The Swedish concept of total defence, which has similarities to those of its neighbouring Allies, represents a powerful model for strengthening the resilience of Alliance members and populations and for protecting Allied territory across the full range of threats. If the home base cannot be protected countries will be severely hampered in their ability to project power. The distinctions between peace, crisis and conflict are now blurring with hybrid attacks. Russia and China continue to analyse in depth all Western vulnerabilities. If countries are unable to protect against inevitable high end hybrid attack as a prelude to kinetic attack then all defence planning may become undermined.
In Sweden everyone can be enrolled in some form of national service between the ages of 16 and 70. This can be either military service, civilian service, or a general national service obligation such as working in schools or digging roads. Not everyone is serving, but all must complete a “mustering” questionnaire. The focus in Sweden at the moment is on rebuilding military service, which will be followed by a move to civilian total defence mobilisation.
A booklet distributed to all households indicates what do in case of war and who to contact, with numbers provided on paper. The booklet is especially read by people under 30, and leads to more discussion and awareness in society about why there is a need to increase defence spending and the different ways in which people can contribute to the total defence activation of society.
Total defence has become a fundamental component of conventional deterrence. Robust total defence signals that countries can deal with hybrid threats in peacetime. The organisation of civil society in this way is a cost effective means of conveying that robust deterrence by denial is in place.
Resilience is a concept that Allies interpret very differently, so if there is some initiative on total defence across the Alliance it would have to be adaptable to the variety of national situations. Unsurprisingly, countries on the front lines with Russia have undertaken the most robust resilience initiatives; i.e. Estonia has a “data embassy” outside the country to preserve all government data in case the country is invaded. The further countries are from Russia the weaker the perception of threat becomes.
The NATO Office of Chief Scientist (OCS) has been working with NATO’s resilience committee to assess what type of research is needed to give advice to the committee. Civilian officials working on related issues lack understanding of how they link into the defence sector, and also do not have the same sense of urgency. Ministries are typically very siloed and legal frameworks are different. Initiatives are needed to induce ministries to work together with a sense of urgency within a civil, total defence framework. Total defence involves hundreds of agencies and actors. For total defence to work policies have to be very well coordinated and exercised. A civil defence planning process along with exercises encompassing all the relevant ministries and head of government could be an important part of the solution to these total defence challenges.
The EU has started looking at societal resilience with preparedness days calling for residents to maintain on hand 72 hours of critical supplies. The EU has the institutional framework to support societal resilience and this area could constitute a major element of a deeper EU-NATO relationship.
A key milestone occurred at NATO’s 2024 Washington Summit on integrating civilian planning into collective defence planning. NATO should build on the ideas regarding resilience from at the 2024 Summit and link these to the family of plans as part of a shift in focus to defending citizens alongside NATO territory.