



Wilton Park

Programme

Responding to deliberate biological release: the requirements for effective, coordinated international action

Wednesday 27 – Friday 29 September 2017 | WP1556

This meeting will identify how governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental entities can prepare and effectively implement collaborative action in the event of the use of biological weapons, whether by states or non-state actors, in order to ensure an effective response that contains the outbreak promptly and promotes a quick recovery.

In recent years BTWC Article VII has attracted renewed attention by BTWC States Parties, due in part to the repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria, which underscored the complexity of staging an effective international response and the critical importance of advance preparedness, and in part due to the increasing threat of emerging and re-emerging infectious disease (exemplified by the EVD outbreak in West Africa) and the awareness of how ill prepared the world is for a large scale pandemic. Putting the provisions of Article VII into practice in the event of a deliberate release of a biological agent will, of necessity, involve many different government, inter-government and non-government entities working in close collaboration. For this to happen, there are many practical, legal and other complex logistical and operational challenges that will have to be overcome.

Studies conducted after the 2014-15 Ebola outbreak, including the 2016 Wilton Park conference on this topic, strongly indicate that this collaboration will be significantly more complex and challenging than has hitherto been realised. Although the Eighth Review Conference of the BTWC discussed the issue, States Parties failed to agree a course of action to address it. Nonetheless, the Conference stated that “capabilities to detect, quickly and effectively respond to, and recover from, the alleged use of a biological or toxin weapon need to be in place before they are required”, and stressed a requirement for building on the work already conducted through the intersessional process. This is also a priority for the Global Partnership (GP)’s Biological Security Working Group and the Global Health Security Agenda Action Package Respond 2. This meeting will support the BTWC, GP and GHSA processes by developing tangible, action-oriented recommendations for how coordination of international response can be made more effective.

In association with Global Affairs Canada and the Center for Global Health Science and Security, Georgetown University

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GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Georgetown University Medical Center
Center for Global Health Science and Security

Wednesday 27 September

1500	Participants arrive. Tea/coffee available
1600-1615	Welcome and introduction Mark Smith Senior Programme Director, Security and Defence, Wilton Park
1615-1715	1. The nature of the challenge A short forward-looking session to assess the following issues in the context of why this workshop is convened: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Why, exactly, is a coordinated response likely to be difficult: what has made this meeting necessary and how? This will involve drawing on studies of the Ebola outbreak, including the 2016 Wilton Park meeting.• Article VII and its obligations, and limits (i.e. situations where it will not be invoked) Rebecca Katz Co-Director, Center for Global Health Science and Security, Georgetown University, Washington DC Trevor Smith Senior Program Manager, Biological and Chemical Security, UNSCR 1540 Implementation, Global Partnership Program (IGA), Global Affairs Canada, Ottawa John Walker Head, Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London
1715-1745	Tea/coffee
1745-1915	2. Transferrable lessons from the CWC: responding to and investigating possible deliberate use This session will assess progress in implementing the OPCW's Rapid Reaction Assistance Mission (RRAM) concept, and the parallels between the CWC's Article X and what might be done under BTWC Article VII. It will also assess the challenges of conducting an investigation in parallel to a humanitarian assistance operation. Jan Lodding Deputy Director, Department for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm Steven Wallis Team Leader, Fact Finding Mission, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), The Hague
1930	Reception followed by dinner

Thursday 28 September

0800-0900	Breakfast
0915-1045	3. The mandate for, and actors in, coordinated response What is the nature of the mandate for international response to a deliberate biological release? Where does it come from and where are its boundaries? What do we understand by BTWC Article VII and its obligations (e.g. words like "assist") and limitations? What non-

Article VII mandates or avenues for action are there? Do these mandates/mechanisms overlap, conflict, duplicate? How could they be de-conflicted? What is the division of labour in assistance, attributions assessments and humanitarian response? What are the duties of member states, and those of IGOs, NGOs etc? How can the ISU project on strengthening global mechanisms for responding to deliberate use help?

Maurizio Barbeschi

Scientist, World Health Organization (WHO), Geneva

Valeria Santori

Consultant, Biological Convention Implementation Support Unit, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), London

1045-1130

Photograph followed by tea/coffee

1130-1300

4. Manuals and SOPs

What are they, who develops and sustains them, what endorsement is required? Which ones are needed as a matter of priority? How can they be tested? What sort of table-top or field exercises would be needed?

Kenneth Faulkner

Officer in Charge, RCMP CBRNE Operations, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Ottawa

Scott Cairns

Project Manager, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), New York

1300-1430

Lunch

1500-1630

5. Command and control, supply and logistics

Effective command and control is essential: how can this be made to work? What are the challenges and options? The challenges of equipment supply and logistics. What are the challenges in deploying to and operating in a non-cooperative/non-permissive environment? Are pre-positioned stockpiles of medical counter-measures and/or equipment useful and if so, what should they contain? How could supplies be sourced at short notice? Depending on location of the event, airlift capacities could be needed in country as well as to transport first responders and aid: what are the options here?

Nahoko Shindo

Manager, Expert Networks, Infectious Hazard Management, WHO Health Emergencies Programme, World Health Organization, Geneva

David Lowe

Inspector, Police National CBRN Centre, Coventry

1630-1700

Tea/coffee

1700-1900

6. Group work: a plan of action

A round of focused work in small groups, tasked with drawing up next steps. The framework is as follows: what SOPs/recommended practices/guidelines are required, where can they derive their mandate, where can they be drafted, and how validated.

Group 1

Matthew Lim

Deputy Health Attaché, United States Mission to the United Nations and Other International Organisations in Geneva, Geneva

Group 2

Kathryn Millett

Research Provider, Social science, International Politics, Biosecure, Witney

Group 3

Ellie Graeden

Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Talus Analytics, Lyons

and

Valeria Santori

Consultant, Biological Convention Implementation Support Unit, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), London

1930

Reception followed by dinner

Friday 29 September

0800-0900

Breakfast and checkout

0915-1045

7. Report back from group work

Outcomes of the group work collated and discussed.

1045-1115

Tea/coffee

1115-1125

8. Evaluation survey

Completion of online survey

1125-1230

9. Conclusions and wrap-up

I suggest asking the three speakers from session 1 to discuss next steps to put the workshop recommendations into practice:

Rebecca Katz

Co-Director, Center for Global Health Science and Security, Georgetown University, Washington DC

Trevor Smith

Senior Program Manager, Biological and Chemical Security, UNSCR 1540 Implementation, Global Partnership Program (IGA), Global Affairs Canada, Ottawa

John Walker

Head, Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London

1230

Lunch

1345

Participants depart