



Report on Wilton Park Conference 754

RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN AFRICA: BEYOND THE PEACE AGREEMENTS

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1 2005: The year of Africa

Economic, social and political progress in Africa has been limited by a number of factors in the post-colonial period. At the present time, the following are among the key constraints:

- Africa's climate and geography, particularly for landlocked, natural resource poor economies with high transport costs and vulnerable, semi-agricultural economies;
- limited diversification, leaving Africa largely dependent on economically volatile primary commodities for export;
- negative perceptions by investors, who tend to extrapolate damaging media information about any individual country to all countries in a region;
- high levels of indebtedness, which tend to lead to human capital flight and consequently limited capacity, both physical and human;
- weak governance, lack of accountability and transparency, which can lead to patronage and short term focus on control of resources rather than delivery of public goods;
- conflict, which causes instability and hampers growth.

The cultural and linguistic diversity of Africa also means that the continent finds it hard to make its voice strongly heard in international fora. Recent statistics on the Millennium Development Goals indicate that the economic indicators agreed by the international community at the UN's Millennium Summit are unlikely to be reached for Sub-Saharan Africa unless urgent action is taken. The dramatic impact of HIV/AIDS is further cause for concern.

Increasingly, 2005 is seen as the year of opportunity for reviewing progress and gathering political will to reverse negative trends. The UN will have a review process (Millennium plus five) at which progress towards the Millennium Development Goals will be assessed. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) is now sufficiently mature to assess progress and shortcomings.

All of the above factors provide the background against which the decision to establish the Commission for Africa was taken. The Commission itself is an initiative of British Prime Minister, Tony Blair and is designed to provide detailed background for increased commitment to Africa. Africa will be a central element in Britain's presidencies of both the EU and G8 during 2005.

The private sector, where most people work, will have to be the driver of growth. Issues for discussion include the poor domestic investment climate in many African economies, high levels of capital flight from Africa, and the overestimated risks for investors in Africa (particularly given the high rate of return on investment). Over the last 25 years, most African countries have shown poor economic performance, although some have had periods of success (e.g. Ghana, Mozambique, Uganda). Additional important dimensions include:

- **Natural resources - agriculture:** Natural resources will be an important engine for growth and poverty reduction. However, the extractive industry, in particular, has been associated both with conflict and with significant levels of

corruption. Agriculture will be a key, not least given the impacts of climate change.

- **The economy – trade:** Delivering a Doha trade round through the World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations will be essential. One key area will be to see what can be done about expanding agricultural trade. Both the US (through the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act - AGOA) and the EU (Everything but Arms Initiative) have looked at expanding trade with Africa. Regional integration will also be a key, as will formulation of approaches to addressing Africa's reliance on primary commodities and vulnerability to price volatility and decline.
- **Empowerment and culture:** Improving service delivery and using more effectively the human capital of Africa will be essential.
- **Participation:** Participation in African political life at every level, including the role of civil society, will be key.
- **Culture and empowerment:** Culture needs to be seen both as a goal in itself (as a method of work and a context through which to help solve challenges), as well as being an asset for development.

Cultural resistance to tackling HIV/AIDS, migration in and from Africa, and the positive contribution from African diaspora groups will all be elements. It is also essential to establish how the voice of the poor can effectively be heard. The sound management of cultural assets, protection of intellectual property rights, empowerment through technology, and incomes for poor, as well as cultural producers are all key elements. The work of NEPAD and UNESCO in this context will be essential. The elements of political governance are also essential.

NEPAD has made progress on its Africa Peer Review Mechanism and others, including the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) through its Africa Governance Report and the World Bank's work on assessing successful governance, are also key elements. Economic governance including public financial management is a key. Initiatives in this field include:

- The UN Convention against corruption and the OECD convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials;
- the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative;
- the Kimberley Process on diamonds and G8 initiatives to improve transparency, accountability, and economic governance.

All of the above add to indigenous African efforts to improve economic, social and political progress.

Peace and security

Conflict represents one of the key obstacles hindering African development. Achieving peace and security is essential for growth and poverty reduction in Africa. This is recognised by African governments and peoples, and at institutional level through the African Union and NEPAD. Progress has been made in recent years, by strengthening regional mechanisms and addressing individual conflicts, although many, including the Congo and Sudan are still far from resolution.

For the international community, it is essential to get the balance right between “African solutions for African problems” and the responsibility of the international community. The balance of responsibility between African and non-African governments is key to this area. Key questions include:

- the allocation and use of aid (humanitarian as well as development assistance);
- the application of political and military tools;
- addressing vulnerability to conflict, including “early warning” analysis;
- promotion of development in unstable situations and effective post-conflict reconstruction.

Areas where the international community can assist, include limiting the arms trade and restricting trade in “conflict goods” (e.g. diamonds). Linking disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation (DDR) initiatives with political and economic aspects is also essential. It will also be essential to see how donor financing and support can best be deployed. Work by Paul Collier (formerly of the World Bank) suggests that careful planning of resource deployment 4-7 years after conflict provides the best benefits.

Particularly compared with the period of “presidents for life” and the one party state, of civil wars and military coups, the situation of Africa with respect to conflict is less grave than previously. This is not to belittle the huge problems of countries such as Congo and Sudan; it is nonetheless the case that many of the other long-standing civil wars now seem to have been resolved.

2 Reversing the trend, rebuilding the continent

For Africa to move definitively beyond the era of conflict, consistently high levels of leadership are needed, both within countries and also in the international community. It is now widely recognised that a peace agreement is only the end of official violence and only the beginning of the consolidation of peace. After the killing finishes, reconciliation and rebuilding are still needed. Whereas in the past, political power in Africa all too often proceeded “from the barrel of a gun”, it is a hopeful sign that former presidents are now living peacefully in their own countries, for example in Benin, Ghana and Mali. To build on the progress that has been made, three approaches are necessary:

- To keep promoting peaceful transfers of power. Here, it is incumbent on long-term leaders to resist the temptation to “play with the constitution”. Ten years in power is increasingly seen by Africans as enough for any leader. UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan is on record as supporting this approach.
- More transparency is essential. This requires an end to corrupt practices and the leadership elite sending money abroad.
- Reform and the security sector: specific policies, tailored to each country in question, are required.

To build on the opportunity presented by the end of conflict, some key points need to be stressed: the primary responsibility for moving to civilian rule rests with the population of the country in question in the immediate follow up of peace

agreements. There should also be an international donor conference where binding pledges and commitments are made and subsequently respected. This is a question of credibility both for the internal and external actors on conflict. Delays are not helpful. If the international organisations push for a programme, they also need the support of non-governmental organisations. It can be disruptive and unhelpful if, at the same time as official negotiations (aiming at peace agreements) are in progress, NGOs are running parallel negotiations. The multiplicity of external actors involved can serve to prolong conflict, particularly if these actors are not directly accountable. Increasingly, Africa is equipped through its regional structures to address conflict more effectively. The example of the major crisis in Côte d'Ivoire is an example. Ghana and Nigeria are playing a positive and leading role with Togo and Niger. For sustainable peace agreements, one of the questions is what to do with leaders of armed factions. This has been called the "what to do with Charles Taylor?" issue.

There is also a great need for consistency from the international community. For example, what are the conditions under which sanctions will be imposed? What are the criteria for lifting sanctions?

There is also a need for clear resolve, and an indication that no return to war will be tolerated. There cannot be "no go" areas. There is a certain indication that many developed countries regard the conflict in Congo as "too difficult". The formula "African solutions for African problems" must not be used as an excuse for the international community to wash its hands of conflict and to abrogate responsibility. Rather, if African institutions are taking the lead on an issue, they must be supported by the international community in order to play this role effectively.

3 NEPAD

During the recent session of the assembly of the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa, the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan stated that the persistence of conflicts in Africa such as that in Darfur impaired the vision that the continent wants to create for itself. The development of NEPAD and the founding of the AU (as successor body to the OAU), indicates a new urgency among African states to develop effective institutions. Africa is making a determined effort to move beyond the era when power preceded "from the barrel of a gun". Of 107 African leaders overthrown between 1960 and 2003, two thirds were murdered, jailed or forced into exile. Until 1979, 59 African leaders had been removed, only three had retired peacefully and not one had been voted out of office. The African Union is determined that it should not have leaders sitting around its table who come to power by means of coups.

NEPAD goes beyond this and has instituted the African Peer Review Mechanism. Under this mechanism, African states submit themselves to assessment by fellow Africans. It is an attempt to ensure that sound political, economic and corporate governance is achieved. NEPAD enjoys tremendous goodwill within and outside Africa. It has been criticised, however, as an initiative of African leaders, rather than African peoples. Nonetheless, it has succeeded in establishing new structures for accountability.

The G8, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and United Nations have all provided favourable endorsement of NEPAD as a basis for future relations with Africa.¹

One of the challenges which NEPAD faces is how to organise the exchange of experience and information between African countries facing similar issues. Post conflict reconstruction is one case in point. Many countries have a truth and reconciliation commission or equivalent. Working with other continental and international organisations and involving civil society groups, NEPAD is in a strong position to foster the exchange of information on such processes.

Similarly, the undermining effect of corruption is an issue on which African countries can also develop and exchange models of best practice.

The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has raised additional new possibilities. In January 2004, President Museveni of Uganda, became the first head of state to ask the ICC to open an investigation into a domestic situation, the conflict in Northern Uganda between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan forces. The charges against the LRA include abduction of thousands of children, many of whom have allegedly been used as child soldiers, sex slaves or human shields. Murder and mutilation have also been widely reported. However, as there are also human rights allegations against government forces, this is a complex and contentious issue.

In June 2004, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno Ocampo announced that the first investigation of the ICC would be into serious human rights offences allegedly committed in the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo, after July 1 2002 (the date when the Rome Statute of the ICC came into force).

NEPAD represents a new institutional possibility within Africa. The effectiveness of the African Peer Review Mechanism has yet to be proved and it faces many challenges – the case of Zimbabwe can be mentioned. It is a genuinely African initiative and has the external support of the international community.

¹ In November 2002, the UN passed a resolution (A/RES/57/2).

4 Structural causes of conflict and violence in Africa

It has been argued that crisis and large-scale violence in between African states emerges from four structural conditions in particular:

- Authoritarian rule;
- the exclusion of minorities from government;
- socio-economic deprivation combined with inequity;
- weak states that lack the institutional capacity to manage normal political and social conflict.

For any external power considering intervention or indeed internal actors, this approach throws up a number of implications:

- It is necessary to focus more on the structural causes of violence than on violence *per se*;
- it is necessary to distinguish between the symptoms and causes of intra-state crises;
- intra-state crises cannot be resolved quickly and easily;
- intra-state crises do not end with a cessation of warfare;
- peace-building strategies are the only viable means of preventing and resolving a crisis;
- good governance requires efficiency and effectiveness on the part of state institutions;
- political stability requires structure, accommodation and diversity;
- peacemaking and peace-building are primarily the responsibility of local rather than foreign actors;
- international actors should practice what they preach;
- foreign actors should “do no harm”.

5 Democratic control of the security sector

Overwhelmingly, in recent decades, armed conflict has either been internal conflict (civil war) or internal conflict which has been exacerbated by intervention of cross-border forces. Traditional wars of country A against country B have been rare. Civil war, in turn, is rare in well functioning democracies. The cleavages which lead to states breaking apart are familiar: regional problems, often compounded by ethnic/racial divisions, maldistribution of resources within the country, a sense of exclusion among large sectors of the population, and weak state institutions, are all indicators of potential difficulties. The unfettered power of security forces in many African states has itself been a trigger for violence; *coups d'état*, gross human rights violations and murder of political activists and innocent civilians, corruption and the abuse of power by the security forces, are all familiar. Under such circumstances, the issue of effective democratic control of the armed forces presents itself. In many African countries, rebel groups have taken up arms against the government, and often succeeded in taking over the government. Transition of power has often been by armed force.

Other linkages can be observed:

- Linkage with production of hard drugs, for example Collier and colleagues in their report *Breaking the Conflict Trap* have observed that 95% of global opium production is in civil war countries.
- HIV/AIDS has spread as a result of the social dislocation generated by armed violence, and armed forces, whether of the government or of rebels, have often been the cause for the spread of HIV/AIDS.
- The connection between situations of civil war and international terrorism can also be observed. Afghanistan under the Taliban provided an ideal setting for Al-Qaeda.

Against this background, the issue of democratic control of armed forces must be seen as an important issue. Core principals for democratic governance of the security sector include:

- ultimate authority on key security issues must rest with elected representatives;
- security organisations should operate in accord with international and constitutional law, as well as respecting human rights;
- information about security planning and resources must be widely available both within government and to the public;
- civil-military relations must be based on a well articulated hierarchy of authority between the civil authorities and the defence forces;
- civil authorities, particularly elected representatives, need to have the capacity to exercise political control over the operations and financing of the security forces;
- civil society must have the means and capacity to monitor security forces and provide constructive input into the political debate on security policy;
- security personnel must be trained to discharge their duties professionally and should reflect the diversity of their societies, including women and minorities.

In order to support such aspirations, Western governments need to support the development of democracy in Africa through increased support to parliaments to strengthen systems of good governance and build capacity for effective parliamentary oversight.

In fragile societies in Africa there is a need for peace-building support and strengthening the capacity of regional and sub-regional organisations to bring order to these societies as well as dealing with emerging threats and security. African parliaments and civil society need to ensure that the armed forces do not interfere in domestic policy in their country. The democratic control of the defence budget and policy is essential. The emphasis on good governance should create a space for democratic debate about the rule of the armed forces. It should also strengthen the rule of law. Democratisation of the security sector is an important condition for reducing insecurity and consolidating democracy and good governance.

6 National and international responsibility for conflict resolution: Case study - Liberia

Until the end of the 1990s, Liberia was known as one of the most stable countries in Africa. The descent into civil war, particularly since 1989, has led to the death of 300,000 people. Liberia, from being a relatively peaceful and stable country has served as a negative example of the impact of war in poor African countries: resulting in waves of refugees and illegal immigrants, trafficking of human beings, narcotics, weapons and diamonds - a fluid and dangerous system where national borders are not recognised and non-state combatants are active.

The genesis of conflict in Liberia can be marked as the April 12th 1979 Rice Riots when Liberians demonstrated against a proposed increase in the price of rice, the nation's staple food. Only a year later, Liberia became a military dictatorship. In 1985, the country suffered rigged presidential elections. This led to an invasion led by a former armed forces general in 1985, followed by the 1989 incursion of president Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia. The country had hoped that the death toll of 300,000 would be a matter of history at the time of the 1997 presidential and general elections. Unfortunately, the elected government failed to promote good governance and the rule of law. It also failed to provide the economic basis for development and the improvement of the majority of lives of Liberians.

Since August 2003, and the peace agreement in Accra, a national transitional government in Liberia has been put in place. There is a UN force of 15,000 UNMIL soldiers on the ground and almost 2,000 international civilian police and more than 500 international civilian staff. The disarmament programme has also been a marked success with almost 57,000 former combatants being disarmed and de-mobilised.

A key focus for the National Transitional Government of Liberia is the rebuilding of infrastructure and the institutions destroyed in the 14 year war. The aspiration is to hold free and democratic elections in October 2005. This is a complicated process, not least because of the large number of potential political parties and presidential aspirants. Unfortunately, many of the candidates who have so far declared their

intentions are perceived by many in the country as in one way or another implicated in the previous political problems. Others among the candidates are seen as having enriched themselves from the corrupt and exclusionary political culture of the past.

It is essential that whoever comes to power is not seen as having been seriously implicated in the problems of recent years. However, is it possible that a relatively unknown figure can command respect and effectively wield political power? Many people recall the way in which the President Taylor came to power in 1997. This was achieved through a mixture of outside and local support and a heavily ideological campaign suggesting that he was “best” for the country and that he could alone ensure peace.

The prospects for durable peace in Liberia are, however, closely tied up with peace processes in other West African countries. In particular, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea must be mentioned as a result of the movements of combatants and smuggling of arms from Liberia into these countries.

The following are some of the lessons from the Liberian case:

- An effective post-conflict leadership is needed to transcend the problems of the past. This will have to be transparent, accountable and visionary. Elections alone cannot be seen as a panacea for deep-seated problems. The “imperial presidency”, or the cult of the president, is a corruption of national values related to chieftaincy. It has led to dictatorship in many countries.
- Division of powers, decentralisation of civil administration and a robust civil society are needed.
- Before elections, it is essential to have a clear and binding agreement as to how the wrongs of the past will be addressed, in terms of truth and reconciliation on the one hand, or strong legal measures to end the culture of impunity. A national dialogue can often be helpful in this regard.
- Leadership must be seen not as an opportunity for an elite to exploit the country, but must be based on economic empowerment, broad based development and the protection of human rights and the rule of law.
- Leaders and people must promote nationalism and patriotism rather than divisive identities, including ethnic or tribal rivalries.
- Both at national and international level, the role of armed forces is ambivalent. Armed forces are needed to secure stability and prevent insurgency; they can also act effectively through international bodies. However, Africa’s history of coups and military interventions remains a current problem.
- The international community also has responsibilities: harbouring potential insurgents in neighbouring countries is a recipe for continued destabilisation and armed conflict. Effective prosecution for war crimes is essential.
- The international community must continue to send out a clear message that tyrants and brutal dictators will not be supported or tolerated.
- The social and economic conditions for stability in Africa must also be created.
- Peaceful democratic change is a prerequisite for effective leadership, but requires a level playing field, resources for voter education, media access for all candidates and capacity building for political institutions.
- Funding for security sector reform will continue to be needed.
- Resources are also needed for development of infrastructure, and the restoration of the social infrastructure (e.g. the legal and education systems), which are often seriously impaired as a result of civil war.

7 How much truth? How much reconciliation? The case of Sierra Leone

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone was a product of the Lome Peace Agreement of 1999. It was inaugurated by the President in 2002. In addition, the Special Court Act of 2002 invited the United Nations to set up an international criminal tribunal to “try and bring to credible justice those members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and their accomplices responsible for committing crimes against the people of Sierra Leone and for the taking of the United Nations Peace keepers as hostages”.

Establishing such a commission requires the readiness to address many difficulties. Crimes against humanity cannot be ignored. Many of those, however, who were responsible for major violations of human rights, are very powerful and thus difficult to “bring to book”. The principle of full disclosure before any amnesty, as exemplified in the South African case, has important implications. The model chosen for Sierra Leone did not exchange immunity from prosecution for full disclosure in cases of major human rights violations. Within Sierra Leone, there was no agreement as to how the reconciliation process could best be achieved.

The factual findings of the Commission are themselves interesting. One of these is that the “conflict diamonds”, contrary to conclusions of much of the externally written analyses, were not a major cause of the conflict. The actions of Charles Taylor became a trigger for the conflict which was inevitably moving towards armed confrontation. The greed, corruption and nepotism which an elite followed, reduced most people to a state of poverty. When the armed phase of the conflict broke out, appalling levels of indiscriminate violence occurred. In various ways all the armed factions involved in the conflict were responsible for systematically plundering and looting the country. The RUF of Charles Taylor was the primary violator of human rights in the conflict, although the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Sierra Leone Army and the Civil Defence Forces also were responsible for major violations of human rights (in descending order of gravity).

For many Sierra Leonians, the Special Court has a key role. There will be no meaningful reconciliation until those who are responsible for the most serious violations of human rights are punished. At the same time, many communities have begun accepting back the young people who were engaged in the war into their communities.

In the hearings of the Commission, over and over again, the value of reconciliation was seriously questioned if the material conditions of the victim did not improve. This led to the Commission deciding to recommend the Comprehensive Reparations Programme for those whose lives had been devastated. Truth telling without reparation could easily be seen as an incomplete process. Restorative justice requires not only truth telling but reparations and is thus able to strengthen the reconciliation process.

8 Senegal: the Casamance Conflict

The Casamance Conflict has never been on the international agenda, but it remains a volatile situation because of the history, geography, and demography of the conflict. It also poses real issues of governance for the government of Senegal. The events of 1982 (a huge demonstration) and 1983 (the rally in Dakar) emphasised two points. The first was a generalised rejection of armed struggle as a way of resolving the issue and a call on central government to live up to its responsibilities. The rally in 1983 was an important turning point. For many years, the situation has been one of stalemate, with each side calling for a durable peace.

The range of responses to the conflict have shown that a military response did not work and administrative measures have so far been insufficient to resolve the grievances. The 1996 process of de-centralisation was promising, but was not able to do enough.

The conflict is ripe for confidence-building measures. Neighbouring countries must play a positive and supportive role, in particular, Guinea Bissau and Gambia. The regional organisations must act as a guarantor of an internal settlement. The conflict is important from the point of view of an inter-cultural approach to conflict resolution. Aid cannot be a tool for conflict resolution, unless there is a durable and viable solution, aid itself will exacerbate the tensions. As in so many conflicts, civil society also has an important role in the resolution of this issue.

9 Peace, security, democracy and development in the Great Lakes region of Africa

There are strong geographical, sociological and geopolitical reasons for treating the Great Lakes area as a coherent region;

- Geographically, the region refers to the countries which border on the Great Lakes of Africa, Lake Idi Amin, Lake Mobutu, Lake Victoria, Lake Kivu, Lake Tanganyika.
- Sociologically and geologically, the Great Lakes region is a mountainous area bordering on the Great Lakes, a volcanic region with good soil for cultivation, a region with good weather and high density of population and high population growth. These characteristics can be seen from Ituri, Eastern DRC to Western Kenya and South to Katanga and North Zambia;
- Geopolitically, the Great Lakes crisis has affected most of the countries of central Africa. There are seven core countries, the DRC, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. In addition, the current peace discussions also include Angola and Congo Brazzaville. These latter two countries also feel the negative impact of the crisis. Both of these countries still host many refugees from Rwanda.

Background to the international conference

In 1986, civil conflict in Uganda spilled over to Tanzania and served as one of the causes for Tanzania to intervene in Uganda and remove Idi Amin. Conflicts in Northern Uganda still have a regional and national impact. President Museveni has justified his intervention in the DRC by arguing that rebel armed groups are using the DRC territory to attack government positions in Uganda. Northern Uganda remains unstable and this raises security concerns for Uganda, the DRC and Sudan;

- The Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) organised Rwandan refugees in Uganda. Rwandan Tutsi refugees settled there and in the Eastern DRC from 1962 onwards, after the Hutu majority took power in Rwanda at independence. Tutsi groups began organising and found opportunities for military training as they integrated into Museveni's struggle against Amin. After the Rwandan genocide, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) took power by military means. Two million refugees fled the country and 1.2 million settled in the DRC. These included many who had been responsible, in some way, for the genocide. The new Rwandan government regarded the Interahamwe as a threat and sought to resolve the issue by force on DRC territory.

The Mobutu dictatorship was overthrown in 1996-1997 by Laurent Kabila. From 1998 onwards, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe supported DRC government forces against new rebel movements supported by Rwanda and Uganda

The crisis in Burundi must also not be overlooked. Former president Ndayishimiye has focussed the attention of the world on this issue. Two presidents of Burundi have been killed in recent years, one by the army, and the other in the same aeroplane as Habyarimana. The problem of refugees from Burundi is a burden to Tanzania. It is also a problem for the DRC. Burundi has sent troops into the DRC alongside Rwandan and Ugandan troops. In recent years, then, the region has suffered five

million dead (1.5 million in Rwanda through genocide and war and 3 million in DRC alone) as well as millions of refugees and internally displaced persons. Peace processes, ceasefire agreements and accords in single countries cannot solve the regional complex of issues.

The international conference

Mandated by the UN Secretary-General, Ibrahima Fall, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Senegal, has been appointed as Special Representative for the region. In March 2003 he toured the countries of the region and met all the heads of states, who agreed that the time had come to begin a preparatory process for the Great Lakes Conference.

It is recognised that for this conference to be a success, the preparatory process must ensure ownership of the process by the peoples of the region. It is also widely recognised that leaders signing peace agreements, but these not being followed through, is not a recipe for sustainable peace. The issues are being addressed in four clusters:

- Peace and security;
- Democracy and good governance;
- Economic development and regional integration;
- Social and economic issues.

Clearly, security issues are not the only factors leading to deterioration in the security climate. Poor governance and corruption, for example, in the case of DRC, have been major sources of insecurity for the entire region. Internal policies of ethnic exclusion are dangerous for all, as the cases of Rwanda and Burundi show.

Towards a Stability and Development Pact for the Great Lakes Region

The challenging and comprehensive approach which has been adopted will require progress to be made on all four of the issues outlined above. National coordinators have been identified and from June 2003 to July 2004, consultative work at national level has been undertaken. The period August-September 2004 was dedicated to work by preparatory committees established by each government. Three meetings of preparatory committees were scheduled for September and October 2004. A summit of heads of state is planned for Dar es Salaam from 16-18 November with another summit planned for June 2005.

10 Sudan: a multi-layered conflict

With the exception of the period 1972-1983, Sudan has been in a situation of open civil war for most of the period since its independence almost fifty years ago. The most obvious conflict is the North-South civil war, but in recent months, the humanitarian crisis in Darfur has, as well as the direct cost of the war (over 2 million lives), been a source of regional instability and widespread humanitarian suffering. The Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) has stressed that the transformation of the conflict in Sudan has to begin with direct negotiations between the two warring parties. In addition to these North-South negotiations (Government of Sudan, and Sudan People's Liberation Movement), there also needs to be a consultative process among Sudanese political forces and civil society regarding the other conflicts. Both the government of Sudan and SPLM have incorporated representatives of other groups into their negotiating delegations. This approach has to be understood both in terms of coalition-building and also as anticipating final agreements on power sharing, wealth sharing and security. The agreements made on the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei recognise the unique grievances and historical circumstances in each of these areas. The agreements on the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile could be an eventual model for resolving local grievances in Darfur.

The current crisis in Darfur, as well as being possibly the most serious humanitarian crisis in the world today, has also led to a stand-off between the government of Sudan and the international community, currently being played out in the United Nations. The Darfur crisis could also de-rail a potential North-South agreement. Or, to put it the other way round, it is impossible to conceive of a robust North-South peace accord while violence continues in Darfur. At the very least, any UN mandated monitoring mission will have to be deployed throughout the country, including in Darfur. Given the long history of conflict, and the strength of feeling in the South, it is still likely to prove very difficult to get support from the South for national institutions.

US policy on Sudan aims at;

- promoting peace, democracy and good governance;
- fostering growth oriented sustainable development;
- encouraging trade, investment and debt relief;
- providing post conflict humanitarian assistance;
- contributing to the global war on terrorism.

“Normalisation of relations” depends upon performance of the government of Sudan in implementing future peace accords, especially the good governance and human rights provisions. If such conditions are met, Sudan will be a high priority for debt relief under the provisions of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.

The international community recognises that the African Union has a particularly important role to play in the Sudan situation generally and the Darfur crisis in particular. Understandably, there is great reluctance to move to a Chapter 7 peace enforcement mandate for a UN monitoring mission. The mandate for a mission is more credible under Chapter 6. It is highly unlikely that major countries would make the troops available for an operation of the size necessary given the huge

geographical area of Sudan. However, the US and other countries have made it clear that they would expect to be major donors of humanitarian and development assistance once a credible peace agreement is signed. Safeguards relating to governance and transparency will, however, have to be strong as neither the North nor the South has a good record of accountability. The presence of unknown quantities of oil may well require international monitoring in accordance with the wealth-sharing provisions of a peace accord. In addition, the strong sense within Africa and internationally is that Sudan should remain as one country.

Lessons from the case of Sudan

Many argue that African countries and indeed African organisations (primarily the African Union and regional bodies) must take the lead in conflict resolution. Such efforts also require strong and co-ordinated international support;

- the parties to the conflicts must be held primarily accountable for carrying out agreements;
- African regional organisations and the African Union should strengthen and be assisted in strengthening their conflict resolution efforts;
- Agreements under negotiation should aim at establishing an inclusive democratic framework;
- The international community must make a commitment to assist with reconstruction, development, governance and humanitarian needs.

11 Responding positively to political violence: the Mozambican Agenda 2025 Process

Even after its struggle for independence, Mozambique suffered for 16 years of civil war with external involvement – from Rhodesia and South Africa. In 1992, peace agreements were signed. In 1994 the first multi-party elections were held, but even by the end of the century, the social, economic and political situation in Mozambique remained difficult.

According to the UN, the war had cost Mozambique at least 15 billion dollars in a country that was only generating 250 million dollars in exports each year. Mozambique was thus under-performing as a result of a range of factors, including the poor dialogue between the main political parties, ethnic, regional, racial and cultural divisions. The country was also heavily indebted, and having difficulty paying its external debts. As the millennium approached, Mozambique was further shaken by floods, drought and a general election (in 1999), the results of which were contested.

In addition, the country was heavily aid-dependent and receiving 550 million dollars each year, representing 50% of the national budget. International aid was channelled through relatively weak government institutions. The agricultural sector, on which 70% of the population depended, was not receiving significant support. Unemployment and inequity were growing and creating instability. There were also regional divisions within the country and a poor harmonisation between the macro

and micro levels within the economy. Corruption was growing and the legal system was ineffective. In the last three decades, Mozambique had lived through three different political economic and social systems: the colonial system, the socialist experiment and the present capitalist system.

Agenda 2025: vision and strategies for the nation

In light of the above difficulties, the President of Mozambique formulated a plan for a long-term national agenda, to strengthen unity, promote growth and employment and to address the asymmetries within regional resource allocation. Fourteen leading personalities, reflecting different views were chosen as a Committee of Counsellors. These were not there to represent a political party, interest group or other faction. The group was to address any issues deemed necessary. The work would be done by Mozambican citizens and any external support would be precisely that – external and in a supportive capacity. The analysis, research and decision-making would only be undertaken by nationals.

A one page “declaration of commitment” was produced and eventually, at the end of two years of analysis, debate and discussion, a 180-page consensus document was achieved. The purpose of the report was to answer questions such as:

- What are the long-term aspirations of Mozambicans?
- What conditions affect the ability of the country to achieve desired outcomes?
- What are the alternative scenarios for the future?
- What vision of society underlines the aspirations formulated?
- What challenges need to be confronted?
- How should Mozambique coordinate with International partners to achieve the vision and strategies?

The process itself was very extensive: as a result of meetings in 128 districts, 12 “thematic” nuclei were developed: the aspirations formulated in these meetings included:

- Education: To respond to the challenges by 2025, with an emphasis on literacy and adult education, but also stressing self employment:
- Health: emphasis on the quality of primary care and extension of sanitary services:
- Promotion of commercial agriculture for income generation (i.e. the market):
- Mechanisation and use of irrigation systems:
- Agro-industries to add value to local production:
- Rational use and sustainable management of natural resources, particularly forests:
- Maintenance and development of basic infrastructure, access to water and electricity:
- Permanent access to inter-provincial roads and between districts:
- Promotion of a culture of peace, dialogue, inclusiveness and reconciliation:
- Government without corruption, and quick and easy access to services:
- Reduction of asymmetries in economic development within the country:
- Creation of equal opportunities for citizens:
- Better distribution of the wealth and reduction of social inequalities.

Four scenarios, named after the goat, the crab, the turtle/tortoise and the bee have been formulated. These take into account 20 variables which have been outlined for human capital, social capital, economy and development and government;

- The “goat” scenario – prevalence of high corruption, lack of transparency, refusal of dialogue, and exclusion which could even lead to a war situation, or generate an authoritarian regime. In short, the “goat” devours everything and destroys the possibilities of growth;
- The “crab” scenario is characterised by some dialogue, some openness, but an increase of corruption and less economic benefit for nationals. The crab goes backwards as well as forwards and progresses in a rather uncertain way.
- The “turtle/tortoise” suggests a better situation than the current one; better education and health services; better government, an increase in economic competitiveness, the creation of jobs and more opportunity for nationals, but some corruption. The turtle/tortoise progresses but only slowly.
- The “bee” scenario preserves peace, promotes inclusiveness and dialogue and society acts in an entrepreneurial way. It achieves significant improvements in education and health services at local level, promotes inclusion and stimulates business.

In popular debate, these scenarios have generated lively discussion.

The process continues, in dialogue, both internally within the country and with EU embassies which have shown serious interest in the project.

12 **Angola: between war and stable peace**

Angola has now moved beyond the phase of open warfare, but even optimistic observers would not claim that the conditions of stable peace have been achieved. Both in his internal and external policies, the President is preparing for elections. He has written to parliament and, in May 2004, visited the United States. Angola is a rich country - but with some of the poorest people in the world. In 2002, four million people were displaced. Two million of these have now returned. Problems persist, since in the camps for the displaced they had some means of support. Now, however, the camps have been closed and many people, unable to return to their lands, have no obvious means of support.

In retrospect, Angola serves as a warning of the dangers of rushing elections. After the 1991 Agreement, which was intended to resolve the civil war, elections were pushed through in too quick a time scale. This required the experience of virtual collapse of government and the tensions around the election process re-kindled the fire. The 1994 Lusaka Agreement was meant to redeem this situation, but was unable to do so. However, this was the first time that a serious effort had been made to talk about reconciliation and achieve a real agreement. The situation in the 1990s, characterised both by a strong rebel leader and aspirations towards “national unity” indicate that this can be a dangerous and unstable state of affairs. It was not until Savimbi’s death that the conditions for a successful agreement were present. UNITA could have resisted for longer, but there was a widespread desire for peace and even a readiness to redefine the state.

Unfortunately, there is currently no common vision, nor a serious peace agenda or effective plan for national reconciliation. The government is widely perceived to be an elite, which is ruling in its own interests rather than the interests of the majority of the population. In short, if a situation of stable reconciliation and reconstruction is to be achieved, much needs to be done.

13 **Conclusion and recommendations**

The **African Union** is determined that it should not have leaders sitting around its table who come to power by means of coups. **NEPAD** goes beyond this and has instituted the African Peer Review Mechanism. Under this mechanism, African states submit themselves to assessment by fellow Africans. It is an attempt to ensure that sound political, economic and corporate governance is achieved. It is clear that NEPAD represents a new institutional possibility within Africa. The effectiveness of the African Peer Review Mechanism has yet to be proved and it faces many challenges – the case of Zimbabwe can be mentioned. It is a genuinely African initiative and has the external support of the international community.

For the **international community**, the persistence of conflict and unstable post-conflict situations in Africa poses many dilemmas:

- the allocation and use of aid (humanitarian as well as development assistance);

- the application of political and military tools;
- addressing vulnerability to conflict, including analysis of an “early warning” nature;
- promotion of development in unstable situations and effective post-conflict reconstruction.

For the **African countries** themselves, **democratic control of the security sector** presents a range of challenges including the following:

- ultimate authority on key security issues must rest with elected representatives;
- security organisations should operate in accord with international and constitutional law, as well as respecting human rights;
- information about security planning and resources must be widely available both within government and to the public;
- civil-military relations must be based on a well articulated hierarchy of authority between the civil authorities and the defence forces;
- civil authorities, particularly elected representatives, need to have the capacity to exercise political control over the operations and financing of the security forces;
- civil society must have the means and capacity to monitor security forces and provide constructive input into the political debate on security policy;
- security personnel must be trained to discharge their duties professionally and should reflect the diversity of their societies, including women and minorities.

For any **external powers** considering intervention or indeed internal actors (**African governments and the military**) considering the use of armed force:

- It is necessary to focus more on the structural causes of violence than on violence *per se*;
- it is necessary to distinguish between the symptoms and causes of intra-state crises;
- intra-state crises cannot be resolved quickly and easily;
- intra-state crises do not end with a cessation of warfare;
- peace-building strategies are the only viable means of preventing and resolving a crisis;
- good governance requires efficiency and effectiveness on the part of state institutions;
- political stability requires structure, accommodation and diversity;
- peacemaking and peace-building are primarily the responsibility of local rather than foreign actors;
- international actors should practice what they preach;
- foreign actors should “do no harm”.

The Sudan case is paradigmatic. **African countries** and indeed African organisations (primarily the African Union and regional bodies) must take the lead in **conflict resolution**. Such efforts also require strong and co-ordinated international support;

- the parties to the conflicts must be held primarily accountable for carrying out agreements;
- African regional organisations and the African Union should strengthen and be assisted in strengthening their conflict resolution efforts;

- Agreements under negotiation should aim at establishing an inclusive democratic framework;
- The international community must make a commitment to assist with reconstruction, development, governance and humanitarian needs.

The following are some of the lessons from a **post-conflict** situation such as the Liberian case:

- An effective post-conflict leadership is needed to transcend the problems of the past. This will have to be transparent, accountable and visionary. Elections alone cannot be seen as a panacea for deep-seated problems. The “imperial presidency”, or the cult of the president, is a corruption of national values related to chieftaincy. It has led to dictatorship in many countries.
- Division of powers, decentralisation of civil administration and a robust civil society are needed.
- Before elections, it is essential to have a clear and binding agreement as to how the wrongs of the past will be addressed, in terms of truth and reconciliation on the one hand, or strong legal measures to end the culture of impunity. A national dialogue can often be helpful in this regard.
- Leadership must be seen not as an opportunity for an elite to exploit the country, but must be based on economic empowerment, broad based development and the protection of human rights and the rule of law.
- Leaders and people must promote nationalism and patriotism rather than divisive identities, including ethnic or tribal rivalries.
- Both at national and international level, the role of armed forces is ambivalent. Armed forces are needed to secure stability and prevent insurgency; they can also act effectively through international bodies. However, Africa’s history of coups and military interventions remains a current problem.
- The international community also has responsibilities: harbouring potential insurgents in neighbouring countries is a recipe for continued destabilisation and armed conflict. Effective prosecution for war crimes is essential.
- The international community must continue to send out a clear message that tyrants and brutal dictators will not be supported or tolerated.
- The social and economic conditions for stability in Africa must also be created.
- Peaceful democratic change is a prerequisite for effective leadership, but requires a level playing field, resources for voter education, media access for all candidates and capacity building for political institutions.
- Funding for security sector reform will continue to be needed.
- Resources are also needed for development of infrastructure, and the restoration of the social infrastructure (e.g. the legal and education systems), which are often seriously impaired as a result of civil war.

The issues relating to balancing **truth and reconciliation** on the one hand and the demands of justice after major human rights violations on the other are illustrated by the case of Sierra Leone. For many Sierra Leonians, the Special Court has a key role. There will be no meaningful reconciliation until those who are responsible for the most serious violations of human rights are punished. At the same time, many communities have begun accepting the young people who were engaged in the war back into their communities. In the hearings of the Commission, over and over again, the value of reconciliation was seriously questioned if the material conditions of the victim did not improve. This led to the Commission deciding to recommend the Comprehensive Reparations Programme for those whose lives had been devastated.

Truth telling without reparation could easily be seen as an incomplete process. Restorative justice requires not only truth telling but reparations and is thus able to strengthen the reconciliation process.

The most dramatic situation in Africa is represented by the **conflicts in the DRC and the wider Great Lakes region**. It is recognised that for the regional conference to be a success, the preparatory process must ensure ownership of the process by the peoples of the region. It is also widely recognised that leaders signing peace processes, but not being followed through is not a recipe for sustainable peace. The issues are being addressed in four clusters:

- Peace and security;
- Democracy and good governance;
- Economic development and regional integration;
- Social and economic issues.

Clearly, security issues are not the only factors leading to deterioration in the security climate. Poor governance and corruption, for example in the case of DRC, have been major sources of insecurity for the entire region. Internal policies of ethnic exclusion are dangerous for all, as the cases of Rwanda and Burundi show.

The experience of Mozambique shows that albeit belatedly, with national support, processes of reconciliation can be developed if there is commitment from the main antagonistic forces. Angola has not yet reached that position. The Casamance conflict in Senegal shows that internal conflicts can persist for a long time and require political commitment inside the country and good will from neighbours if they are to be satisfactorily resolved.

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