President Putin’s overarching objectives have remained steady over the years. His ambitions are rooted in resurrecting Russia as a premier power and ensuring Moscow is a decisive player in shaping European and Eurasian security. Central to this vision is the establishment of a distinct Russian sphere of influence, embedded within a polycentric worldview where great powers dominate their regions, and smaller states have limited sovereignty. Since 1999, removing U.S. influence from Europe has been a consistent priority for Russian foreign policy, and that this goal remains a cornerstone of Putin’s agenda.
In terms of next steps, Russia’s longstanding influence campaign is likely to persist. This includes not only propaganda and cyber operations but also intimidation, especially targeting post-Soviet states. Cognitive warfare, indoctrination, and political pressure campaigns complement these methods. At the centre of the campaign is Russia’s large-scale conventional war in Ukraine, which remains crucial for Moscow’s claim to ultimate sovereignty and regional dominance. Putin’s ambitions may not stop at Ukraine, pointing to evidence of incursions and attacks on critical infrastructure in the Baltics and beyond. Another area of concern is the regeneration of Russia’s covert military capabilities, which could strengthen hybrid threats across Europe. Putin continues to cultivate the narrative that any direct conflict with Russia would escalate to nuclear war, thereby deterring stronger Western responses. The Arctic will likely remain an arena for strategic signalling, but despite recent developments, it is not expected to become a daily hotspot.
Regarding Putin’s assessment of his own prospects for success, he has likely concluded that nuclear deterrence works, as Russia (by virtue of being a nuclear power) invaded a large neighbour without provoking direct international military intervention. However, frustrations have emerged: Ukraine’s resilience and the scope of indirect Western military support have undermined Russian expectations of a swift victory. Even so, Putin likely continues to view Western countries as hesitant to engage in direct conflict, reinforcing his belief that time favours Russia. Moscow’s capacity to expand military production, strengthen its conventional forces, and maintain a functioning economy, despite sanctions, supports this assessment. The view in Moscow is that Russia can sustain a long war of attrition. Meanwhile, the West has not reached a definitive verdict on Ukraine’s outcome, leaving room for Putin to claim success through endurance. Russia would regard any reduction in U.S. involvement in Europe as a strategic victory, although it is still too soon to determine whether such a shift will materialise.