The UK’s threat environment spans state-based military risk, degraded and vulnerable critical infrastructure, and institutional fragmentation, with universities offering a clear illustration of how a single sector can function as both a national asset and a point of exposure. These vulnerabilities are compounded by underdeveloped structures for public–private cooperation and a persistent tendency to treat resilience as a series of siloed issues rather than a connected whole.
A fragmented resilience architecture
Resilience thinking has evolved rapidly outside government in recent years, reflecting a recognition that the foreign and domestic are now deeply entangled. Constant short-term crises are eroding the social contract, and the UK remains broadly underprepared, both in its understanding of the threat, and its preparedness.
Political leaders themselves are not yet convinced of the plausibility of state-on-state conflict, complicating any attempt to prepare the public. Interdependence within national infrastructure is poorly understood and under-resilient, with insufficient redundancy to withstand simultaneous shocks. Misinformation and disinformation tend to converge on a single narrative outcome, the prospect of civil unrest. Indeed, religion, race and regional difference have all been subject to mis-and-disinformation driving unrest. A UK equivalent of an agency dedicated to countering societal-level cyber and information threats, akin to a “National Security Agency for society”, could address a clear gap.
Universities as an asset and a vulnerability
Chronic underfunding across parts of the higher education sector, dependence on international student income, and fragmented lines of communication with government have left parts of the national research and innovation base exposed. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review’s recognition of the value of universities, including a proposed defence university alliance, has been welcomed but remains under-utilised, potentially hampered by its location within the Department for Education rather than the Ministry of Defence, illustrating a broader pattern of fragmented departmental ownership of resilience issues.
Information, infrastructure and supply chain risk
The risks posed by the United States increasingly withdrawing from its role on the global stage, alongside increased Russian aggression and antagonisms, is likely underestimated. While the Ministry of Defence has shown increased desire and capacity to engage with the private sector on preparedness, the rest of government lags behind. Resilience should be framed around strengths and asymmetric advantage rather than threats alone. The UK is particularly vulnerable in the information domain relative to frontline NATO states. Undersea infrastructure, cyber-enabled information warfare, and the difficulty of sustaining diversified and secure supply chains, particularly for critical minerals, are priority areas requiring a clearer long-term strategic vision.
Structural and political barriers
Restricted political security clearances have a corrosive effect: excessive classification of security information limits ministers’ and business leaders’ ability to engage meaningfully, and decision-making remains heavily concentrated in London. Universities’ entanglement with foreign funding, particularly from China, illustrates the sector’s exposure, and the UK lacks a clear strategic “north star” compared with more centrally directed approaches elsewhere. The erosion of the third sector’s capacity, over-reliance on individuals also engaged in essential civilian roles, such as policing and healthcare for transition-to-war planning, and the dominance of everyday economic pressures over defence as a public concern also represent significant vulnerabilities.
The overall threat picture
Russia is the most immediate threat, particularly through hybrid activity, but it isn’t the only risk. Supply chains, critical infrastructure, social cohesion, and the spread of misinformation and disinformation are all vulnerabilities, as is climate change, and these problems all feed into each other, creating a complex threat picture. A persistent UK tendency towards complacency and an “island mentality” understates exposure and interdependence. The private sector has shown clear appetite to contribute more to national resilience but is often held back by a lack of sustained engagement from government, and little cross-departmental joined-up-thinking. While many actors across sectors are willing to contribute to national resilience, the United Kingdom currently lacks the institutional, financial and intellectual architecture to connect these efforts coherently. Building stronger government-to-government, whole-of-government and whole-of-society structures, underpinned by more open information-sharing, is a necessary next step.