Participants welcomed the increasing understanding that both legally binding and non-legally binding approaches to PAROS are complementary1. The Responsible Space Behaviours OEWG’s Concluding Joint Statement captures this well, “reaffirm[ing] that political commitments on responsible behaviours can be developed in support of, and without prejudice to, the pursuit of legally binding measures and instruments in this area”2. However, this needs to be operationalized as well as account for different perspectives on threats and challenges.
A point of conceptual clarification. It was observed that sometimes, there is an unhelpful conflation in space security discussions when the word ‘norms’ is taken to mean responsible space behaviours, and ‘legally binding initiative’ as a reference to the PPWT (Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects). Non-legally binding approaches, including norms, could include responsible space behaviours but are not necessarily limited as such. Legally binding initiatives include but are not restricted to the PPWT.
While legally binding measures have a higher status and entail State responsibility under international law, non-legally binding approaches contribute to norm shaping, enabling incremental progress and consensus building due to their flexible and adaptable nature. Additionally, non-legally binding approaches can produce legal consequences through influencing treaty implementation, informing customary international law and shaping domestic legislation; the example given was of UN resolutions first elaborating the future principles and obligations of the OST.
It was suggested that thinking in spectrums may provide an opportunity to operationalize the complementary nature of legally binding and non-legally binding approaches: a spectrum of threats, and a spectrum of responses on how to manage those threats.
Discussions on the range of threats and challenges covered a broad breadth of topics, including:
Trends
- Increasing strategic competition in space, including the further militarization of space and the development of counterspace weapons
- The rise in conjunction events, with a biannual doubling of conjunction events over the past few years. There are about 10,000 active satellites in orbit today, with an additional 1,000-1,500 new satellites added every six months. In the past, 95% of risky conjunction events were due to debris whereas today, 60% of risky conjunction events are between two active spacecrafts.
Specific instances of concern
- Grey zone behaviour such as cyberthreats and activities such as jamming and spoofing
- Lack of transparency in the intended use of a satellite
- New technologies and capabilities such as rendezvous and proximity operations.
Open questions for further discussion
- The role of legally binding and non-legally binding measures, risk reduction and TCBMs in breaking underlying drivers driving the development of counterspace capabilities, such as threat perceptions and distrust
- Given differing threat perceptions shaped by factors such as capability asymmetry and inter-State relations, is it possible to adopt a standardized approach to understanding threat perceptions? What are the merits of a behavioural-based approach to that end?
- What are the different degrees of State practice available for informing existing and emerging norms of behaviour?
- Can capabilities be regulated? What are methods to differentiate between civilian and military assets in space, and how would one go about monitoring and verifying different types of capabilities and behaviours?
- How does the space and the nuclear-weapons nexus affect PAROS and space security more broadly?
- Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, para 30 ↩︎
- Responsible Space Behaviours OEWG’s Concluding Joint Statement, https://docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Working_Group_on_Reducing_Space_Threats_-(2022)/PHL-_STATEMENT-__Concluding_Joint_Statement.pdf ↩︎