In this video playlist, participants discuss NATO deterrence strategy and how the Alliance can and should adapt to a shifting geopolitical landscape. Participants examine the coordination between French nuclear doctrine and NATO’s deterrence posture, highlighting how forward deterrence and Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA) participation can strengthen collective European nuclear capabilities. The role of theatre nuclear forces and flexible response options in managing escalation is also explored, with participants discussing how Russia, China and North Korea are transforming their nuclear postures across the strategic and theatre levels. Participants emphasise that effective deterrence depends on a diversity of options, and that sustained dialogue between NATO and its European allies remains essential to the Alliance’s deterrence strategy.
Héloïse Fayet (Head of Deterrence & Proliferation Research Programe, IFRI) and Vipin Narang (Frank Staunton Professor of Nuclear Security and Political Science, MIT) discuss the key points.
Transcripts
Héloïse Fayet
I think we have a tendency to see the difference between French doctrine and NATO doctrine as bigger than it really is but I do hope that the participation of three DCA countries in the forward deterrence initiative is going to be a way of easing, let’s say, the coordination between France and NATO when it comes to nuclear deterrence and nuclear strategy. And I really hope that we will see in the near future a collective European thought to reinforce all of these capabilities in order again to address the whole spectrum of threats that Russia can address to France and to Europe, and forward deterrence is a way to, let’s say, address these challenges through multiple areas for dialogue.
Vipin Narang
The adversary has already shown a willingness to employ nuclear weapons if they’re getting conventionally defeated or punished. And so you may need theatre nuclear force options or non-strategic force options to manage escalation before the adversary threatens to escalate to the strategic level or before we have to. We have not faced nuclear adversaries in the maritime environment of the Indo-Pacific before. China was content with a very minimum deterrent, not very survivable up until the last 10 years. It has decided to compete across the board and undertake a wholesale transformation of its nuclear force posture, and then North Korea’s emergence. At the theatre nuclear level, I believe your best deterrent is through a diversity of options, flexible response options. This idea that we need to match the Russians one for one or the Chinese one for one at the theatre force level, or that it causes an arms race, I think is not only misguided, it’s logically and empirically untrue. When China fills out all its silos, we don’t need to double the force. We don’t need the Russian warheads plus the Chinese warheads, plus one, because that’s not how we do nuclear strategy at the strategic level. It does not actually take large numbers, but I do think we need more diversity.