The UK is behind many of its allies and international partners when it comes to building a genuine culture of national preparedness, and there is much it can learn from states that have invested in this area for decades. These lessons are not directly transferable: differences in geography, history, population size and political culture mean that no single model can simply be lifted and applied to the UK context. However, examining what has worked elsewhere, and why, can help shape a future UK approach grounded in evidence rather than starting from first principles.
Estonia – six pillars of total defence
Estonia’s approach, developed since 2009, rests on six pillars: military defence, civil defence, the maintenance of vital societal services, the population’s will to defend the country, international engagement to promote security, and internal security. Strong public backing for national defence, including majority support for personal participation and for conscription, reflects a deliberate, decades-long investment in social cohesion through shared national rituals, cross-party political consensus, and a long-standing model of universal conscription that allows rapid mobilisation of a substantial proportion of the population. A dedicated cyber capability, including the world’s largest cyber defence exercise, forms a further pillar of this approach, underpinned by defence spending significantly above NATO’s benchmark.
Finland – Long-term embedded preparedness
Finland’s model, shaped by a long border with Russia and a historical experience of conflict, treats preparedness as constant rather than exceptional. It encompasses conscription, active NATO engagement, demonstrable political will, whole-of-society involvement including business and utilities, and sustained investment in media literacy to counter misinformation and disinformation. A structured process assigns dozens of preparedness-related tasks to different ministries; long-standing security and national defence institutions bring senior figures from across society together to build common understanding; and extensive civilian shelter capacity underpins this system, with preparedness treated as a continuous process of adaptation rather than a fixed state to be achieved.
Singapore – balancing technological ambition with digital resilience
Singapore’s long-standing culture of total defence includes conscription and an annual day of national commemoration, alongside a distinct emphasis on digital and intelligence capability as a fourth arm of its armed forces. Rapid adoption of artificial intelligence, seen as strategically necessary to avoid a competitive gap, is balanced against management of associated cyber and societal risk, particularly among a large, small and medium-sized enterprise sector where adoption remains low. Building public trust, transparent government communication following cyber incidents, and structured business engagement mechanisms are central to this approach, alongside a broader emphasis on strengthening national identity and social resilience to withstand manipulation.
Denmark and Sweden – building preparedness from a later start
Denmark’s experience is less mature than Estonia’s or Finland’s, with lower public threat awareness but growing momentum, partly catalysed by developments concerning Greenland. Measures include a deliberate, calibrated use of alarmist messaging to increase public attentiveness, honesty from government about existing shortcomings, extension of conscription to include women, a national preparedness brochure, and a national preparedness training week involving schools and businesses. Sweden’s experience includes the creation of dedicated ministerial and agency structures for civil defence and psychological resilience, distribution of household preparedness guidance, the involvement of a large number of public authorities across defined economic and infrastructure sectors, and legislation enabling the mobilisation of citizens for civil defence functions.
Cross-cutting lessons from these models include the value of habit-building around small-scale preparedness behaviours; the importance of signalling societal and political will to defend as a deterrent in itself; the need to develop media and digital literacy, particularly among younger citizens; the importance of identifying and engaging critical businesses directly in resilience planning; and the close link between public trust in government and government’s ability to deliver on economic opportunity and public services more broadly. Governments in more advanced systems have paid close attention to building political consensus on the need for preparedness, and a degree of calibrated alarmism can be a legitimate tool for prompting public attentiveness, provided it is not allowed to tip into panic.