Even if government had a clear picture of the threat landscape, it is of limited value if it cannot be communicated effectively to the public and political class. This section examines the barriers to effective communication, from low public salience and distrust of political messengers to competing misinformation and disinformation narratives, and considers how trust and engagement might be rebuilt from the local level upwards.
Public attitudes and trust in messengers
Polling evidence shows that defence and security are less of a concern among younger adults, in contrast to older age groups, and that support for increased defence spending is strongest among those who are more financially secure. This points to the need to frame defence issues in ways that connect more directly to everyday concerns such as the cost of living. Politicians and government figures are among the least trusted messengers on defence, regardless of party, whereas non-political voices carry greater credibility; a neutral, uncontroversial tone is therefore the most viable basis for building consensus. Growing political polarisation around the identification of the principal threat, with some perceiving the United States as the greater risk and others prioritising immigration, underscores the importance of depolarising this debate.
Competing narratives and cognitive warfare
Two competing and destabilising narratives dominate the information environment: one from the far right, built around the prospect of civil unrest, and another from parts of the far left and Islamist extremism, built around a sense of inevitable societal collapse. Elite communication has so far failed to engage with either narrative or to offer a compelling alternative. The UK’s post-war security has depended heavily on a now-eroding rules-based international order, and hybrid warfare functions as a deliberate strategy to polarise societies to the point where a passive, moderate centre is left disengaged while extremes dominate the debate. Better outreach to this centrist majority is essential, alongside a shift in public and institutional thinking from hybrid warfare towards the broader concept of cognitive warfare, understood as encompassing more direct attempts to shape a population’s beliefs and decision-making. Local-level reporting mechanisms would give citizens both responsibility and agency in resilience efforts.
Rebuilding trust from the local level up
Rebuilding trust in local communities, public services and everyday social networks, rather than in central government alone, is central to addressing growing apathy, which reflects a broken social contract and a public perception that government lacks a grasp of the bigger picture. A fragmented media environment allows adversaries to exploit early narrative-setting and keep government in a reactive posture. Improved data and threat-mapping capability, better use of commercial infrastructure to feed resilience systems, and a shared civic identity, sometimes framed as a resilient “Brand Britain”, that unites around common ground rather than only against common enemies, would strengthen this response. Local and regional government, alongside trusted intermediaries with more credibility than central government, are essential for translating national priorities into locally meaningful action, and resilience structures should ideally be established well ahead of any crisis. Abstract framings such as “we are at war” are unlikely to prompt action; more tangible entry points, such as climate resilience or emphasising the impact of real cyber attacks, such as those on Marks and Spencer or Jaguar Land Rover, could serve as testing grounds for models later applicable to defence.
Lessons from public engagement and exclusion
Formal engagement structures often deliver little in practice. Russia already regards itself as at war with the West, a view not yet widely accepted in Western Europe. A generation of young people risks becoming detached from mainstream narratives, with social media platforms acting as vectors for competing great-power narratives. Public exclusion from exercises such as war-gaming reflects an unwarranted assumption that the public cannot be trusted with difficult information, when evidence suggests the opposite. The Vaccine Taskforce stands as a positive example of disciplined messaging combined with modern channels and a willingness to take calculated risks.
Framing, literacy and consensus
Contradictory government messaging undermines public trust. “Multi-hazard” framing may be more accessible to the public than a single abstract national security narrative. The legacy of past foreign policy failures continues to shape public and youth scepticism. Media literacy and critical thinking skills, particularly for younger audiences, require sustained investment. The military has become increasingly distanced from civilian life, and rural and urban communities have distinct communication needs. Alternative framings, such as “preparedness” rather than “national security”, and international examples, including a Swedish national preparedness brochure distributed to all households, offer more inclusive starting points.
A cross-party consensus on national security no longer exists, and any national conversation must engage honestly with contested visions of the UK’s global role, rather than assume a unity of purpose that may no longer hold. Effective social cohesion strategies depend on sustained, repeated engagement, trusted facilitation, and genuine local ownership, calibrated to both slow-burn and fast-moving threats, and matched to messengers the public already trusts.