectives:

- To understand how the organisations and entities that the world relied upon to stop a naturally occurring disease outbreak would respond to a suspected or confirmed deliberate biological event.
- To identify the main ways in which suspected or confirmed deliberate use affects the nature of response efforts and the roles/responsibilities of key organisations and entities.
- What specific considerations should the BTWC community be examining to ensure appropriate frameworks and capacities are in place for international response to deliberate events and to promote preparedness at the national level?
- To develop proposals, including proposals for future work that can be put to the Eighth Review Conference of the BTWC in November 2016.

#### In association with:



Global Affairs  
Canada

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Canada



Ministry  
of Defence

## Monday 19 September

1300-1400 Participants arrive and buffet lunch available

1500 **Welcome and introduction**

**Mark Smith**

Programme Director, Wilton Park, Steyning

**Governance and coordination to support international assistance**

1515-1645 **1. International governance to support international assistance**

This session will place the BTWC, particularly Article VII, in the context of international response mechanisms. The relevant provisions of the BTWC, UNSCR 1540, IHR and GHSA, and the challenges of their implementation, will also be assessed.

**Yvette Stevens**

Ambassador and Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the United Nations, Geneva

**John Walker**

Head, Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London

Lessons for deliberate events: The outcomes and conclusions of the US BWC-Ebola project

**Rebecca Katz**

Expert Consultant, Public Health Scientist, Biological Policy Staff, US Department of State, Washington DC

1645-1730 Photograph followed by tea/coffee

1730-1900 **2. Ensuring a coordinated response in the receiving country: outbreak response in permissive and non-permissive environments**

Response to an outbreak may take place across a spectrum of possible contexts ranging from response to an apparently natural outbreak in secure areas under the rule of law ("permissive"), to response in a similar environment, but where the outbreak is believed to be deliberate in origin, to a natural or deliberate outbreak in a conflict zone ("non-permissive"). This session will examine how these contextual questions affect domestic and international outbreak response.

Responding to a case of suspect BW use: non-permissive environments – command and control

**John Walker**

Head, Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London

Permissive environments: How is response (tracing, treatment, etc) in areas that remain under government control affected by suspicion or confirmation of deliberate release? How might this affect marginalised or minority populations? How does investigation of alleged use and/or attribution assessment work simultaneously with the humanitarian emergency assistance?

**Mahmud Abdallat**

Director of Preventive Medicine Department, Royal Medical Services (RMS), Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF), Amman

1930

Reception followed by dinner

**Tuesday 20 September**

0800-0900

Breakfast

**Key capacities**

0915-1045

**3. Biosafety and biosecurity**

Outbreak response and biosecurity: safe and secure collection, storage and disposal of samples, medical waste and other materials.

**Gary Kobinger**

Head of Special Pathogens, Head, Vector Design and Immunotherapy, Special Pathogens Program, National Microbiology Laboratory, Public Health Agency of Canada; Adjunct Professor, Department of Medical Microbiology, Faculty of Medicine, University of Manitoba

Logistics: how to maintain access to commercial logistical options (air etc) to transport samples, patients, aid etc in the event of deliberate release rather than a natural outbreak

**Brian Finlay**

President and Chief Executive Officer, The Stimson Center, Washington DC

**Trevor Smith**

Senior Program Manager, Biological and Chemical Security, UNSCR 1540 Implementation, Global Partnership Program (IGA), Global Affairs Canada, Ottawa

1045-1115

Tea/coffee

1115-1245

**4. Availability of and access to emergency medical countermeasures**

For an outbreak for which countermeasures exist, how would the fact of a deliberate outbreak affect availability? What challenges exist regarding international deployment of emergency medical countermeasures? What lessons do past emergency responses offer?

**Maria Julia Marinissen**

Director, Division of International Health Security, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, United States Department of Health and Human Services, Washington DC

**Alejandro Costa**

Scientist, Pandemic and Epidemic Diseases (PED), World Health Organization (WHO), Geneva

1300-1430

Lunch

1500-1630

**5. Treatment of affected populations**

This session will look at the role of NGOs, private sector, government ministries, the military and IOs in response and how treating affected populations will shift between a natural and deliberate release. To include contact tracing in difficult environments and provision of essential services in the midst of a deliberate event.

**Akin Abayomi**

Head of Department, Division of Haematology, Stellenbosch University, Cape Town

	<p><b>Lance Plyler</b> Medical Director, Disaster Response Unit, Samaritan's Purse International Relief, Boone</p>
1630-1700	Tea/coffee
1700-1830	<p><b>6. The role of private sector actors</b></p> <p>Private sector and international entities that provided on-ground resources in 2015 outbreak: how a deliberate release affects what they are able/willing to provide.</p> <p><b>Craig Stark</b> Regional Medical Director, Government Services (Asia Pacific, Middle East and Africa) International SOS Assistance UK Ltd, Singapore</p> <p><b>Susan Erikson</b> Professor, Faculty of Health Sciences, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby</p>
1900	Reception followed by Conference dinner

## Wednesday 21 September

0800-0900	Breakfast and checkout
0900-0920	<p><b>7. eQuestionnaire</b></p> <p>Completion of online eQuestionnaire</p>
0930-1115	<p><b>8. Group work: preparing recommendations for the Eighth BTWC Review Conference</b></p> <p>Group work will be in world café format in the Great Hall.</p> <p><b>Group A</b> What specific role can the BTWC play through Articles VII and X in combating the threat posed by outbreaks of infectious disease caused by the deliberate hostile use of microorganisms or toxins? What actions could/should the States Parties take nationally and collectively in the years following the Review Conference? What are the priorities? How should a new intersessional programme address Articles VII and X issues?</p> <p><b>Facilitator: Alex Lampalzer</b> Political Affairs Officer, Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, Geneva</p> <p><b>Group B</b> How should measures to strengthen Article VII complement efforts being made by the WHO and its member states separately to address the lessons of the Ebola outbreak? To what extent should these take into account work with OIE and FAO? What and where are the synergies? How do we avoid duplication? What initiatives or efforts by the WHO or other international bodies are most relevant to enhancing national preparedness, and international coordination and response capabilities? How could BWC States Parties best support or complement these efforts? Given that BWC States Parties have agreed that emergency assistance might be provided by individual States Parties in advance of a determination by the UNSC that a violation has occurred – and hence when it may be unclear whether an outbreak is natural or deliberate in origin – should provision of such assistance be coordinated with the WHO or other international bodies? If so, how might this be achieved?</p> <p><b>Facilitator: Piers Millett</b> Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford</p>

**Group C**

To what extent should the prime focus be on national capacity building to combat infectious disease outbreaks? And how would efforts here enhance capabilities to respond to an invocation of Article VII? What are the priorities areas here in terms of surveillance, detection, identification, diagnosis and mitigation capacities and capabilities? And how do the IHRs help here?

**Facilitator: Rebecca Katz**

Expert Consultant, Public Health Scientist, US Department of State, Washington DC

**1115-1145**

Tea/coffee

**1145-1245****9. Conclusions**

Report back from working groups and plenary discussion

**1245**

Lunch

**1400**

Participants depart