NATO lacks a clear, comprehensive theory of victory against Russia. While the Alliance is unlikely to lose a war, it does not currently have a framework for achieving success. What exists instead is a collection of reactive measures shaped by the war in Ukraine, broader threat assessments, and shifting U.S. priorities. Since 2022, NATO has relied on bolstering deterrence, reassuring allies, and supporting Ukraine, but without articulating a clear long-term objective for relations with Moscow. An actual strategy would not only prepare for the challenge of Russia’s hybrid, high-intensity, and nuclear threats but also serve as a powerful signal of determination to Moscow.
Two major drivers are shaping NATO’s approach. The first is Russia’s own trajectory. Despite decades of reassurance and unilateral restraint on NATO’s part, Moscow has escalated its ambitions. Russia has pursued revisionist policies since at least 2007, invaded neighbours, and invested heavily in its defence industry. Today, it mobilises vast resources for a protracted conflict, combining low-cost drone production, hybrid warfare, and nuclear coercion.
Far from moderating its behaviour, NATO’s restraint has reinforced Moscow’s belief that the Alliance lacks resolve. Russia now uses nuclear weapons not only as deterrents but as tools of coercion, successfully limiting NATO’s involvement in Ukraine.
The second driver is the shift in U.S. priorities. With Washington increasingly focused on China and potentially reducing its conventional presence in Europe, NATO must consider how to deter Russia with fewer American assets. This raises difficult questions about whether European allies can fill the gap and how sustainable the current balance of contributions will be in the long term.
On the question of transatlantic consensus, views diverge. On one hand, there has been notable progress in aligning threat perceptions since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Increases in defence spending, the integration of Finland and Sweden, and strengthened support for Kyiv all demonstrate a shared commitment. On the other hand, divisions remain. Different regions hold varying perspectives on Russia’s threat, U.S. politics introduce uncertainty, and European business communities are not always aligned with security priorities. The absence of a consistent U.S. strategy toward Russia further complicates matters. Without clarity from Washington, NATO’s collective strategy risks remaining fragmented and reactive, rather than proactive and long-term.
As Russia increasingly relies on nuclear coercion, NATO’s nuclear posture has become critical to both deterrence and reassurance. Continued nuclear guarantees are essential, especially as conventional balances appear less favourable. Moving beyond the “three no’s” could reinforce deterrence by signalling that NATO is no longer bound by outdated commitments and could expand nuclear sharing or deploy new capabilities if necessary. Emphasising the importance of normalising nuclear messaging, modernising deterrence arrangements, and better integrating nuclear, conventional, and hybrid strategies could all also offer more effective components of a strategy. NATO’s credibility in facing Russia depends on demonstrating unity, strengthening nuclear deterrence, and developing a proactive, long-term strategy that moves beyond reactivity.