Ensuring continued constructive transatlantic engagement will require building structures and arrangements resilient to political pressures and changes within the U.S. There remains a need for greater robustness in responding to technological uncertainties, particularly with the rapid pace of advancements in artificial intelligence that could accelerate unexpected challenges. U.S. extended deterrent remains the foundation of NATO security and must continue in a way that is credible in the eyes of Russia. This premise bears supporting via sustained dialogues through the High-Level Group and the Nuclear Planning Group. One manifestation of alliance support may need to include backing potential U.S. uploads after the expiration of New START, depending on how negotiations between Russia and the U.S. (should they materialise) might unfold. The Dual-Capable Aircraft mission equally remains vital, and it should remain open to broader participation and accompanied by collective communication across the alliance about its purpose and value.
The U.S. must continue to demonstrate a committed stake in Europe, balancing nuclear policy with conventional posture to reassure allies and deter adversaries. However, alliance leadership need not be Washington’s responsibility alone. Independent centres of decision-making within Europe could strengthen signalling to Russia, while the provision of extended deterrence or similar arrangements from the UK and France should continue to be refined and assessed within alliance discussions.
In terms of demonstrating commitment and resolve beyond capabilities, response time improvements will generate more flexibility and optionality in deterrence strategies. Non-nuclear allies with strong industrial bases take on more visible leadership roles and responsibilities within alliance structures, thereby reinforcing NATO’s collective strength. Finally, the alliance needs to continue addressing the challenge of emerging disruptive technologies, as these developments complicate second-strike considerations and will require the alliance to develop improved and adaptive responses to maintain credible deterrence in the future.
Gina Sinclair and Jack Crawford
Wilton Park | September 2025
In partnership with
-
Notes
Wilton Park reports are brief summaries of the main points and conclusions of a
conference. The reports reflect rapporteurs’ personal interpretations of the proceedings.
As such they do not constitute any institutional policy of Wilton Park nor do they
necessarily represent the views of the rapporteur. Wilton Park reports and any
recommendations contained therein are for participants and are not a statement of policy
for Wilton Park, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) or His
Majesty’s Government nor any participating governments.
Should you wish to read other Wilton Park reports, or participate in upcoming Wilton Park
events, you can find out more here.
To receive our monthly bulletin and latest updates, please subscribe here.