The accelerating speed of technological advancement and the increasing convergence between diverse tech sectors, alongside the broad range of potential applications, necessitate continuous and integrated evaluation of implications for WMD non-proliferation. Different segments of the WMD non-proliferation and counter-terrorism community possess varying levels of awareness regarding the state of the art in different technological sectors. International organisations are already employing various mechanisms to remain informed about technologies that could support their work or necessitate globally coordinated guidelines. For instance, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has convened several Emerging Technology Workshops to explore potential applications of advanced technologies, such as distributed ledger technology and artificial intelligence, to its nuclear safeguards. Similarly, in recognition of the accelerating pace of convergence and application of AI-enabled synthetic biology, an Expert Advisory Committee of the World Health Organisation (WHO) issued recommendations and a Framework for Governance on human genome editing. More broadly, WHO published the Global Guidance Framework for the Responsible Use of the Life Sciences in 2022. The Scientific Advisory Board of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) annually scans the technological horizon, reporting on developments relevant to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons.
Furthermore, meetings of the Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG) have consistently considered WMD proliferation threats and non-proliferation opportunities arising from disruptive technologies, with member governments investing in technological solutions to specific challenges. Examples include the Monitoring and Tracking Chemicals (MATCH) project, which has demonstrated the potential of distributed ledger technology (DLT) to streamline declarations of international dual-use chemical transfers, and INTERPOL’s BioTracker, which leverages big data and machine learning for early warning of biological threats. The BioPrevail initiative also incentivises industry to leverage innovative technology to develop new solutions to enhance the sustainability of high-containment biological laboratories in resource-constrained settings.
However, these efforts have largely been siloed, opportunistic and/or ad hoc. Moreover, many governments in the Global South remain on the sidelines of these discussions and risk benefiting only partially from these powerful new technologies, or worse, experiencing political, economic, and social exploitation and instability. Meanwhile, research scientists, applied technologists, and small and mid-sized technology firms often lack awareness of how their inventions and technological advancements could enable malign actors to acquire or proliferate CBRN weapons, or conversely, how they could strengthen WMD non-proliferation regimes and counter-terrorism efforts. While leading artificial intelligence firms invest in responsible AI initiatives and embed guardrails in large language models, smaller start-ups may not possess the same level of awareness regarding vulnerabilities. Open-source cyber defense tools like “hackathons” may be beneficial for traditional cybersecurity but are not well-suited for identifying and mitigating CBRN vulnerabilities in new technologies. Instead, more specialised and controlled approaches are needed to safely and effectively uncover potential risks without inadvertently creating new ones.
In this context, there is a clear opportunity for the Global Partnership to leverage its significant multilateral influence and proven threat reduction track-record to reinforce and expand existing work within the IAEA, WHO, OPCW, INTERPOL and other international and multilateral organisations. The Global Partnership could signal the critical importance of WMD-RT by submitting open letters to relevant entities with questions on new technologies and could sponsor side events on WMD-RT at meetings or conferences of states parties to the relevant Conventions. Sustained effort to build mutual understanding and trust over time will be foundational to identifying shared problems and aspirations and implementing threat-agnostic and technology-agnostic approaches to both mitigating proliferation risks and leveraging proliferation prevention benefits of WMD-RT. This trust- and community-building process could benefit from lessons learned from previous efforts to integrate new stakeholders, such as public health practitioners and law enforcement specialists, into the WMD non-proliferation community of practice, with staff secondments proving fruitful.
To achieve this, a first critical step is to map, build, engage, and sustain a networked collaboration between government and industry by:
- Coordinated stakeholder and platform mapping. Mapping academic institutions, private companies, NGOs, and governments globally whose work or interests intersect with the WMD non-proliferation and counter-terrorism mission space. This effort could include a platform mapping exercise to identify relevant interlocutor networks best suited for engaging these communities, such as Chambers of Commerce, accelerators, venture networks, and intergovernmental discussion forums. While the first three are largely outside of the scope of the GP, their mapping will help outline areas where others can engage. The mapping exercise will also address the information asymmetry between government and industry and acknowledge that industry is not a monolithic entity, requiring processes that allow for smaller players to engage, as these often operate at the frontlines of commercialisation but have limited resources for engagement.
- Constituency building and education. Educating target constituencies through learning networks, tailored to each group. For example, the GP could lead outreach to the younger generation of technology innovators through targeted awareness-raising operations on dual-use concerns and WMD literacy, akin to previous educational outreach to engage bioscience students on the ethics and dangers of bio-proliferation. The FBI’s workshops with “do-it-yourself laboratories” and industry’s “creativity labs” offer models. The WHO Academy’s online dual-use research of concern (DURC) courses and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) Erlangen Initiative for outreach to academia on export controls and research of concern also provide platforms that could be built upon. Opportunities also exist to connect the G7 to the G20, expanding this critical agenda to a broader constituency, including countries of the Global South.
The GP offers a vital forum for information sharing across sectors and can facilitate the clearer articulation of WMD threat reduction priorities. Additionally, sponsoring side events focused on WMD-RT at meetings or conferences of relevant conventions can help raise awareness and drive engagement across the policymaking community. There is also an opportunity to better combine resources across GP partners, starting within the G7. Given the lack of regular conversations between the security sector and the private sector, the GP can convene stakeholders for dialogue, focusing on problem identification. This includes creating an “aggregated view” of issues and solutions and encouraging convenings across WMD-relevant conventions and multilateral regimes to discuss and promote solutions with diplomats, scientists, technologists, and NGOs, considering “ecosystems” rather than isolated “sectors.”