China’s recent military parade signalled that domestic manufacturing capabilities are strong enough to allow China to resist political and economic reliance on others for a sustained nuclear weapons programme, including any need for GCAP or AUKUS-style arrangements. As such, it also does not have a need for a necessity-based security arrangement mirroring Russia and North Korea’s 2024 Strategic Comprehensive Partnership, seemingly indicating that the three countries may collectively be friends, but China should not be viewed as equal to the other two.
China’s nuclear modernisation has three primary impacts on European security issues. First, it indicates China’s increasing ability to operate as growing nuclear power with a complete nuclear triad, which could make future decisionmakers more uncomfortable with the heightened risk of any instance of potential conflict with China. Beyond the security implications of the ability of Chinese nuclear weapons to be capable of reaching Europe in the hypothetical event of a conflict, Europe should also consider the implications of Chinese nuclear doctrine and strategy from a political perspective. At present, for example, there is a danger of Europe not fully appreciating the political value and legitimacy China generates among non-nuclear weapons states with its No First Use policy.
Second, it finally gives Europe’s traditionally stalwart ally, the U.S., sufficient incentive to pivot fully to Asia (and subsequently draw resources away from Europe), as Washington seeks to address its strongest competitor. However, by Europe borrowing the U.S.’s framing of China’s rise as a “two-peer problem,” Europe is encouraging itself to only consider what might be lost by any US withdrawal, when it might instead be more useful to consider what Europe might gain from a more focused U.S. presence in Asia.
Third, nuclear and defence industries writ large may become more interesting to China as it continues to seek modernisation. China could become more reliant on Russian fissile material even as it continues to expand domestic capacity for production. Equally, China may become more interested in the European defence industry, either as an example or as a potential opportunity for collaboration or competition.
Further east, Europe should still consider North Korea as a security issue within a nuclear context, as Kim Jung Un is considered by some as the likeliest leader of a nuclear-capable country to break the nuclear taboo. A nuclear incident, even isolated to the Korean Peninsula, would have knock-on effects for Europe. North Korea’s future relationship with China bears monitoring, especially considering that Pyongyang views the Taiwan and Korean Peninsula issues as analogous.
Relatedly, Europe should consider the impact of security assurances, and the potential absence thereof, in Northeast Asia. From a broader geographic perspective, Asian states seem disinterested in establishing a NATO-style security architecture, including anything resembling a Defensive Counter Air (DCA) mission. China realises this and seems increasingly poised to capitalise on the absence of this kind of structure by establishing its own influence—or, at least, mitigating the ability of the U.S. to do similarly—through coercion. Europe should watch how the future of the security assurances the U.S. does have in the region evolve, given the potential for “friendly proliferation.”