Summary

- Patterns of immigration and emigration are generally shaped by the long term economic performance of a country, however the current global recession makes it difficult to predict future movements. There is likely to be increased competition amongst the more developed countries for highly skilled migrants. On current demographic projections, China, for example, may change from being a source to a destination country.

- The impacts of migration are unevenly distributed across populations and the vast majority of people who move are young adults. Most migrants move within national boundaries or within their region, rather than trans-continentally.

- Political, religious and ethnic persecution are the key drivers of forced migration, but new displacement scenarios are evolving, including environmental degradation, declining resource, population growth and climate change.

- Factors vary regionally. Extreme poverty and instability drives much of the outward migration from Africa; in South Asia, migration is a well-established livelihood option; and in the European Union, migration has been facilitated by the right to free movement of labour. The ability of national governments to manage migratory flows is enhanced by regional cooperation. However, an inflexible, ‘one size fits all’, approach will be counter-productive and could divert attention from multi-lateral solutions.

- Migration is not a substitute for development: some states rely heavily on remittances but evidence indicates that they do little to alleviate poverty in the
• Many states recognise that effective integration and the active promotion of citizenship amongst migrant populations can help overcome a sense of exclusion.

• Public attitudes to migration are frequently negative. Migration is often a proxy issue for wider social concerns, such as access to housing and employment. Political leadership plays a key role in shaping the debate and encouraging open and honest discourse.

• Governments will continue to control illegal migration in order to facilitate the migration flows which they do want. There are significant challenges posed by the need to control borders for security purposes whilst ensuring that refugees can continue to seek protection. In the longer term, border controls can only go so far in reducing migratory movements if the economic, humanitarian, political and ecological drivers are not addressed.

• Stronger integration of migration strategies and an assessment of their impact in all policy areas would assist governments to plan flexibly for migration rather than planning migration.

• The existing evidence base for developing policy is too small and could be improved by a clearer understanding of trends, research on patterns of migration, and an assessment of the effectiveness of current immigration systems

Drivers for migration

Economic Factors

1. The long term economic performance of a country shapes its patterns of immigration and emigration. Movement is not restricted to people leaving poorer countries to go to richer ones. The very poorest countries experience relatively low levels of trans-national migration because few people can afford to move; and some higher income countries are still experiencing substantial emigration, as their citizens pursue opportunities abroad. But on the whole, the evidence suggests that as countries develop economically, their levels of net emigration tend to drop.
2. During the recent years of economic growth, the most developed economies have experienced high levels of immigration. Now, as the current global recession bites, the trend of significant reverse or onward migration is likely to speed up, for example, Mexicans from the United States and Poles from the UK. Such movement is a rational response by migrants even if origin countries are experiencing recession, as it may be cheaper to survive at home. The East Asia crisis of the 1990s provides a possible template for what will happen. Host countries made efforts to return migrants and there was a high rate of voluntary return, both between and within countries. For example, one million people left Jakarta for other areas in Indonesia. The current global crisis may be so acute, however, that migrants who can, may try to stay in host countries, particularly if they can access social benefits.

Vulnerability

3. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), records 31 million persons as ‘of concern’. These include internally displaced people and those seeking protection in other countries. Political, religious and ethnic persecution remain the key drivers of forced migration, but new displacement scenarios are evolving, including environmental degradation, declining resource, population growth and climate change. A key concern is to ensure that the special status of refugees is preserved. If states treat them as just a migrant subset, there is a real danger that their rights will be eroded and that they will not be able to access protection. On the other hand, there is not a clear dichotomy between forced migration and economic migration: many migrant movements involve some degree of compulsion and some degree of choice.

4. Many migrants who fall outside the refugee definition are nonetheless vulnerable, including unaccompanied children, trafficked people, the internally displaced, stateless persons, those who want to claim asylum but are locked out by border controls, irregular migrants, domestic workers, abandoned spouses, stateless persons, victims of climate change and natural disasters, those without the skills to survive in new societies, and those coming from situations of extreme poverty. Sometimes migrants are willing to become vulnerable, in transit for example, in order to achieve the outcome they want.
Demography

5. The vast majority of people who move are young adults. To some extent, migration flows increase as the number of young adults in the population rises. As populations age, they are less likely to move.

6. The impacts of migration are not evenly distributed across populations. Most migrants move within national boundaries or within their region, rather than trans-continentially. Emigration is often from very specific areas (for example 95% of Bangladeshi immigrants in the UK come from one district) and immigration is highly concentrated, with most migrants moving into cities, especially ‘global cities’ such as London and New York. This phenomenon has implications for policy makers, because immigration policy is invariably set at the national level even though the implications of that policy may be most acutely felt in only a few cities. There are indications that cities like London may lobby for different migration policies that better suit their needs.

7. It is important to remember that much migration is internal. One hundred and fifty million people in China are regarded as internal migrants, a total that is not far behind the 200 million figure for total international migration.

Regional Factors

8. Migratory patterns in, and from, different regions often vary considerably and are driven by different factors. Extreme poverty and instability drives much outward migration from Africa. Within the continent, most migration is sub-regional, irregular and hard to control. For example, Kenya is struggling to cope with migration levels from a dysfunctional Somalia, but when it closed its border points, the levels of movement (54,000 in the 10 months to November 2008) actually increased. Countries are often poor at cooperating effectively, deporting irregulars to neighbouring rather than home counties, for instance, and not burden sharing or sharing information.

9. In South Asia, migration is a well-established livelihood option, but patterns of migration vary hugely within the region. India, for instance, sends large number of highly skilled migrants abroad, particularly to the West, but recently has seen more circular migration, with measurable development gains. Other countries experience
more migration involving lower skilled persons, often working on short-term contracts, either within the region or the Middle East.

10. In **Europe**, the main driver of recent migration has been free movement of labour within the European area, with large numbers of workers from Eastern Europe taking advantage. There continues to be considerable North/North migration, with Europeans flowing into North America and vice versa.

**The Benefits and the Negative Impacts of Migration**

**Economic**

11. There is much debate over whether migration is good for economies. One way of viewing this is to regard the gains from migration as similar to gains from trade, allowing employers access to larger markets and resulting in better matching of employees to jobs, with migrants filling skills gaps. As such, migration should be equally valuable in upturns and downturns, and government policies should not be overly restrictive during economic downturns. If migrants are allowed to be mobile then they could cushion recessionary impacts, balancing economic cycles by moving around to where the jobs exist. However, so called ‘super mobility’, where migrants move from country to country in search of the best opportunities, could pose risks to some economies if they neglect national skills development.

12. It is not clear if greater trade between regions promotes or diminishes migration. North-North migration does seem to have been stimulated by greater trade, but the pattern is reversed for North-South. In both circumstances, migration probably enhances trade. For example, Indian IT workers in the US may have boosted IT trade between the two countries. In the short-term, however, sudden trade liberalisation can cause problems for developing economies and drive people to migrate.

13. Experts differ on whether migration helps or hinders technological progress. The availability of labour may reduce incentives for firms to develop capital-led solutions. On the other hand, skilled migrants can help to fuel investment in capital and technology, rather than hindering it.
14. The perspectives of developed countries often dominate debates about the economic benefits of migration. Many migrants themselves clearly benefit from their decision to migrate, though their skills are often underused, at least in the short term. The impacts on countries of origin from migration are variable – the loss of skills can be balanced by the value of remittances and, in the longer term, there are development gains from circular migration.

Regional

15. Effective cooperation between states at the regional level enhances the ability of national governments to manage migratory flows, in ways that help both states and migrants themselves. Such arrangements can help to foster burden sharing, for instance of refugee flows, and enhance border and security cooperation. It can also broaden perspectives on migration – for example, emerging arrangements in Latin America have led to countries in the region looking beyond traditional policy priorities, such as the benefits of remittances, to recognise additional social and human rights issues.

16. Although states within regions often share common characteristics, there are also differences. ‘One size fits all’ approaches often break down. Free movement within regional blocs won’t always meet the aspirations of migrants, many of whom may want to move further afield. Another concern is that regional arrangements diverts capacity to develop multilateral approaches. Such arrangements could also duplicate problems with trade, reducing potential gains from genuinely free flows.

Developmental

17. Migration is not a substitute for development in home countries. However, it can help to alleviate poverty in the short term, especially where states have failed to create employment and provide security. One of the more obvious ways in which migration can help poorer countries is through remittances, which some states have come to rely on heavily. The downside is that high levels of remittance, and indeed diaspora investment, can distract states from pursuing economic development goals and policies and can leave them vulnerable when flows slow during downturns.
18. Migration comes from concentrated areas and consequently remittances flow back to them, doing little to alleviate poverty in the poorest areas. For example, 60% of remittances from expatriate Filipinos goes to the Greater Manila area.

19. The ‘brain drain’ has generated much research and debate. This debate is likely to increase, as more developed countries focus their managed migration programmes on attracting high skilled migrants. However, it is unclear how this impacts on development and what the negative effects may be. The impact will probably vary according to the context. For example, IT workers leaving India are unlikely to be problematic and may even have positive spin-offs from remittances and circular migration. On the other hand, health workers leaving Africa are having a serious effect on health provision in the continent.

20. From a development perspective, the best sort of migration is ‘return migration’ whereby people leave the home country, make money abroad (remitting much of it), pick up skills and return home with them. South East Asia has benefited from temporary migration of many of its workers to the Gulf, though this is often low skilled migration. Countries such as India are benefiting from the return migration of its highly skilled migrants.

21. Another important component is diaspora investment. Diasporas are often key actors in linking their home towns to global networks of production and trade. The UK government has invested in diaspora programmes, both to support remittances (for example, through its sendmoneyhome.com website) and through programmes that encourage the more active re-importation and recycling of migrant skills into home countries.

Integration Issues

22. Cheaper travel and communication have made migration easier, but have also changed the nature of identity. Migrants and their children can retain relationships in their country of origin and in some senses ‘be’ in both places at the same time. There are fears that these ‘multiple identities’ could be damaging the integration prospects of migrants and harm their economic prospects. There are particular concerns when certain groups of migrants suffer entrenched social exclusion, with evidence in some states that this can lead to radicalisation. On the
other hand, multiple identities can assist integration, enabling people to retain a sense of belonging to strong communities and avoiding situations where second generation migrants fall prey to ‘downward assimilation’.

23. Many societies with high immigrant populations are questioning the merits of multiculturalism and are actively promoting integration and citizenship as a way of overcoming exclusion. Nonetheless, in some cases, migrants lack opportunities and experience ‘psychological disenfranchisement’. However, countries such as the US have seen much progress in the advancement of migrant communities in the last twenty years.

**Public Attitudes in Host Countries**

24. There is considerable concern among policy makers and those working in the migration field that public attitudes to migration are often negative. That said, opinion polls in a number of countries (e.g. Denmark) show that long-term attitudes about migration haven’t changed much over decades – people feel immigrants should be treated well, but that they should contribute to the country they join. However, the concern remains that public fears and suspicions continue to be high.

25. Politicians, media, and migrants themselves can together create a cycle of negative perceptions. One-off local problems can be generalised by the media to seem representative of migration generally. Policy responses from governments can give the impression that migration is a systemic problem in the process, reinforcing negative views among the public. This in turn makes migrants feel victimised and alienated and can lead to further disenfranchisement from the societies in which they live. However, it is often the case that migration is a proxy issue for wider social concerns, such as access to housing and employment and a general unease about the pace of change in modern societies. Race is also an issue that lurks behind public concerns about migration.

**Approaches to Managing Migration**

**Economic**

26. There is some scepticism about the economic wisdom of state-planning as a way of managing migration (such as through points based systems or PBS). Critics
draw parallels with the manpower planning approach to education, which did not succeed in meeting future skills needs because planners could not keep pace with the changes in fast evolving economies. Meanwhile, evidence suggests that employer-driven systems have performed quite well at matching migrant workers with job vacancies. The PBS is a more objective system. Its transparency may also be an effective way of ‘selling’ immigration to sceptical publics.

27. If migration is to be managed for economic gain, the systems need to retain some flexibility in order to allow adjustments to changing circumstances. There are concerns that a focus on border security and enforcement will unduly restrict economic migration and this could worsen, or at least lengthen, the recession. Ultimately states will continue to see the need to control illegal immigration in order to facilitate the migration flows that they do want.

28. In managing migration, governments need to plan: for it to happen; to shape it; and to maximise benefits and to minimise costs. Governments should not expend energy trying to control every detail of who arrives. In other words, planning for migration rather than planning migration.

Borders

29. Borders are one of the most obvious intervention points for the control of migration. The US and European countries have invested heavily in physical borders (such as fencing) and e-borders, pushing borders out to regional limits and introducing juxtaposed controls in countries of origin. However, these developments are relatively recent and still have limited application. In most countries, customs and immigration remain separate agencies, the only exceptions being the US, Canada, Singapore and the UK. The use of advance passenger information and screening is still fairly limited and there are no systems in use for automated risk assessment of visa applicants. These systems require the storage of massive amounts of personal data, most of which relates to legitimate travellers. It remains the case that most people involved in visa processing lack the knowledge and training to detect security risks. In addition, most security checks are carried out at already congested points of arrival. A challenge for governments is the need to control borders for security purposes and to manage migration, while allowing tourism and trade to be
unimpeded. There is also a difficulty in ensuring that refugees can access protection in a world of increasing controls designed to stop irregular movements of people.

**Regional or Global**

30. Regional groups or blocs could continue to form in order to manage migration and, in the future, the world could divide into four large migration regions. In this scenario there could be a ‘greater North America’ (involving free movement between the US and Canada, for example), ‘greater East Asia’, ‘greater South Asia’, and greater EU and a number of smaller regions, for instance in Latin America and Africa. This would lead to the re-structuring of migration management at a regional level.

31. In *East Africa*, Kenya is involved in a number of regional arrangements, including the east African community, which has common tariffs, and free movement for goods and services, in addition to the broader Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) grouping. Members of both of these groups and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) met recently to discuss the possibilities of a EU style common area, involving almost half the population of Africa.

32. Policy responses from *South Asian* countries have been ad hoc, and it is one of the few areas where no regional process is in place for the strategic management of migration. However, states in the region have recently recognised that they should be cooperating more closely.

33. While there is momentum behind the development of regional arrangements there has been less progress in developing binding global agreements on migration. There has been talk of setting up the equivalent of a World Trade Organisation for migration, but the bigger powers, such as the US, want to maintain control over their own policies allowing them to pursue their own interests in this area. They generally opt to work at a regional or bilateral level.

34. There are no real indications of the emergence of a leading international migration agency. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) could be a candidate but this is likely to be opposed by other agencies. The Global Forum on
Migration and Development (GMFD) is a promising global development but it is likely that it will remain as a non-binding forum for sharing information.

35. Future Trends

Economic

36. The impact of the global recession makes the prediction of future migration flows difficult. However, in the long term it is clear there will be large differences in economic development and population growth and this will drive migration flows. It is likely that migration from Africa will grow substantially, particularly to Europe, and to a lesser extent to the US.

37. It is questionable whether competition between states to attract the best and brightest migrants will continue. On the one hand, growth of tertiary education will increase supplies of skilled workers; and technology, especially communications technologies, will reduce the need for people to move for work, as more will be able to be done remotely. On the other hand, changes in many other technologies will increase the demand for highly skilled people, who will be needed to operate them. At present, the evidence tends to favour an increase in demand for highly skilled migrants, with greater competition between host countries. It appears that attracting foreign students will be a key part in states’ strategies.

38. If technologies continue to develop, demand for low skilled or unskilled migrants may diminish, with people in this category increasingly isolated from migration opportunities. However, this trend is not clear-cut. Thriving ‘high tech’ economies also need low skilled support. For example, hospital cleaners are needed for a successful health system, alongside doctors and nurses. If managed migration routes are not open for the unskilled there may be an increased in irregular migration.

39. The connection between migration and security is not clear, as much terrorist and criminal activity is ‘home grown’. However, security concerns are likely to reinforce political imperatives to tighten borders and more strictly manage flows in and out. Too great a focus on security and developing a ‘fortress mentality’ may
reinforce problems of poverty and exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the security threat, as well as increasing push factors for migration.

**Development**

**40.** At present, migration rarely features in development planning. For example, most of the millennium development goals progress reports hardly mention migration. This deficit needs to be addressed: if countries or regions of origin adopt the right migration strategies there are clear benefits for local development. One of the keys to successful development is labour intensive industry and diasporas can be a key source of investment in such industries. In China, provincial governments have been strengthening connections between Chinese ex-patriates and their hometowns, by the inclusion of local Chinese communities in overseas delegations and by holding investment fairs in Fujian marketed at the diaspora. They also ensure that diaspora are aware of macro policies, including the extent of infrastructure investment put in place by the government to encourage labour intensive investment.

**41.** Policies are needed to address the brain drain, although destination countries are unlikely to perceive it as in their interests to limit the movement of the highly skilled. Similarly, there is little likelihood that developed countries can be persuaded to pay direct compensation to governments for the costs of lost labour. The requirement for policy adjustments will fall on developing countries, for example, reforming tertiary education financing and increasing employment opportunities and conditions for their high skilled populations.

**Vulnerable Groups**

**42.** While much remains to be done to ensure that refugees can access protection outside their own countries, there also needs to be a greater emphasis on root causes. In many cases, the crisis that triggers forced migration can be predicted and strategies put in place to deal with population displacements. More proactive and preventative work, including by development agencies, is needed in these situations. There is a need for a binding instrument to embed a responsibility to protect on states which face large internal displacements.

**43.** There may be some advantages to revisiting the refugee protection architecture, however there are serious concerns that this could undermine the 1951
Convention. Efforts might be better directed at encouraging states to respect instruments already in place and dealing with new situations of vulnerability in a more systematic, rather than an ad hoc, basis.

44. Unlike refugees, migrants lack a United Nations (UN) body to protect them, and there could be some value in creating one. More information is needed on the support needs of vulnerable groups and the ways in which assistance can be provided. Such help should start in countries of origin, but it should allow for movement if that is the best solution to vulnerability. The regularisation of irregulars is one way of decreasing vulnerability in the country of destination, although one-off amnesties may not be the answer. However, pressure will grow for irregulars to be given greater legal protection and rights in the countries where they live and work.

Demography

45. Economic and environmental factors are bound to lead to major demographic readjustments over the coming decades, with people moving out of areas where there are few resources to support them and to areas either internally or beyond national borders. The highly skilled are more likely to be able to move to more developed countries, with major cities as the most likely destinations. Lower skilled migrants are likely to be limited to movement within national boundaries or regions.

46. In Africa, much depends on how sub-Saharan Africa fares economically and politically and how it is affected by climate change. Current prospects for the region do not look good, and emigration on a large scale is likely, much of it irregular if legal routes into Europe are shut off.

47. In South Asia broader geopolitical factors are likely to have a bigger impact on the numbers moving and their destinations. If South Asia is seen as an incubator of terrorism, south Asians may have less opportunities to migrate, particularly to countries of the west. This appears to be happening at the moment with regard to Bangladeshis.

48. In the US, which has higher birth rates than other OECD countries and which retains more opportunities for legal immigration, population growth should remain substantial. As the US attracts a high level of highly skilled migrants, the importance
of the US in geo-political terms is also likely to grow. Circular migration involving the US will further extend its global influence.

49. In East Asia, China will experience a dramatic decline in fertility and rapid ageing, as it is making no provision to replace the population ‘lost’ through the one child policy. Present estimates suggest there may be 2 million job vacancies in southern China. This raises the possibility that China will need to import labour and move from being a country of emigration to one of immigration. Such a change would represent a profound cultural and political shift for China. Emigration will continue, but probably with a greater proportion of those leaving only for limited periods and greater circular migration.

50. In the EU, a number of countries assume they will be able to fill at least their unskilled vacancies from within the area. However, populations are ageing and history has shown that, over time, emigration from new accession states drops off as these states become more prosperous. This suggests that EU countries may in time have to accept non-EU migration at the low skilled level. Arrangements could be made with countries in the Maghreb region for instance, allowing in controlled flows of lower skilled migrants, perhaps on temporary work permits. The scale of this, however, should not be exaggerated. At present migration adds about 1 million people a year to the EU population, whereas expansion of the EU borders in 2004 added 74 million. Assuming the accession of Turkey and elsewhere, enlargement may be a more effective way of meeting future EU labour needs.

Governance

51. There is a lack of appetite for more rules and instruments to govern migration at the international level, so the focus will fall on national governments and regional blocs to put existing instruments into practice. In the absence of formal global frameworks, actors should consider greater multilateralism, for example through the GFMD, and should give enhanced roles to international agencies. There is growing global good practice in the promotion and management of migration. Existing supranational bodies should be identifying positive examples and disseminating them, for example, through an inventory of good practice.
Borders

52. It is likely that all forms of pre-departure screening will increase and data provided by visa applicants is likely to be central to this process. This information is already gathered and the tools to analyse it exist, raising few privacy concerns. As approaches become more sophisticated, there is likely to be an increasingly individualised approach to the management of travel. Rather than country-based decisions (ie from a visa or non visa country), decisions will be made on individual characteristics, using bio-graphics and bio-metrics. Issues may arise about privacy. However, Western attitudes may already be changing with the rise of the ‘Facebook’ generation who appear willing to volunteer and share personal information.

53. Although the sophistication of border arrangements will increase, it remains likely that many migrants or their agents will find ways of circumventing systems through visa, passport and identity fraud, hacking into computer systems or using corrupted insiders. Countries or regional areas seeking to control their borders will have to weigh up the costs of keeping ahead of irregular migrants and people smugglers, both in economic and human terms. It will remain the case that many people from poorer countries will want to move to find better lives, even if the dangers and risks of the journey are very high. At present irregularity still has more benefits than costs for many people. Governments will need to have a comprehensive and humane strategy to shift the cost/benefit equation if they are determined to reduce such movements. This could involve increased probability of capture through cooperation, which the EU, through its Frontex arrangements, is pioneering. There is an increased likelihood of detection through technology – for example, e-borders, vehicle scans, use of sensor technology etc (the US is targeting an 87% detection rate, up from the current rate of around 60%).

54. There is also an increased likelihood of return through deportation or repatriation, but also through assisted voluntary packages, and funds to support return and reintegration. Countries wishing to reduce irregularity will also consider ways in which to ensure that migrants pay a higher price through detention and restricted access to employment. An increase in worksite enforcement and fraud proof national identity plans for residents are possible options. However, there are ethical and humanitarian issues associated with such tough policy responses. States will need to consider a cost-benefit approach in assessing their control
mechanisms. For example, the contract for US border security does not have ceiling and could rise to 42 billion dollars. Is this justifiable against the costs of continued irregular migration?

55. Border control can only go so far in reducing migratory movements if the economic, humanitarian, political and ecological drivers are not fully addressed. Development aid, trade justice and improved governance are vital because poverty, lack of opportunity and security, and repression remain major push factors for all forms of migration. One of the problems with tighter border control is that it prevents illegals from returning or at least circulating. Circular migration is beneficial and should be encouraged.

Integration

56. Integration policy varies between countries. In a number of countries (e.g. Denmark) there is a focus on migrants proving their loyalty to the country they live in. In the UK, greater emphasis is now being put on citizenship, requiring migrants to “earn” the privilege. At the same time, there is increasing recognition that successful integration policy requires action across a number of domains, including education, the workplace and in political life, to encourage participation by new communities. Countries are still trying to navigate between the respective roles of the state, immigrants and other citizens in ensuring successful integration. Policymakers need to recognise that national identities evolve and that they should stimulate constructive debates on national and cultural identities.

57. Strategies may include maximising opportunities for people of mixed origin to explore their identities in positive ways. For example, the Department for International Development Department in the UK is supporting diaspora volunteering. There is also some evidence that circular movement of migrants aids integration, while also benefiting countries of origin. It is important that policy makers distinguish between entry and settlement and find appropriate ‘levels’ of integration and integration policies for those who don’t remain for long periods. At the same time, integration strategies for the children of migrants need to take into account their different relationship with the host country. In some cases, this the only home they have known. Community organisations, even those which represent single
nationalities, can assist with bridging as well as bonding between states and individuals.

Public Attitudes

58. Political leadership is vital in influencing public attitudes towards migration. However, promoting the benefits of migration can be difficult for politicians who fear that if they are too out of step with voter concerns they risk losing power. Accordingly, politicians in many countries have been accused of pandering to public opinion, rather than trying to lead it. However, devolved jurisdictions have pursued more positive policies and evidence suggests that the public is largely supportive. While attitudes to asylum in Europe are generally quite negative, a coordinated approach by government and non governmental organisations (NGOs) during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 led to high levels of public support for an emergency evacuation.

59. If public attitudes remain largely negative, states will be required to address the issue as a priority. More research on public attitudes is needed in order to understand and counter negative aspects. Greater engagement through the media will be required. However, the public debate needs to be an honest one, with elites addressing the legitimate concerns of the public.

60. Increased education about migration issues, refugee and human rights, is necessary to ensure public understanding and increase community cohesion.

Increased Policy Coherence

61. There is an urgent need to integrate migration strategies with other policy areas at national, regional and international levels. One proposal, under consideration by the British government, is for all areas of policy to include a migration impact assessment. At the same time, migration policies should always include an assessment of their development impacts. Existing forums (for example on trade, development and security) could also provide space for more joined up discussion of migration issues. Front line practitioners and migrants themselves, as well as academics, NGOs and policy makers should be included in these discussions.
A Much Improved Evidence Base

62. Although much more work has been done in recent years, the existing evidence base for developing policy and strategies is still too limited. Greater longitudinal data would help give a clearer picture of trends and guide rational policy responses. There should be more research on patterns of migration, both global patterns and more localised patterns. Primary research and policy analysis into the linkages between migration and development is also needed. Finally, there needs to be more policy focused research on the actual performance of immigration systems, in particular, how people use them and what works.

Laura Chappell
February 2009

Wilton Park Reports are brief summaries of the main points of a conference. The reports reflect rapporteurs’ personal interpretations of the proceedings - as such they do not constitute any institutional policy of Wilton Park nor do they necessarily represent the views of rapporteurs.