In this time of extremely rapid technology transformation, innovation is being largely driven by private civilian sector companies developing technology for commercial purposes. These companies do not typically engage with the defence sector and are not particularly interested in doing so. Amongst a number of issues, they are deterred by the extensive paperwork requirements to even apply for a tender. The defence sector needs to explore how to address these constraints by reviewing procurement processes to make them more flexible and rapid. Defence agencies need to rethink how they can effectively engage in public private partnerships (PPPs) with the kinds of companies that are becoming so central to defence technology innovation.
NATO has been developing a Rapid Adoption Action Plan to ensure that military forces can integrate EDTs at an operational tempo that matches or exceeds adversaries. In 2021 NATO also launched the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) to foster transatlantic cooperation on critical technologies, promote interoperability and harness civilian innovation by engaging with academia and the private sector. However, DIANA funding is tiny compared to that of individual allies. While both of these initiatives are important, continued innovative thinking about how NATO and its member states can best engage with the private sector and take forward rapid adoption of EDTs is needed.
There are many developments taking place in the civilian space that need to be considered for defence applications. As noted in paragraph 11, the military already depends heavily on civilian infrastructure. The building of deeper civilian-military connections would help to identify what additional civilian built infrastructure could be used for military purposes. Deeper ties could also address issues such as what obligations the private sector could come under to make assets available to the military in time of war under Nordic type models of total defence, such as making personnel available for cyber security and defence roles.
There are again valuable potential lessons to be learned from how Ukraine has managed PPPs. Ukraine has fostered permanent rapid innovation routes and has also been finding novel ways of producing and delivering in volume and at pace. Ukrainian application of software updates to weapons systems on a weekly basis would not be possible within Western procurement rules. There may also be relevant lessons from the procurement practices of Western special forces, which tend to be more agile.
The very high consumption rate of munitions in the Ukraine war has highlighted the need to be able to produce in volume. Western defence procurement had been centred on the production of high-end equipment produced in small quantities with no concept of production in mass, based on the assumption that large scale conventional conflict had become outdated. The largest tank manufacturer in Europe only produces 20 tanks per year. A corner has been somewhat turned for munitions as well as for missiles. European NATO members in particular need to rebuild readiness in mass with munitions stockpiles and the ability to field systems in numbers, very rapidly and able to be upgraded. Investment in industry is needed to provide it with the ability to ramp up production. Commercial practices of no stockpiling and just in time delivery should not apply to defence contractors.
Industry works on the basis of profit. Getting technology that is close to maturity into the development phase is expensive, so governments need to support industry in taking this forward through the forging of stronger collaborative partnerships between government and industry. In order to invest more in supply chains to support production in volume, companies need long term contracts. NATO could make better use of the CNAD to build bridges with industry, with NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) and the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) also playing an important role.
From a NATO perspective there is a need to recognise that the EU has become a significant player in the defence industry and technology spheres. The two organisations need to properly coordinate their activities in order to ensure maximum, mutual benefit from their respective efforts. In order to achieve such mutually beneficial cooperation and to continue exploiting the full breadth of defence technologies that are developed across the Alliance, it will be critical for the nations and institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community to maintain sufficiently high levels of political trust in each other in a geopolitical context of increasing complexity and challenge. NATO’s role of maintaining Allied interoperability at the high end of conflict will become more challenging as warfare gets faster and more intense, and will risk becoming impossible without the necessary political trust.