The new ATT Secretariat’s priorities
The ATT Secretariat’s priorities for CSP11 will be transparency and accountability with a focus on compliance and fostering information exchanges. For example, the Secretariat will try to better understand why reporting levels are still low and launch a reporting champions initiative. It will also continue to collaborate with the important regional initiatives supported by the European Union (EU) in Latin America and West Africa. In addition, it will also seek to engage more with the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and regional bodies such as the African Union (AU), Organization of American States (OAS) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote ATT implementation and universalisation.
As part of this endeavour, the Secretariat will develop measurable implementation metrics to better understand whether the support they currently offer is having its intended impact in terms of improving compliance and universalisation. These metrics could also be used to demonstrate the security and economic benefits of joining the Treaty.
Another priority of the ATT Secretariat is to foster more inclusive and diverse engagement, including a better integration of gender perspectives. With a view to encouraging more women to present, take the floor and head delegations, as well as to promoting greater participation from a larger number of States Parties overall, the Secretariat is re-examining how it measures meaningful participation. One step it has already taken is to request delegates to register for all meetings in the CSP cycle, not just the conference itself, for the purposes of collecting gender-disaggregated data on who is participating in the ATT process
Finally, the financial stability of the ATT is an important priority for the Secretariat. Planned measures include earlier engagement with states in arrears. The Secretariat will also explore whether there are technical issues such as high bank fees that make it difficult for state to pay their annual contributions. In addition, the Secretariat will look into the feasibility of replicating the model of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Provisional Technical Secretariat, which accepts voluntary in-kind and financial contributions from states and private sector entities in addition to annual contributions from States Parties.
Regarding the Working Group meetings themselves, the aim is to have better structured, more dynamic and engaging discussions throughout the CSP11 cycle. To facilitate this, there will be more time allocated for discussions on a smaller number of topics:
- The Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI) will discuss imports, gender-based violence, and Mexico’s gender focal point proposal.
- The Working Group on Treaty Universalization (WGTU) will have national presentations on the ratification process.
- The Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) will focus on transfer reports to the ATT Secretariat from the perspective of national implementation practices regarding reporting.
Unfortunately, the shortage of nominations for Working Group chairs and sub-Working Group Chairs remains an ongoing challenge. Without states volunteering to take up Treaty leadership roles, the Secretariat must step in to lead the committee, which does not reflect well on state prioritisation of the Treaty. Currently States Parties in arrears cannot chair Working Groups, but a more flexible approach could have net benefits for the Treaty, and allow for greater leadership and opportunities, which could help national leaders understand the Treaty’s value and importance.
Defining the ATT’s path in the next decade
The first decade of the Treaty, shepherded by a single Head of Secretariat, focused on establishing the bureaucratic structures of the Treaty. With the foundations now established, having a new Secretariat Head provides an opportunity to reflect on how the Treaty operates and to reimagine aspects such as the structure of Working Groups, the management committee, the VTF and the DIEF. Another consideration could be around promoting greater inclusion by expanding the reach of the Treaty to more governmental and civil society actors outside of Geneva. There is also an opportunity to revisit some of the past CSP themes and to consider how to ensure that each theme builds on the previous one.
The ATT has to be considered within the context of other disarmament and arms control mechanisms. This year, the Working Group meetings clash with the high-level segments of the Human Rights Council and the Conference on Disarmament for the second year running. The Secretariat will coordinate with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs moving forward to try and prevent overlapping meeting dates. Delegates will also be given a more detailed work plan with clear guiding questions, but less reading material overall, so they can come prepared and involve technical experts as necessary.
An important aspect of promoting the ATT is regional outreach to build personal relationships with key counterparts, especially in the Global South. The sponsorship programme is one effective way of bringing delegates to Geneva, but there could be more clarity on what the Secretariat expects from those who participate in the programme. In the past, regional outreach by CSP Presidents was effective, but it depends on the financial means and priorities of their respective states.
The CSP11 Cycle also presents a window of opportunity to consider several specific functions of the Treaty in more detail.
Implementing articles 5, 6 and 7
On the one hand, it would be timely to reflect on how to bring discussions on effective Treaty implementation in specific cases from side events to the Working Groups, the focus needs to be on building trust and confidence by adopting a ‘no surprises’ approach.
On the other hand, it could be worth considering whether the rigidity of Working Groups is itself a hindrance. Rather than waiting up to a year for the next Working Group meetings, it might be possible to arrange informal meetings to discuss crisis situations as they arise. Carefully crafted terms of references could allow for specific forums similar to the DIEF, to be convened when a crisis develops. Such forums could facilitate information exchange whereby states, and potentially international organisations and CSOs working on the ground in the relevant contexts, could share and triangulate their data. Having accurate and up-to-date data would support Member States in better applying the Treaty’s provisions on prohibitions and risk assessments, and to identify the most appropriate and feasible mitigation measures to prevent diversion and associated serious violations of IHL and IHRL.
Another approach, given the sensitivity of these issues in some cases, would be to discuss theoretical exercises as a means to share insights and good practices. Under this model, states could champion thematic issues such as transit, and focus their interventions in specific domains.
Transparency and reporting
Reporting compliance faces several longstanding issues, such as the lack of institutional memory when staff turnover, especially where there is no handover or national standard operating procedures, meaning that sometimes people tasked with reporting do not understand what the requirements are or what they mean. There can also be challenges in accessing necessary data from security ministries.
There are, however, several potential ways to remedy reporting challenges, and thoughtful consultations with States Parties may identify more. For example, currently only one person per member state can have an account on the reporting platform, so it requires this individual to prioritise what is usually a time-consuming task. Moreover, this individual may feel embarrassed about submitting a late report, or updating a report.
The Secretariat could therefore look into options to allow multiple users to input data, sending automated yet personalised reminders, and congratulating people for sending or updating reports, even if they are late. It could remedy the reporting process, by allowing states to save a draft report and complete it at a later time, meaning it has to be completed in one go.
Identifying reporting ‘champions’ could be an effective way of improving reporting compliance. There could be a role for civil society in this, although one issue is that there is no open access database of reporting points of contact. This also undermines transparency, because NGOs, civil society and industry do not know whom to contact if they have follow-up questions. This is compounded by the fact that the existing website is difficult to search, there is no indication regarding whether an annual report has been updated, and no database to provide aggregated information.
Universalisation, cooperation and assistance
To advance universalisation, it would be important to gain a better of understanding of what has worked when it comes to undertaking the ratification processes in different contexts. It is already clear that universalisation is a long, multi-stakeholder process and may not be achieved in a given country within the one-year mandate of a CSP chair. Longer-term engagement by regional champions could be key, and there may also be benefits in reaching out to parliamentarians who can keep the topic on the political agenda as governments change.
Moreover, while top-down approaches targeting senior officials may be more in line with established protocols, bottom-up approaches whereby VTF funding is used to support legislative reform or strengthen export controls, thus bringing a country more in line with ATT obligations, is also important in bringing about the conditions needed to ratify the ATT. This can be done most efficiently when it is coordinated with efforts related to other mechanisms like the UN Programme of Action, and can be especially effective if industry can be brought in from the beginning to understand their role in ATT implementation.
Diversion and transfer or information sharing: the future of the DIEF
The need for a DIEF in some form is more relevant than ever, given the central importance of diversion in the Treaty and its role in undermining international peace and security. Its usefulness lies in unpacking typologies of diversion through real-world examples, and identifying tangible practices to prevent diversion.
The DIEF has, however, become excessively politicised at times, and the rules of procedure have not always been strictly enforced. The current format is characterised by a large degree of apprehension on the part of States Parties. It is somewhat telling that it took a lot longer to find a new chair than for other parts of the ATT. There is often a lack of interaction, which can be because the diplomats in the room do not have the necessary technical expertise to make meaningful interventions. In addition, member states do not usually have enough advance notice regarding which cases will be discussed in order to prepare an intervention.
It could therefore be worth considering whether some alternative or complementary formats may be better suited to achieving the states objectives of the DIEF. One would be to organise regional or sub-regional ‘mini-DIEF’ sessions outside of Geneva in contexts where states would be more willing to share, and then to report back on these discussions at the CSP. Other options could be to hold a version of the DIEF at the UN Office for Drugs and Crime in Vienna, or at INTERPOL in Lyon, in order to link it with discussions and technical experts working on trafficking and transnational organised crime. Other forums such as the Wassenaar Arrangement or regional expert groups (such as the Conventional Arms Export Control (COARM) group in the EU) could provide inspiration for alternative formats. Secure hybrid formats might also be worth considering to allow a wider number of technical and regional experts to attend remotely.
An ongoing discussion at the DIEF is whether to involve civil society experts. Approaching this as a ‘yes-no’ question, however, may detract from some alternative solutions. For example, it could be possible to modify the DIEF’s terms of reference to allow the chair to invite specific CSOs or industry to attend or present. It would also be possible to have ‘break-out’ sessions in which CSOs can participate. This, as is the case for all alternative models, would benefit from states having more time to prepare their interventions, for example, during the intersessional period.
As with the discussion on applying articles 5, 6 and 7, there could also be an option to discuss theoretical or anonymised examples through table-top exercises as a means of facilitating exchanges in national practices without the risk of naming and shaming. Another shared challenge is that the DIEF could be more effective if it were more agile. The DIEF could therefore discuss mechanisms that would allow law enforcement in one country to reach out to industry in another on an ad hoc basis in order to prevent and address diversion, including by filling gaps in supply chain integrity where the existing document is not sufficient. This could serve as an early-warning mechanism to prevent the transfer of arms which could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of IHL, IHRL and gender-based violence (GBV), rather than as a forum to discuss serious crimes after the fact.