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Conference report

**Turkey's policies for engagement in the contemporary world**

**Thursday 24 – Sunday 27 March 2011 | WP1031**



## Conference report

# Turkey's policies for engagement in the contemporary world

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### Summary

The timing of this conference could not have been more appropriate, and backdrop relevant. The Arab Spring that has spread across the Middle East and North Africa highlights Turkey's growing importance in the region and the role it can play in facilitating transition to democratic governance throughout these regions.

Turkey is a secular and democratic state, and yet there has been much discussion about Turkey's renewed ties with its neighbours. It has been viewed, by some, as evidence of Turkey turning away from its traditional alliances with the West. However, Turkey's policy in reaching out to the region does not necessarily mean that it has lost interest in its accession to the European Union (EU), or that it is less committed to its traditional relationships. It is precisely because Turkey has widened and deepened its network, and because of Turkey's unique and strategic position, that it has a renewed influence in the world far beyond its borders. Turkey's foreign policy aims, it is argued, are consistent with Turkey's desire for EU membership, and Turkey would be a strong asset to the EU in its neighbourhood.

There is serious concern that Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU are leading to a stalemate. The public in Turkey is largely concerned that the EU is playing into the hands of some key member states' political agendas, particularly in France and Germany. Both are in favour of a "privileged partnership" with Turkey instead of full membership.

On the other hand, there is mounting anxiety in Brussels that Turkey is not implementing reforms quickly enough, or is even back-tracking. There is particular concern over freedom of expression, the rights of minorities and judicial reform.

The EU-Turkey relationship cannot be improved without resolving the issue of Cyprus. Some propose establishing a mechanism for the discussion of EU-Turkey relations outside of the accession process.

Is Turkey's foreign policy approach simply misunderstood? Is Turkey a victim of its own success? How can Turkey continue to progress domestically so it is a source of inspiration for its neighbours? These questions, among others, were discussed over a two-day international conference in Istanbul.

### Turkey's evolving foreign policy

1. Turkey's foreign policy has undergone a transformation since the end of the Cold War. A changed security environment has enabled Turkey to act more independently and assertively, as well as exploit new opportunities in the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. There is no question that Turkey is now a key global power. Turkey is an influential actor with a multi-dimensional foreign policy and immense "soft power" in its region – and beyond. With the current turmoil in the Middle East, given Turkey's geo-strategic position it is arguably more important than ever.

2. Six principles guide Turkey's policies under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since it came to power in 2002:
  - Balancing security and freedom, by transforming domestic politics as the necessary context for Turkey's evolving foreign policy
  - Maintaining "zero problems" with neighbours, since good relations in its region constitutes security for Turkey;
  - A new regional vision for Turkey's neighbourhood, based on a common security zone, high level political dialogue, economic cooperation and multicultural coexistence
  - Overcoming the continuing 'compartmentalized' or divided mentality of the Cold War period, so that close relations with one country are not perceived as being to the detriment of another
  - Reaching out to Africa, Asia and Latin America
  - Playing a more active role in global fora.
3. While it can be argued "zero problems" with neighbours may appear utopian, the aspiration to decrease problems and to retain impartiality in regional conflicts is widely supported. Some see an increasing linkage between foreign and domestic politics, with the government willing to use foreign policy initiatives as a strategic tool for enlarging its domestic constituency.
4. There has been an unprecedented increase in the scale of diplomatic activity. This is particularly visible in the Middle East, where there is ample scope to play a leadership role. Yet while Turkey is engaged more than any other country in the region, it is still trying to develop the capacity to implement such a multi-dimensional foreign policy. The Prime Ministry, for instance, recently opened an Office of Public Diplomacy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is establishing an Office on Conflict Prevention, in order to facilitate a better "whole-of-government" approach to conflict resolution, diplomacy, mediation and conflict prevention. Some caution that Turkish diplomacy may be over-reaching itself with insufficient infrastructure and capacity to sustain its initiatives.
5. Turkey's domestic developments, including broad-ranging democratic reforms, strong economic growth, positive movement towards social cohesion, and widening of education, have contributed to a new-found confidence. There is more emphasis now on promoting stability and security through democracy and the rule of law than a decade ago. Turkey's accession process to the EU has without a doubt provided a framework for Turkey's democratization to take root. Turkey's unique position, with reach to its neighbours in the West and East and ability to influence key issues, would be an asset for the EU.
6. In recent years, Turkey has made substantial contributions in a number of strategically important areas. These include:
  - Iraq, where Turkey has supported the stabilization and reconstruction of the country, politically, through mediation among political parties, and economically, with Turkey's business community in the fore;
  - Afghanistan, where Turkey is an integral part of NATO's effort to bring peace and stability - Turkey leads two Provincial Reconstruction Teams and has committed \$200 million in development support over the last three years; it also plays a valuable role in supporting the Afghan National Police Force;
  - the democratic transitions across the Middle East and North Africa, with Turkey playing an important role in the international effort to address the Libyan crisis; it also provides guidance on political party development, election monitoring and support to civil society in both Egypt and Tunisia.

## Turkey and the European Union

7. Some voice strong arguments for Turkey's accession to the EU. Some 80% of foreign

direct investment in Turkey comes from the EU, while Turkey is Europe's sixth largest economy: there are obvious mutual economic benefits. Turkey is a secular and democratic state, with a predominantly Muslim population, and its membership would increase the EU's diversity. Yet Turkey's accession process has slowed down, in part, because of the unilateral French veto on several chapters of negotiations due to Turkey's non-implementation of the Additional Protocol extending the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement to Cyprus<sup>ii</sup>. Overall perceptions in the EU towards Turkey remain broadly positive; however, Turkish pundits generate enough noise in the media to give the impression that the EU as an institution is against Turkey's European integration. There is intense feeling in Turkey that it is treated unfairly in relation to EU visa policy in comparison to other non-member states. Brussels is still committed to Turkey's accession process although there is mounting concern over the pace of reforms regarding freedom of speech, the rule of law and minority rights. If Turkey is no longer anchored to the EU, some argue, will Turkey's ongoing democratization process be left to develop without a solid framework to emulate? Recent reports, like the German Marshall Fund's Global Trends Survey 2010, indicating that many Turks no longer see accession to the EU as a favourable development are of further concern. A disenfranchised public may not demand its leaders to meet reforms if they no longer see accession as a feasible goal.

8. In order to break out of an imminent stalemate, both parties should avoid politicizing the issue of membership. Ankara needs to be reassured of the neutrality of the accession process; it should look beyond the current political realities in some EU member states and stay true to its strategic commitment to European integration. This implies looking into ways of solving the issues that hamper the process. As long as Ankara meets the negotiations requirements, the process will continue with the goal of full membership. Brussels must encourage member states to end their talk of a "privileged partnership", as this gets played out of proportion in the media.
9. In turn, Ankara needs to reassure its European friends that it is fully committed to European integration. It should keep the lines of communication open with the EU, for example participating in the newly established 'strategic dialogue' mechanism that EU High Representative Catherine Ashton launched with Turkey in 2010. Turkey should aim to coordinate, or at least keep the EU abreast, of its engagements in global and regional affairs.
10. Talks on Cyprus, ongoing since 1977, aimed to reunify the island in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation have seen progress and major setbacks. There was hope that the divided island would be united leading up to the 2004 referendum. However, 76 % of Greek Cypriots rejected the United Nations' Annan Plan and Cyprus joined the EU soon after. On the other hand, 64.90% of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the Annan Plan, leading to considerable frustration over the EU's decision to admit Cyprus.
11. There was enthusiasm, in 2008, for the election of Demetris Christofias, particularly because of his positive relationship with the Turkish Cypriot President Mehmet Ali Talat. The two leaders initiated high-level discussions and supported talks, although they were unable to achieve much. The election of Derviş Eroğlu in 2010 heralded a new Turkish Cypriot disillusion. The lack of trust prevents talks continuing. Both sides are equally frustrated, and the absence of communication contributes to misperceptions and misunderstandings. This includes the perception that neither side thinks the other wants an outcome, or to implement it.
12. Some suggest the way forward is for all stakeholders to take unilateral steps, which would build confidence and help establish an environment more conducive to an overall agreement. Starting with Turkey's implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, these could also include:
  - Greek Cypriots to allow the port of Famagusta to handle Cypriot (including Turkish Cypriot) trade with the EU, under Turkish Cypriot management and EU supervision; to end their practice of blocking Turkey's EU negotiating chapters; and, in the event

of trade beginning with Turkey after it implements the Additional Protocol, open up the Green Line to the passage of Turkish goods so that Turkish Cypriots may also benefit.

- Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to hand back property in the Turkish-military controlled ghost resort of Varosha to its Greek Cypriot owners, subject to a UN interim regime that oversees reconstruction.
- Greek Cypriots to allow charter flights to Ercan Airport in the Turkish Cypriot zone, monitored by the EU.
- Turkey, Greece, the UK and the two Cypriot communities to put in place a mechanism to verify troop numbers on the island; similarly, the Turkish Cypriot leadership to organize with Greek Cypriots a census to determine the exact population of the island and the legal status of its inhabitants.
- Greek Cypriots to cooperate with Turkish Cypriot administrative entities, pending a political settlement, while Turkish officials should meet with Greek Cypriot officials, and Turkish Cypriots should be supportive.
- The European Commission, supported by the EU Presidency, to continue to serve as an honest broker to secure agreement on interim steps. Leaders of EU member states should avoid partisan statements at a time when UN talks continue and no one party is being clearly obstructive.<sup>iii</sup>

13. The Turkish democratization process and developments in the international system thrust Turkey to the forefront of many global and regional issues. The 2008 EU Accession Partnership document encouraged Turkey “unequivocally to commit to good neighbourly relations; (and) address any sources of friction with neighbours<sup>iv</sup>.” As a part of its “zero problems policy,” Turkey established a new policy of engagement in the region. But Turkey’s heavy emphasis on its neighbours has raised concerns among some that it might be giving more priority to issues that are not directly connected to its EU accession process. Ankara has repeatedly acknowledged, perhaps not as vigorously as in the past, that European integration remains a priority. Ankara argues that its foreign policy is in alignment with EU foreign policy, and its engagement in the neighbourhood, notably the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East and North Africa, is mutually beneficial for the EU and Turkey. Turkey is undoubtedly more politically and economically advanced than its neighbours, and contributes to European foreign and security policy by helping to stabilize the region. Turkey is not necessarily a model to copy in all respects, but its successes are certainly inspirational in the region. As the EU struggles to act as a global player, Turkey could provide cultural, military and democratic know-how that could be of great benefit to the EU, not only on a regional but on a global basis.

### **Turkey’s relations with its neighbours**

14. Traditional Turkish foreign policy placed strong emphasis on security considerations. The major players were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military. Turkey’s more recent foreign policy, on the other hand, has seen the rise of the trading state with economic trade and business considerations at the fore and demands for increased markets for Turkish goods. The influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military has decreased; the Ministry of Energy and Under-Secretariat for Trade, for example, together with business groups are now more engaged in foreign policy, with an emphasis on dialogue and cooperation to promote the policy of “zero problems with neighbours”.
15. Turkey’s “neighbourhood policy,” the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) all have an objective to seek a stable, secure, democratic and prosperous market-oriented and integrated neighbourhood. The tools to accomplish this objective are typically the same: to establish greater trade and,



where possible, free trade agreements (FTAs); increase “people to people contacts”; and apply conflict mediation or resolution approaches as required.

16. The major differences between Turkey’s “neighbourhood policy” and ENP or EMP relate to: Turkey’s significant growth of trade and trade diversification as opposed to the EU’s energy-oriented trade with EMP countries and restrictions on access to the Internal Market; the Schengen “paper wall” whereas Turkey has promoted visa-free movement of people; “conditionality” to encourage reform rather than “laissez faire” promotion of reform by default; and Turkey’s “talk to all parties” approach. Turkey’s easing of visa restrictions with several neighbouring countries is of concern to some skeptics of Turkey, though business interest groups have benefited greatly from this policy.
17. In 2010, the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEİK) facilitated an agreement called the “Levant Quartet” to develop stronger economic and cultural integration in the Middle East. Core signature countries included Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. The initiative has been seen by some as a fore-runner of EU-style cooperation. Its supporters aspire to include Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Oman and Bahrain by 2015.
18. While for centuries Turkey and **Russia** were rivals for regional supremacy, their close relations today are not based on strategic considerations but liberal economic policy. Current annual trade turnover is estimated to amount to \$30 to 40 billion, with Russia as the most significant trading partner for Turkey after the EU. Both can benefit from a durable relationship. Yet some tensions remain, including dynamics in the Caucasus, Turkey’s strong presence in Central Asia and policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some question whether Turkey is becoming over-dependent on Russian energy supplies.
19. Following the Nagorno Karabakh conflict between **Armenia** and Azerbaijan, Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993. With the encouragement of Brussels, and in line with its own “zero-problems” policy, Turkey initiated a rapprochement with Armenia. From 2008 to 2009, Turkish President Abdullah Gül and Armenian President Serg Sarkisian engaged in talks that later culminated in the signing of two protocols. Some argue continued movement towards reconciliation was blocked when Turkey coupled it with concessions related to the Nagorno Karabakh peace process. The unravelling of the rapprochement process and the suspension of the ratification of the protocols is testimony to underestimation of the influence of domestic constituencies in foreign policy. There are further suspicions regarding Russia’s engagement in the Nagorno Karabakh issue and in the region, particularly since its invasion of Georgia in 2008. A possible reconciliation between Baku and Yerevan might decrease Russia’s influence in the region. While the whole world’s focus is somewhere other than on the Caucasus, there is mounting feeling this region needs to register on the strategic radar of international players.
20. Since the 1990s, Turkey has been increasingly active in the **Western Balkans**, initially multilaterally, through NATO interventions, and in EU military and peacekeeping operations, but also through its close ties to a number of countries. It brokered a constitutional agreement between Bosnian Muslims and Croats in 1993, and invested in some of the most economically challenged areas, all of which contributed to the stabilization of the region. After 2009, there was a shift towards unilateral engagement, for example in Bosnia, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Davutoğlu. Trilateral relations with Bosnia and Serbia are important, as are those with Croatia and Bosnia, although the latter constitutes a lesser priority. Results are not obvious, however, as Turkey does not have good relations with Bosnian Serbs. Rapprochement between Serbia and Turkey is remarkable and a laudable achievement.
21. Turkey’s economic presence elsewhere in the **Balkans** owes much to the EU. Its Customs Union with the EU was instrumental for FTAs in the late 1990s and beyond.

Turkey trades more with EU members than with non-members in the region: business is more important than sentiments or shared history. This is why Romania, with its bigger economic market, matters more than Bosnia or Kosovo. The EU and Turkey may currently aim for the same outcome in Bosnia and the Western Balkans -- conflict resolution as well as political and economic integration -- but there is a growing sense of competition. Turkey filled a vacuum in Bosnia after the failure of the Butmir talks in late 2009, which made EU member states feel sidelined. Germany did not invite Turkey to the Berlin talks, but opted to bring in all Bosnian parties. Some argue the need for more strategic coordination, suggesting creation of an EU-Turkey mechanism for discussing the area.

22. Despite Turkey bettering relations with Syria and Jordan in the late 1990s, the realignment of Turkey's current foreign policy is most prominent in the **Middle East**. During the AKP's first term (2002 to 2008), there was more emphasis on building stronger relations with all countries in the region; there have been periods of intense conflict, particularly between Turkey and Israel, during the AKP's second term.
23. **Turkish-Israeli** relations were based to some extent on security concerns in the Middle East particularly with respect to Syria and terrorist groups. Following the Israeli Operation Cast Lead in Gaza commencing December 2008 and concluding with the Gaza flotilla killings aboard the *Mavi Marmara* in 2010 there have been a number of incidents causing serious friction between the two governments, bringing Turkish-Israeli relations to an all-time low. While Israeli governments have been responsible for much of the damage to relations, Turkish rhetoric over Israel has been unhelpful. It is difficult to see how a more prosperous Middle East, as well as full regional integration, can be achieved without Israel and peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Can Turkey could rise above the current bilateral problems and restore good relations with Israel, to enable it to resume the mediating role it has carried out between Israel and Syria, and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Turkey has the potential to build understanding between Israel and the Arab world if it can revive its previous close ties.
24. There has been a very marked qualitative change in Turkey's relations with **Syria** with the policy of open borders, broad-ranging economic cooperation and societal contacts. The volume of trade between the two countries has almost tripled between 2006 and 2010, with the balance clearly in Turkey's favour. Yet Turkey's economics-driven policy faces an acute dilemma as the protest movement in Syria gathers pace. How can Turkey balance its commercial and strategic interests with its democratic values?
25. Turkey is opposed to **Iran** acquiring nuclear capabilities, but its approach differs to that of the US and EU. Turkey and Iran collaborate on security and counterterrorism issues. Trade between Turkey and Iran is approximately US \$10 billion, with an imbalance tilted in Iran's favour. This figure is expected to double in the next few years. Approximately one million Iranian tourists travel to Turkey every year. Turkey does not wish to impair its socio-economic relations with its neighbour through supporting sanctions, but hopes to keep Iran at the negotiating table through its engagement. The question arises as to how Turkey can carry out an independent foreign policy towards Iran without prejudicing its traditional relations with the West.
26. Turkey's role in conflict resolution and mediation has perhaps been most pronounced in the Middle East region. Turkey's approach has typically aimed to discover issues and facilitate better interaction, as well as produce a favourable climate for negotiation. In this way it helps advance the diplomatic process. It has generally been less inclined to promote specific outcomes. Some suggest there may be disquiet about Turkey's mediation role, and that it is on occasion seen rather as an 'interloper'; there is invariably the potential for colliding with the interests of others, including other states in the region, not only the US or EU. Yet overall Turkish mediation is well perceived in the region.
27. The Arab spring of popular uprisings across the Middle East has been a trying time for diplomacy. All countries, Turkey included, were caught unaware. Turkey is currently

providing guidance on political party development, election monitoring, judicial reform as well as humanitarian support to refugees from Syria. It has played a major role in organising humanitarian relief in Libya, including the departure of migrant workers. While Turkey does not wish to be seen as a model for countries of the region undergoing reform, it is happy to be an inspiration.

## Turkey and the US

28. Turkey-US relations hit their lowest point during the Bush administration. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 contributed to a rise in anti-Americanism in Turkey. The Turkish Parliament's vote not to allow major combat operations to be carried out from the Incirlik airbase led to suspicion that Turkey was turning away from its traditional allies and its identity as a security bastion for the West. However, during the second Bush term, the move away from harsh rhetoric such as you 'are either with us or against us' to a much more neutral exchange contributed to an easing of relations. The election of Barak Obama in 2009 and his subsequent visit to Ankara re-injected life into Turkey-US relations.
29. Turkey and the US share the same objectives of global peace, security, stability and prosperity. Perhaps, in part because of Turkey's geostrategic location, tensions have continued regarding Turkey's style of engagement with countries such as Iran and Syria. At the same time, Turkey and the US have largely very good relations regarding the Balkans, Caucasus, parts of the Middle East and, in particular, Afghanistan as well as on issues of security, counter-terrorism, economic development, and regional cooperation. In 2010, Turkey and the US launched a Framework for Strategic Economic and Commercial Cooperation to enhance bilateral economic and commercial ties, including in third countries given Turkey's role as a regional business hub. Although the US does not have a vote, Washington supports Turkey's accession to the European Union.
30. Some express concern that policy analysts often do not understand the complexity of Turkey's geopolitical location and its foreign policy choices in the region. One example of this is Turkey's engagement with Iran. Turkey is against Iran acquiring nuclear capabilities, but its approach is different. Turkey experienced the effects of a neighbouring country, Iraq, undergoing sanctions. In the 1990s, Turkey's economy was severely damaged given Turkey had significant trade and commercial relations with Iraq. Turkey is hesitant to push Iran into a corner. More open communication between Turkey and the US on Iran would prove useful.
31. While public opinion in Turkey towards the US has improved of late, there is still a need to counter conspiracy thinking, for example that the US supports creation of a Kurdish state. Moreover, while the American Jewish community is undoubtedly an important political actor in the US process, it does not decide national policy; the Administration does this taking account of another country's actions and behaviour in particular, not only views of lobby groups. The Turkish Government should make more effort to lead public opinion despite the views prevalent in its domestic constituency. The flotilla incident, and Turkey's policy towards Iran, may have strengthened the hand of those in the US Congress who chafe at Turkey's more independent and self-confident foreign policy of recent years. There is a continuing need for the US and Turkey to talk regularly, but also to listen and hear the other's perspective. Focusing on, and strengthening, areas of cooperation will help to overcome differences.

## Turkey and the wider world

32. Turkey has initiated a geo-political approach to regions with which it had previously not been deeply engaged, in some cases re-discovering past links with these areas. There is an economic aspect also to this policy. Two new embassies were recently opened in Latin America, and some 18 in Africa. Turkey declared 2006 to be 'Year of the Americas'; it now has observer status with the Organization of American States (OAS)



and aims to achieve the same with CARICOM, the grouping of Caribbean countries, and with Mercosur, South America's premier trading bloc. Turkey deepened relations with African countries by establishing an annual Turkey-Africa summit, and increasing both monetary and technical aid. Turkey's development aid programmes operate in 37 African countries, providing support in areas such as agriculture, creation of small and medium-sized enterprises and education. At the same time, it has serious security concerns in Somalia, Nigeria, and with pirating in the Gulf of Aden. Turkey has similarly sought dialogue with ASEAN and has deepened relations with China, Japan, South Korea and Australia.

33. Turkey is a member of numerous multi-lateral institutions such as NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Council of Europe, Black Sea Economic Cooperation and Organisation of the Islamic Conference. It held a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) during 2009 and 2010, and has declared its intention to stand again for the UNSC in the near future.
34. Turkey, the world's 16th largest economy, is also a member of the G20, established in 1999 to bring together systemically important industrialized and emerging economies to discuss key issues in the global economy. Since then, the G20 has displaced the G8 as the key forum to debate the future of global finance and global economic governance, Turkey has had the opportunity to be an active participant in this process. The G20 provides Turkey an important strategic platform, and Turkey is at the forefront in supporting an enlarged role for the G20 in global architecture.
35. Although there is a relative increase in prosperity across continents, the parallel increase in demand for energy and energy resources, and the increasing competition among countries to control these resources, give rise to concern. The fact that new mega investments needed to meet future energy demands are not being made because of the lingering effects of the global economic crises aggravate these concerns. At the same time, the increasing demand for energy leads countries to seek new solutions, such as renewable energy. Turkey is an important energy consumer without resources of its own, a major transit country, a huge market for energy products and services, and an investor in energy infrastructure. With one of the fastest growing economies in the world – Turkey has been called "Europe's BRIC" -- its energy consumption is expected to double in the next 15 years. It is located in a unique geographical position between regions where two thirds of the world's natural gas reserves are located and Europe, a major energy market. As such, it is naturally affected by global developments and has a role to play in enhancing energy security for itself and the region.

## Conclusion

Turkey is asserting itself ever more prominently on the international stage, and has decisively reinforced its ties with neighbours and the wider region. In the Middle East, it is regarded as a major success story, both economically and in having modernized and matured politically in democratic practice. In the region, its ties with Europe are valued. Yet Turkey needs to restart its European engines: firmly embedded in Europe, Turkey will stand more chance of continuing with reform, attracting foreign investment and a high share of steady markets, which will all contribute towards Turkey enlarging its global role.

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<sup>i</sup> Transatlantic Trends 2010 is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo

<sup>ii</sup> The Republic of Cyprus was accepted as an EU Member State in 2004 despite Greek Cypriots rejecting the UN Annan Plan that laid the groundwork for unification of the island. The Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement calls on Turkey to lift the restrictions on Cypriot vessels from being admitted to its ports and airports.

<sup>iii</sup> Cyprus: Six Steps toward a Settlement, International Crisis Group Europe Briefing N°61, 22 February 2011

<sup>iv</sup> Council of the EU (2008) "Council Decision of 18 February 2008 on the principles, priorities, and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey and repealing Decision 2006/35/EC":

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:051:0004:01:EN:HTML>