Recommendations

Breakout discussions converged around three broad problem areas: fragmented government capability and capacity to lead an open national conversation, compounded by complacency and an exceptionalist “island nation” mindset; the interdependence and fragility of critical national infrastructure; and gaps in public awareness and understanding of threats, spanning state adversaries, misinformation and disinformation and climate change.

These recommendations come in the context of a tight fiscal environment and a range of other political challenges for government. The following recommendations emerged:

Government leadership and structures

• Appoint a designated responsible minister with a clear national resilience strategy, action plan and ring-fenced budget. This could be supported by a joint government-industry council.
• Establish a single entity to counter misinformation and disinformation and align messaging across government departments and public bodies.
• Clarify lines of responsibility between central government, the devolved nations, devolved regions and local government for communicating a shared threat picture.
• Implement the 2025 Strategic Defence Review’s ambitions to unify society around defence and resilience.

Engaging industry and critical infrastructure

• Establish a national business resilience forum to channel private sector willingness to engage in resilience planning.
• Invest sustainably in critical national infrastructure, and ensure regulators have the skills and staff needed to oversee it effectively.
• Develop a dedicated artificial intelligence defence and technology strategy, informed by international models, with attention to digital sovereignty and international partnership.
• Build organisational and staff resilience training, particularly within business, and strengthen information-sharing channels between government and industry.

Building public trust and engagement

• Prioritise a national conversation on resilience with a particular focus on engaging disengaged youth audiences and local communities.
• Empower trusted local and national voices to lead public conversations, cascading responsibility to devolved and local government and local leaders.
• Establish a community resilience service to build skills, empathy and a sense of community among young people.
• Explore options, including forms of civic or national service, to involve young people in resilience and defence-related roles, supported by community funding for the third sector.
• Encourage more candid political discussion of national security issues, notwithstanding the electoral risks this carries.

Building surge capacity and long-term resilience

• Establish a civil resilience reserve, providing surge capacity of experts, engineers, academics and skilled tradespeople, deployable under government oversight during crises.
• Address the long-term implications of an ageing population and associated fiscal pressures for national resilience planning.
• Recognise the media’s role in shaping public understanding during a crisis, and engage media organisations as part of the wider resilience conversation.

Conclusion

The United Kingdom faces an increasingly complex and interconnected set of security and resilience challenges, but its institutional and public preparedness has not kept pace with the scale of these risks. Allied experience shows that effective national resilience depends less on any single measure than on sustained investment, political consensus, and a deliberate strategy to build public trust and agency over time. Central recurring themes include the need for stronger and more coherent government leadership; genuine whole-of-society engagement, particularly with younger and currently disengaged groups; a more resilient and diversified critical infrastructure base; and more open, honest and consistent communication between government, business and the public about the nature of the threats faced and the shared responsibilities involved in addressing them.

Jack Pannell

Wilton Park | July 2026