SSA is experiencing a significant demographic change. The UN World Population Prospects (2024 revision) projects that the population in SSA is expected to continue to grow from about 1.3 billion today to 2.1 billion by 2050, and to 3.3 billion in 2100. Future population trends are uncertain with a 95% projection interval between 2.7 billion and 4.5 billion in 2100. However, the prospect for SSA is rapid population growth and a youthful population, because fertility rates are declining slowly. Due to shifts in fertility and mortality rates, the age structure of the total population is projected to change as follows:[2]
- The under-15 age group is projected to continue its declining share of the total population—from 44% in 2000 to 40% today, and further down to 33% by 2050. However, its absolute number will still increase by 35% between 2025 and 2050, due to continued high fertility rates and population momentum.
- The 15–59 age group is expected to grow its share of the total population from 51% in 2000 to 55% today to reach 60% by 2050. The size of this group will expand by 82% between 2025 and 2050.
- The 60+ age group remains relatively small but is projected to increase its share of the population from just under 5% today to 8% by 2050. Notably, this is the only age group with a higher growth rate between 2025 and 2050 than in the previous period (2000–2025), with numbers more than doubling between 2025-2050.
The small decline in the proportion of the population under the age of 15 in SSA is largely the result of declining fertility rates, albeit slower declines and later initiated than those observed in other regions. Forty-two countries in the region still have a total fertility rate (TFR) above 4 births per woman, and several, including Niger, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, and Somalia, have TFRs exceeding 6.
Notable exceptions include Kenya (3.3 births per woman), Ghana (3.5), Gabon (3.8), Rwanda (3.8), and Ethiopia (4.2), which have all experienced faster fertility declines in recent years compared to the majority of countries in SSA. For those countries that experience rapid fertility declines, the share of the working-age population (15–59 years) increases, which means that the child dependency ratio (under 15) gradually falls. However, for the majority of countries experiencing slower declines in fertility, there are smaller impacts on the dependency ratio. Where achieving a more rapid decline in fertility, including ending child marriage, and addressing human development, particularly girls’ education, are not prioritised, even very careful planning and investments would have little effect on economic prospects.
Declining mortality rates (including child mortality) and related extended life expectancy rates for both men and women across SSA (51 in 2000, 62 now, 67 in 2050) are contributing to growth in the 60+ age group. While this older population segment remains relatively small, its expansion marks the beginnings of a shift in dependency burdens from youth to the elderly, which will become more apparent towards the end of the century. Lower fertility and mortality rates are features of the end of the demographic transition.
There are significant regional differences. For example, Southern Africa began experiencing fertility declines as early as the 1950s and now has the lowest TFR of all SSA regions. Central Africa started its transition later, in the 1990s. There are also country-specific patterns that need to be understood as countries and intra-country disparities need to also be recognised. Landlocked Sahel countries have the world’s highest fertility rates and face steep challenges in supporting rapidly growing populations. Niger, for example, is projected to grow from 28 million in 2025 to 70 million by 2050. This surge will likely heighten regional tensions and drive intra-African migration toward coastal West African states, where fertility rates are slightly lower but populations are still rising and may already be experiencing challenges. Managing these migration flows without triggering social tensions or conflict will be a critical challenge for the region.
Fertility inequality is persistent in countries, particularly between more educated women and less-educated populations. There have been some declines in adolescent (aged 15-19) childbearing, with large declines in countries like Ethiopia and Kenya. However, the rate (average of 10% adolescent childbearing per 1000 births in SSA) is still far higher than in other parts of the world. If adolescent birth rates declined quickly (20% annual reductions), the number of births in SSA would stabilise and would be 20% smaller than what is currently projected in 2050.
These demographic trends present a particularly complex policy challenge and show why demographic evidence and data is important for planning, policy and investments. For those countries that experience faster demographic transitions that lead to lower dependency ratios and higher working-age populations, economic opportunities can be generated provided health, education, and labour markets are significantly scaled up. Rapid population growth means that maintaining current per capita investment will require sustained annual budget increases, which for example will include spending on more trained teachers, nurses, and doctors. Rapid population growth also increases food security challenges. Yet current spending already falls below international benchmarks, and overseas development assistance (ODA) is declining. Ignoring demographic evidence risks further straining service quality and coverage.
SSA needs to integrate 20 million new labour market entrants annually, but only about 25% of these entrants secure formal employment; most find work in low-paid, insecure informal jobs. Policymakers face the challenge of maximising the potential of each new generation, requiring major public and private investment in human capital and measures to boost labour demand. If fertility declines accelerate, the age-structure would shift towards a greater working-age population. With fewer children to support, working-age adults can save more, and families can invest more in each child’s education, health, and wellbeing. This investment, alongside investments in an enabling economic environment, can yield better educational outcomes, improved nutrition, and increased labour market participation for women, as well as enhanced national productivity, economic growth, food security, and stability.
Private sector involvement
To capitalise on this opportunity there are several promising areas for private sector development in SSA, each presenting unique opportunities, but also challenges. Success in these sectors depends on targeted planning, supportive policy frameworks, and substantial investment over a long-time span, that need to be tailored and sequenced through demographic evidence and data.
Areas for private sector development
| Areas | Development potential |
|---|---|
| Agrifood sector | Traditionally the main employer in SSA, especially in smallholder farming. Commercialisation and productivity gains could raise incomes through on- and off-farm activities like processing and trading. However, even with higher productivity, agrifood alone cannot absorb the growing labour force. |
| Manufacturing | In Asia, labour-intensive industries such as garments have driven economic transformation and absorbed large numbers of workers, including women. SSA could attract manufacturing investment, but rapid capital-intensive shifts in the sector, combined with limited infrastructure in SSA, make replicating Asia’s path uncertain. |
| Services | SSA could leapfrog into tradable services like call centres, tourism, software, and creative industries. Realising this potential requires reliable infrastructure—especially power and internet—and a better-educated youth, demanding substantial public and private investment. |
| Digital technologies and Artificial Intelligence (AI) | Digital technologies and the rise of AI offer significant opportunities for innovation and economic growth in SSA. Major challenges to realising the potential of digital technologies must be addressed, including in energy infrastructure, foundational skills, connectivity, and access to devices. Demography can help to understand future trajectories of who benefits from technology and AI and who does not. |
Private and public investments are required, but currently, high public debt, borrowing costs, and low domestic savings, exacerbated by high fertility rates, limit investment capacity. Responding to these opportunities and challenges requires a good understanding of the demographic trends that may shift spending priorities.
Finally, a shift in age-structure towards a working age population alongside an aging population will ultimately create the opportunity to set-up a viable social protection system (e.g. pensions and other savings). This shift will also offer an opportunity to develop domestic care economies. In SSA, women often bear the dual burden of caring for children and aging parents, limiting formal workforce participation during their most productive years. Expanding paid and skilled care jobs could create employment, ease unpaid caregiving burdens, and boost women’s economic participation. Without such systems, and without viable savings, women face reduced earning and saving potential, deepening long-term economic vulnerability.
[2] The UN World Population Prospects, 2024 Revision, demographic profiles: World Population Prospects